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Introduction 
The thesis analyses the water supply sector in the Sub Saharan African region, focusing on 
the challenges experienced by the water utilities to fulfil their mandates, in a context of rapid 
urbanization.  
In September 2000, building upon a decade of major United Nations (UN) conferences and 
summits, world leaders came together at UN Headquarters in New York to adopt the Resolution 
A/RES/55/2, committing their nations to a new global partnership to reduce extreme poverty and 
setting out a series of time-bound targets - with a deadline in 2015 - that have become known as the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The goal number 7 was “Ensure environmental 
sustainability” and it included the Target 7.C which is to “halve, by 2015, the proportion of the 
population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation”. 
The water MDG is dramatically off track in Sub Saharan Africa, with only 64% of the 
population covered in 2012 instead of the expected 77.5% (WHO and UNICEF 2014). These poor 
performances are driven by urban areas, where the water supply coverage through household 
connections declined while the access through other improved sources, like public taps, private 
hand pumps and protected wells, hardly compensated for that. 
This calls for a reconsideration of the policies implemented in the sector following the 
prescriptions of the neoliberal agenda for the sector. In the ‘80s and ‘90s policymakers from 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and donors agencies designed a set of recipes to address 
poor performances of the urban water services in the developing world. This happened in the 
context of structural adjustment policies, such as trade liberalization, labor market reforms, 
financial deregulation and privatization of State Owned Enterprises (SOE). In the water sector, 
these orientations were translated into decentralization, private sector participation, 
commercialization and corporatization of water utilities, with the shift of governments from 
providers to regulators.  
The thesis studies some of the devices and solutions typically adopted by the reformed 
utilities and justified by the expectation of positive outcomes for the access to water by the poor 
The work shows however that some of these devices gained a certain degree of autonomy 
from access goals and became a priority as such, to be pursued by water utilities regardless their 
impacts and interaction with key social dimensions. This phenomenon was in some cases favoured 
by a biased attitude of water sector practitioners, benchmarking regulation and donors.  
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The work highlights that in some cases the reform solutions do not contribute to the 
achievement of the declared objectives, while their implementation can divert scarce resources and 
attention from key sector priorities.  
Cost recovery, Private Sector Participation and household level metering issues are 
analysed. 
The work is organized in three parts.  
The first part proposes a review of the main notions and issues addressed by water 
economics (chapter 1), with particular attention to developing countries. 
The second part is divided into three chapters, closely linked together for their arguments 
but conceived as autonomous papers and characterized by different methodological approaches: the 
first is quantitative, the second and the third are more qualitative in nature and they include original 
findings from interviews on the Lilongwe Water Board, a water utility from Malawi.  
The second chapter focuses on the problems of cost recovery and access to drinking water in 
Sub Saharan Africa. A model explaining the dynamics in water coverage which accounts for 
financial performances of utilities is proposed. The data set covers 25 countries in the Sub Saharan 
region from 1995 to 2012. The results suggest that the access to water depends upon financial 
results, but this relationship is not linear: with increasing returns for relatively low levels of cost 
recovery and decreasing returns beyond a certain threshold. The results are consistent with the 
literature about the risks associated with corporatization and neoliberal reforms in the water sector, 
and they provide some supporting quantitative evidence and recommendations for sector policies in 
the region. The study was submitted, jointly with Dr. Ivan Savin from the University of Jena, to 
“World Development” and it was accepted for publication in June 2015. An abstract was also 
accepted and presented at the International Water Association (IWA) conference WATERIDEAS, 
held in Bologna in October 2014.  
The third chapter refers to the Light Private Sector Involvement initiatives in the Sub 
Saharan Africa water supply sector, considering in particular efficiency improvements, aid 
effectiveness and related policy implications. The study analyses the determinants that can 
incentivize or discourage the partners of light forms of Private Sector Involvement (PSI) initiatives 
to achieve the expected results in the water supply sector in the Sub Saharan Africa region. This is 
done through a review of case studies involving management and service contracts, which are the 
lightest and lower risk forms of public-private partnership. While five cases are taken from the 
available literature, the sixth includes contributions from original research on Lilongwe Water 
Board (Malawi). The chapter considers the incentives to perform for both the private and the public 
partner, as determined by the contracts and by the wider context. The incentives necessary for both 
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parties to engage in the partnership are also considered, jointly with the costs of creating these 
preconditions. The study concludes that the allocation of risks and decision making power are 
among the drivers of poor performances by light PSI initiatives. Moreover, as most partnerships are 
financed by development projects, the study discusses the policy implications of promoting these 
PSI initiatives. The study was submitted, jointly with Professor Elena Maggi, to the 3rd Global 
WOPs Congress 2015, organized by GWOPA UN-HABITAT in Barcelona for September 2015.  
The fourth chapter analyses the priorities and tools for Water Demand Management in urban 
Africa, focusing on household level water metering. The study presents an analysis of the issues 
associated with water metering at household level by utilities in low income areas or informal 
settlements of Sub Saharan African cities. Metering is considered a key tool for water demand 
management and recommended as a good practice in the water supply sector but, while its benefits 
are clearly spelled out by donors and development agencies, its costs and shortcomings are seldom 
considered. The chapter analyses such challenges, based on the available literature and on an 
original case study on Lilongwe Water Board (Malawi). It is argued that the technical paradigm of 
metered household level connection can be in some cases a constraint to the connection of low 
income households, due to the high cost and complexity of the practices associated to this 
paradigm, while the benefits in terms of demand management are not straightforward. Some 
alternatives to universal household level metering are also identified.  
Finally, in the last part of the work the findings from the studies presented are summarized 
and some conclusions and recommendations are drawn about the importance of better focusing on 
the priority of water access, encompassing a wider set of operational solutions. 
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1 Water services industry: economics and regulation theory 
The chapter presents a short review of the main issues analysed by the economics theory on water 
supply and of the tools developed to address them, providing the theoretical framework at the basis 
of the next chapters.  
The first part of the chapter identifies the features which make water a public good or at 
least an imperfect private good and it introduces the main trade-offs faced when trying to allocate it 
through markets. Then the features of the demand and the supply of water services are also 
explained.  
The section on Water Supply presents the returns to scale that characterize the water supply 
industry and the possible approaches to Cost Recovery from users’ tariffs. These depend upon the 
share of costs to be charged on users, the distribution of fixed costs on unit prices and the 
consideration of positive externalities in public health and negative environmental externalities.  
The paragraph on Water Demand analyses the environmental externalities problems which 
make Demand Management necessary in water markets and it presents how contingent valuation is 
used to estimate demand functions in the absence of competitive markets.  
The first part of the chapter ends with the presentation of tariff structures and price 
discrimination in the water sector, with a focus on Increasing Blocks Tariffs as a tool for demand 
management and to achieve distributional goals. 
The second part of the chapter presents the main forms of regulation. These include 
command and control regulations and forms of regulation based on the notion of competition. The 
latters can introduce competition among private firms bidding for a market, or they can regulate 
firms by simulating competition between markets. The main challenges faced by regulators in 
developing countries and in Africa are also introduced. 
 
1.1 The public good features of water resources and water services 
The concept of water as an economic good came up during the preparatory meetings for the 
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro of 1992. It was brought forward during the Dublin conference on 
Water and the Environment (ICWE, 1992), and became the fourth Dublin Principles: “Water has an 
economic value and should be recognized as an economic good, taking into account affordability 
and equity criteria.” Moreover, economists have been working about water long before the 1992 
and they had a role in shaping the policies related to water supply. Economic goods can be broadly 
classified into four ideal categories, depending upon their excludability and rivalry, as shown in 
Table 1.1.  
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Table 1.1 Public and private goods  
 Rival Non rival 
Excludable Private goods Natural Monopolies 
Non excludable Common goods Public goods 
Source: Mankiw and Taylor 2014 
 
The classification of water under these categories is somehow critical, due to two reasons. 
The first reason lies in the fact that these categories should be intended as ideal types, with real 
world goods only approximating their features. The second reason is related to the relative emphasis 
placed on man-made systems for water supply and on water as a natural resource respectively, 
which could result in different classifications. 
The present study will focus on man-made systems for water supply, but, according to 
Integrated Water Resources Management Principles (ICWE 1992), it is important to recognize the 
close interdependence between the environmental and the technical dimensions.  
When water services are considered, some features of the natural monopoly can be 
identified. A natural monopoly is a condition of an industry whereby, due to the features of costs 
and technology, it is most efficient for production to be concentrated in a single firm. The largest, or 
first, supplier in a market is provided with an overwhelming cost advantage over actual and 
potential competitors. This is usually the case in industries where capital costs predominate, 
creating economies of scale and hence high barriers to entry, like utilities operating in the water 
supply sector. Annual per capita Operation and Maintenance Cost (O&M cost) for Africa can be 
estimated as 1.5% to 3% of per capita cost of capital (Banerjee and Morella 2011). It is therefore 
more efficient to increase the output and divide the fixed cost among large number of customers, 
since average total cost declines as output increases. This, in terms of the categories introduced in 
Table 1.1, approximates water supply to the case of “non rival consumption”.  
When water is considered as a natural resource, some features of common goods can be 
identified. In the case of common goods it is costly to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining 
benefits from their use but, unlike pure public goods, they face problems of congestion or overuse, 
because they are subtractable, leading to the so called “tragedy of the commons”. Water 
appropriation or deterioration (for example through land uses which compromise infiltration or by 
polluting water bodies) at one stage of the water cycle can prevent consumption at another stage or 
downstream. Furthermore, being water a renewable resource, when its rate of consumption exceeds 
the rate of reproduction (rainfalls, watersheds recharge,…), its total availability is compromised and 
the capacity of the ecosystem to recover original service production capacity might be affected as 
well. This is again the case for externalities, since the costs borne by the users community in the 
long run overwhelmingly exceed the price paid by the users who are over-consuming the resource.  
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Common goods, or common pool resources, can be made sustainable thanks to an 
institutional, formal or informal arrangement and there is a wide economic literature focusing on the 
role of institutions in ensuring stable common pool resource management, particularly at the local 
and community level (Ostrom, 1990). 
 
Both the consideration of water in terms of water services and of natural resource revealed 
some features which are not the ones of an ideal private good. Externalities should also be 
considered. The existence of positive externalities makes it appropriate to compare the costs of 
water supply services to the total benefits provided by water supply, which should include both the 
social and the private ones. Water provision clearly gives private benefits to the receiving 
household. However, if people are unwilling or cannot afford to purchase enough safe water to 
protect their own health, the health of others is also put at risk. Public benefits of water and 
sanitation systems are thus related to the provision of public protection from communicable 
diseases. For this reason the benefits of having an additional user include both the user’s private 
benefits and the related external (social) benefits. 
This does not necessarily have implications over the option for private or public provision, 
but is generally recognized at least as a reason for regulation (see 1.2). The need for economic 
regulation is due to the existence of significant market failures resulting from economies of scale 
and scope in production, from information imperfections in market transactions, from the existence 
of incomplete markets and externalities, and from income and wealth distribution (Amann, 2006).  
  
Market allocation is based on prices. In microeconomics, the price will be optimum where 
the marginal willingness to pay (see 1.5) and the marginal cost curves cut each other, respectively 
approximating demand and supply. This point should correspond to an efficient allocation of water 
services, from an economic standpoint. However, as competitive markets for water services do not 
exist in real world settings, the equilibrium point cannot be automatically reached and specific 
methodologies are used to estimate both the willingness to pay and the marginal cost functions (see 
1.1). Moreover, it is widely recognized that the economic perspective is not the only relevant to 
water pricing. For example, water pricing is both an allocation mechanism and a revenue raising 
instrument. 
A number of trade-offs can be identified if water policies, and more particularly pricing 
policies are considered in the view of the multiple objectives they pursue. These objectives include 
financial, economic, environmental and social sustainability.  
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Environmental sustainability is about guaranteeing the preservation of water ecosystem 
services and natural capital, encouraging water saving technologies and discouraging wasteful 
behaviours. Financial sustainability is about guaranteeing the long term reproduction of physical 
assets, through cost recovery. Economic efficiency includes the allocation of water to the most 
beneficial uses and usually associated to marginal cost pricing. Social concerns are related with 
affordability and equity for lower income consumers. 
Figure 1.1 Trade - offs among pricing objectives  
 
 Source: based on Massarutto A. 2007 and OECD 2010 
 
The trade-offs between these objectives are represented in Figure 1.1, while some of them 
are briefly discussed below: 
? Financial sustainability and affordability: full cost recovery through tariff is often envisaged 
to ensure financial sustainability buy it can negatively affect affordability by lower income 
users.  
? Environmental and financial sustainability: environmental requirements increase the cost of 
water (through compensation mechanism or through the adoption of environmental friendly 
technologies). This increases the burden over any source of finance which can sustain water 
supply creating potential tension between the environmental concerns and financial cost 
recovery. 
? Economic sustainability and social concerns can conflict because merit uses are not 
necessarily uses associated with the highest economic values. 
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? Environmental and social concerns might conflict: being water an increasingly scarce 
resource, price is an instrument to provide incentives toward water saving and water tariffs 
are a tool of demand management approaches, since they inform users, including polluters, 
about the value of the resource. However, access to sustainable affordable water services 
has to be ensured to the largest possible number of people, increasing the production and 
supply of drinking water.  
? Economic and financial sustainability: pricing water to achieve full cost recovery might also 
conflict with economic efficiency which calls for marginal cost pricing, as it will be 
discussed in the next paragraph. 
 
1.2 Water Supply 
In the estimation of production and cost functions of the water industry and particularly of the 
provision of utility services, the major areas of interest are model specification, returns to scale and 
cost recovery.  
An often adopted model for the specification of the water production function is the Cobb-
Douglas production form or its generalization, the translog (transcendental logarithmic) production 
function (Altmann 2007). 
Concerning returns to scale, water supply businesses are characterized by substantial fixed 
costs and economies of scale. Furthermore utilities are often required to retain substantial spare 
capacity to cope with peak demand and shortages, so that marginal cost is usually lower than 
average costs in the relevant demand range. Yet, marginal costs are not stable in the short run, since 
short run marginal costs fall to zero following each extension of capacity and then rise to full cost as 
capacity becomes exhausted, and so on. Furthermore marginal cost can be increasing, as a result of 
water scarcity which makes the development of new sources increasingly costly.  
The issue of cost recovery is related to the financial sustainability of water utilities and it 
refers to the political will and practical feasibility of recovering the costs of water supply from 
tariffs charged on water users. Cost recovery implies the understanding of how costs are composed 
and the identification of the share of costs to be recovered. Costs include construction, operation 
and maintenance, and replacement of parts when needed throughout the life cycle of the water 
systems. The full financial cost can be decomposed as follows:  
? Operation and maintenance costs (O&M) related with daily running of the water supply 
system, such as costs of electricity for pumping, chemical inputs for water treatment, labor 
and repair; 
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? Capital cost, covering the investment both for the renewal of existing infrastructure and for 
new infrastructure. Depreciation costs are sometimes considered as well (Majumdar 1991); 
? Interest on capital: costs of servicing debt or, in case of equity, return on capital invested are 
sometimes considered as well (Majumdar 1991).  
A full economic cost, according to OECD (2010), is a broader concept than full financial 
costs and should include, jointly with the costs above: 
? Opportunity costs, or resource costs: reflecting the scarcity of the resource and 
corresponding to the cost of depriving the next possible user; 
? Economic externalities: including negative externalities like upstream diversion of water, 
release of pollutant downstream, but also positive ones. 
In the 2000s, the policy debate has moved the attention from a call for full costs recovery through 
tariffs (usually referring to financial costs alone) toward the concept of sustainable cost recovery, 
first introduced by the Camdessus report (Winpenny 2003) and particularly important for 
developing countries. Sustainable cost recovery allows for a mix of Tariff, Taxes and Transfers 
(TTT), recognizing the importance of affordability.  
Urban water supply in Africa was sometimes separated from unprofitable elements like sanitation 
and rural water supply to make it more commercially viable. Separation from sanitation however is 
not in line with Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) principles. The need to rely only 
on tariffs can provide adverse incentives to the extension of networks to poorer areas, as the poor 
can be perceived by operators as an unprofitable market. This issue will also be addressed in the 3rd 
chapter. The possible criteria for spreading the cost of water services can thus be viewed along a 
continuum between endogenous and exogenous solutions, with purely endogenous solutions mainly 
relying on users for cost recovery and purely exogenous solutions transferring all the costs to 
external actors (people located elsewhere, future generations). A variety or intermediate solutions 
are available, like cross subsidies among users, territorial cross subsidies, cross subsidy between 
different services, general taxation and direct/indirect subsidies.  
According to the economic theory, prices should be set at marginal cost since, in the absence 
of externalities, this approach maximizes economic welfare and sends to consumers and producers 
the right signals about the relative scarcity of the goods and services. Yet, as already noticed, 
marginal cost in the water industry is usually lower than average costs (AC) and pricing at marginal 
cost (MC) alone can result in the under recovery of costs. To set the price equal to MC is the first-
best solution in terms of economic efficiency, but it does not ensure the recovery of fixed costs 
when MC is lower than AC. Furthermore, as the marginal cost depends upon the availability of 
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spare production capacity at any given time, it is not stable, and does not offer a reliable base for 
pricing.  
One solution is based on the idea of R. H. Coase (1946) of a two-part tariff. Incremental 
consumption per cubic meter of water is priced at marginal cost but a fixed charge (connection or 
access charge) is also set to ensure that total revenue covers total costs, as shown below: ??????????????????????????? ? ? ??? ???? ?? ????????              (1.1) 
Where i represent each of the N water users, A is the connection/ access charge, C is the 
volumetric charge which reflects the marginal cost of production and is multiplied by Q, the 
quantity of water consumed.  
This two part tariff assumes that average costs are not rising in the relevant output range 
(MC is below AC), which means that the system is not close to the limits of its capacity. Otherwise, 
when the system is at the limits of its operating capacity, the excess of marginal cost over average 
cost should be counterbalanced through a negative fixed charge (transfer-subsidy) to avoid over-
recovery. This is not practically feasible, so that the level of tariffs for water and wastewater is often 
based on average costs. A recommended, solution, also adopted by the UK regulator (OFWAT 
2001), lies the use of long run marginal cost (LRMC), which should ensure both cost recovery 
(financial sustainability) and efficient allocation (economic sustainability). The basic difference 
between short run marginal cost (SRMC) and LRMC is the time frame under consideration and its 
implications for a firm’s ability to adjust its production process, being the long run the time horizon 
where all costs are variable. In practice, the long run term depending on the specific cases, can be 
interpreted as the planning horizon, the average life of assets or the time period until the next 
expansion to meet the projections of demand growth (Marsen Jacob Associates 2004). 
 While short run marginal costs rise steeply as a result of capacity constraints and then fall down as 
a result of significant excess capacity which follows the expansion, long run marginal costs are 
much more stable and reduce the instability of tariffs charges over time (Mann et al. 1980). 
Moreover LRMC can account for both capital expenditure for the expansion of water supply 
systems and for operating costs for their functioning.  
Generally, since in the water sector investments tend to create substantial spare capacity and 
have typically a very long life (up to 100 years), it is usually recommended to set prices adopting 
investment planning periods of at least 20 years and accounting for the residual value of assets 
beyond that date. 
According to Marsen Jacob Associates (2004), LRMC can be calculated from Marginal 
Operating Costs (MOC) and Marginal Capacity Costs (MCC), associated with the investments that 
are necessary to respond to the expected increase in water demand. It should be noticed that LRMC 
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is a forward looking concept, because historical costs are considered as “sunk costs” or costs which 
cannot be altered by decisions taken in the present. On the contrary, future capital costs related to 
system expansion are affected by bringing forward or delaying capacity expansion. One of the most 
common way of calculating LRMC is through Average Incremental Costs (AIC), with Marginal 
Incremental Cost (MIC) proposed by Turvey (1969) being the main alternative. According to 
Saunders and Warford (1976) definition, AIC is obtained by “discounting all incremental costs 
which will be incurred in the future to provide for estimated additional demand over a specified 
period, and dividing that by the discounted value of the incremental output over the period”. This 
means that AIC for the marginal capacity cost (MCC) is the present value of the stream of capital 
expenditure needed to satisfy the projected demand divided by the present value of the stream of 
demand itself.  
Similarly, the MOCs, in the AIC approach, are given by the Net Present Value (NPV) of the 
stream of incremental operating expenditure needed to satisfy the projected demand divided by the 
present value of the stream of demand itself.  
 ???? ? ??????? ????????? ? ??? ??????????? ????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????(1.2) 
 
 
The AIC estimates of the marginal cost smooth down the lumps in expenditure 
corresponding to the discrete timing of investments. The recovery of these costs is instead 
distributed over time, according to the trend of the actual increase in water demand.  
It should be noticed that the inclusion of capital costs in the calculation of the level of unit 
prices should not be given for granted, both in developed and in developing country, in 
consideration of the cost recovery debate. 
 
1.3 Water Demand  
The consideration of the features of water demand can provide some important insights to 
understand the determinants of the consumption patterns that can be observed and the implications 
of different pricing solutions. 
It is first important to notice that, while an increase in the demanded volumes is welcome by 
producers in most sectors, in the case of water it is recognized that demand growth should be 
controlled.  
‘‘Water demand management’’ is a key concept in Integrated Water Resources 
Management. Once water scarcity is assumed and the possibility of water shortages is considered, it 
is clear that the so called supply side solutions are not the only or the best possible answer to 
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increasing water demand. In the previous paragraph, great attention was paid to the infrastructural 
investments which are necessary to face increasing water demand. Nonetheless, according to 
demand management proponents, infrastructural investments can sometimes be substituted, or at 
least coupled by demand side interventions. These are, for example, the minimization of water 
losses and the attempt to influence and condition the demand toward more desirable levels. Gumbo 
and Van der Zaag (2002) classify water demand management measures to increase the efficiency of 
water use into structural and non-structural measures. Structural measures include for example 
retrofitting of water appliances, recycling and reuse. Non structural measures are instead related 
with behaviours and include awareness campaigns, restrictions on use and, notably, water tariffs. 
In some cases demand side and supply side solutions are consistent. For example in many 
areas of Sub Saharan Africa water use is unacceptably low, so that influencing demand toward more 
desirable levels will imply the increase of water availability through the development of new 
sources of water.  
In other cases, not necessarily restricted to developed world and including even some urban 
settings of Africa, water use is too high and water shortages may be addressed also by reducing 
water use and increasing efficiency (Macy 1999). Water Demand Management will also be 
addressed in Chapter 4 by studying water metering, a common device to reduce the waste of water 
and control the level of consumption. 
Nevertheless, in the face of a rapid urbanization which characterizes Africa, developing new 
sources of water usually receives great attention, while the concept of water demand management is 
less implemented in practice (Mulwafu et al. 2003, Arlosoroff 1998, Stiles 1996). As noticed again 
by Gumbo and Van der Zaag (2002), the preference for expensive supply side solutions can also be 
due to political reasons and to powerful coalitions between engineers, financiers and politicians.  
In the absence of competitive markets for water, economists try to estimate demand by 
measuring the benefit provided to users by water in terms of willingness to pay (WTP), through 
contingent evaluation, so that the demand curve, corresponding to the marginal benefit curve, also 
corresponds to the marginal willingness to pay curve. WTP is simply defined as the maximum 
amount that an individual is willing to pay for a good or service. WTP is very high for basic 
minimum water requirements which are necessary for the household to survive, while it diminishes 
rapidly when quantities increase, moving towards less essential water uses. These considerations 
explain the downward slope of the water demand curve. 
According to the literature review proposed by Nauges and Whittington (2009), the first 
analysis of household water demand in developing countries appeared in the 1970s (White et al. 
1972, Katzman 1977, Hubbell 1977). However, these studies remain limited even today, also due to 
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specific challenges encountered in measuring WTP in developing countries. Both in rural and urban 
contexts of developing countries, households usually can access and use various types of water 
sources at the same time or in different periods. This makes the variability in the conditions of water 
access across households much greater than in developed country and prevents researchers to base 
analysis on secondary data from the water utilities only.  
More particularly the following challenges about data quality and availability in developing 
countries can be identified (Nauges and Whittington 2009): 
? Given that the households that are connected to the network often have unmetered 
connections, the quantity of water used at household level cannot be retrieved from water 
utility data and households themselves might ignore how much water they use. 
? Since households have multiple potential sources of water, the models developed by 
researchers usually require data on all these sources, even the ones which are not chosen. 
For example, the option for a vendor will depend not only on the price he charges, but also 
on the walking distance to the well. This kind of data is often not available from standard 
household surveys and is to be collected on the field. The most widely used approaches to 
model water demand are single demand equation for particular sources or separate demand 
equations for households relying on different sources (with Ordinary Least Squares and Two 
Stages Least Squares). To identify the selected water source discrete–continuous choice 
approach, Tobit model and maximum likelihood method are used. 
? Getting water from non-tap sources outside the house always involves collection costs that 
need to be taken into account to assess household behaviour properly. Furthermore also the 
access to piped water can be associated with some coping costs faced by households like, for 
example, the cost of storage tanks to cope with rationed provision (less than 24 hours supply 
by water utilities). As these costs are not reflected in the bill paid to the water utility, the 
corresponding data have to be collected elsewhere.  
According to Wedgwood and Sansom (2003) there are three ways to estimate WTP: 
? observing the prices that people actually pay for goods in various existing markets (in the 
case of water, water vendors, buying from neighbours); 
? observing individual expenditure of money, time, labor etc. to obtain the goods or to avoid 
their loss; 
? Ask people directly how much they are willing to pay for goods and services.  
 The first two methods are called revealed preference techniques, since they are based on 
observations of actual behaviours, while the third technique is based upon the so called stated 
preferences. The contingent valuation methodology belongs to the third group and it is probably the 
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most widely used methodology in this field. During a WTP survey, a market for a non marketed 
good is described and a value contingent to this hypothetical market is obtained. The most critical 
part of the contingent valuation household surveys is thus the design of a realistic contingent 
valuation scenario in terms of level, quantity and quality of the service. Furthermore, it is not 
correct to rely entirely upon the "willingness to pay" of users as the only criterion for supplying 
them with water, because of two main limitations:  
? the existence of external benefits of water use which might be not fully understood by the 
consumer and the relationship between improved water and improved health; 
? the actual "ability to pay". Affordability is difficult to quantify and there are no official 
statements about its level by international organizations, but the threshold of 3-5% of 
disposable income/household expenditure is often quoted by donors, international financial 
institutions and international organization, as a thumb rule (OECD 2010).  
According to Nauges and Whittington (2009), the main determinants of water demand 
functions in developing countries are: 
? Water price: authors generally agree on the inelasticity of water demand by private 
connections in developing countries and estimate the value of the elasticity of between - 0.3 
and - 0.6, which is similar to the one of developed countries. Unfortunately, none of the 
studies reviewed by Nauges and Wittington (2009) and providing estimations of price 
elasticity was based on researches carried out in Sub Saharan Africa. Some studies also 
confirm that piped water and water from other sources are substitutes, and that, as expected, 
households relying on piped water only have a lower price elasticity than the households 
which also rely on a private well (Nauges and Whittington 2009). Based on a study in urban 
South Africa, instead, Jansen and Schulz (2006), after splitting the data into different income 
groups, found a price elasticity for water demand of only –0.23 for the lowest-income group, 
whereas the high-income group has a price elasticity of -0.99. 
? Cost of collection: Collection time/distance to water sources are significant drivers of 
household choice of water sources and have significant negative effect on the quantity of 
water collected from non-tap sources.  
? Quality of water: water taste is among variables influencing water demand by households. 
Water quality and its safety, instead, are not significant determinants of household water-
demand functions in general. This confirms the above considerations about external benefits 
related with public health, because people can often chose unsafe sources. 
? Reliability of supply: consumption of piped water slightly increases if water is available for 
longer hours. 
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? Household socioeconomic characteristics: income (or expenditure) and education level (or 
literacy of the head of household) have been found to be positively associated with 
household option for improved water source. Income elasticity is found to be between 0.1 
and 0.3. Household size is significant: larger households have a greater total water use and a 
lower per capita consumption, due to scale effects. A study from Kenya (Mu et al. 1990) 
finds that households with more women were more likely to rely on water from wells and 
kiosks then on vendors, probably due to their availability to carry water.  
It can be noticed that given low price and income elasticity for water and the typical income 
distributions, raising prices is regressive and therefore reduces equity. 
Many WTP and demand studies about water in developing countries found that even 
low-income residents are willing to pay a high price for adequate water provision. A review of 
the literature based on data from 47 countries and 93 utilities by the World Bank (Kariuki and 
Schwartz 2005) provides information about the ranges of prices charged by private alternative 
providers, confirming that prices of alternative sources of drinking water tend to be higher than 
the price of water provided by utilities. The price of water provided by carters and tanker trucks 
are generally found to be the highest. Nonetheless, these results should be taken with some 
cautions because many studies were funded by the World Bank, which used the findings to 
justify price increases under a pro-poor approach, or to promote private participation. The 
justification of price increase is based on the consideration that higher tariffs could provide 
finance for coverage extension to reach the poor, who were currently paying even more than the 
increased tariff. The private participation arguments instead, use high prices charged by 
informal providers to demonstrate the potential profitability of the water business and attract 
private operators (Budds and McGranahan 2003).  
Information about alternative markets has only recently been used to analyse the actual 
possibilities to improve regulation coverage over these activities (see 1.6.2). 
 
1.4 Tariffs Structures and price discrimination 
Once the level of price is defined based on the cost recovery targets adopted, it is possible to 
identify the actual tariffs to be charged to users, also considering the features of demand and 
affordability problems of different categories of users.  
While the discussion of the previous section (see 1.1) has considered different options for 
the definition of the most appropriate average tariff level, the present paragraph introduces the issue 
of water tariff structures. “A tariff structure is a set of procedural rules used to determine the 
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conditions of service and the monthly bills for water users in various categories or classes (Boland 
and Whittington 1998 p.  2).” 
According to OECD (2010), revenues from water users derive from the following 
components: 
?  a “one time” connection fee, to get the first access to the service; 
? a recurrent fixed charge, which can be uniform across users or linked to some features of 
the user (e.g. size of supply pipe, property value); 
? a volumetric rate (in a metered environment), which is applied to the volume of water 
consumed in the charging period and results in the volumetric charge for that period. This 
implies the application of a second degree price discrimination: charging a different price 
for different quantities, such as quantity discounts for bulk purchases; 
? a minimum charge which is charged for each period, regardless the actual consumption. 
The above listed elements can be combined in various ways, giving rise to the following 
tariffs structures: 
? flat rates (in a non-metered environment), which can be uniform or differentiated based on 
customer characteristics, or based on the season; 
? single volumetric charges (in a metered environment), computed applying one single rate to 
each cubic meter of water consumed. This can be associated to a fixed charge, which can be 
uniform across users or vary according to users characteristic and might even be negative (a 
coupon); 
? increasing block tariffs (IBTs): it is similar to the previous one, but the volumetric rates 
increase with the volume of water consumed. Increasing block tariffs imply three kinds of 
decisions, namely the number of blocks, the volume of water associated with each block and 
the rate to be charged to each block; 
? decreasing block tariffs: the volumetric rates decline with successive block consumption. 
This system is sometimes adopted for industrial users but it is not in line with the principles 
of environmental sustainability and it should be discouraged (OECD 2010). 
Moreover, in the water supply sector third degree price discrimination is often applied. This 
means that a different price is charged to different consumer groups, for example industrial and 
domestic customers. However Ramsey pricing, which provides for mark-up on marginal cost for 
classes of users characterized by lower demand elasticity, poses problems of equity in the water 
sector, as the price elasticity of low income users is lower than the one of higher income residential 
(Jansen and Schulz 2006) or industrial users. 
27 
 
The options for the design of tariff structures and of subsidy mechanisms have been 
considered in different studies on developing countries, particularly focusing on their distributional 
impact (Boland and Whittington 2000, Chisari et al. 2003, McIntosh 2003).  
IBT structures were first designed in industrialized countries to assist poor households and 
they have later gained popularity also in developing countries. According to Boland and 
Whittington (1998), the most common arguments in support of IBT structures are: 
? Social Concerns, affordability: it is claimed that IBTs promote equity because they force 
rich households to cross-subsidize poor households. In fact, wealthy households will use 
more water than poor households, as water is a normal good (as opposed to inferior goods) 
and its use is expected to increase with income (watering gardens, water-using appliances, 
washing cars). The low price of the first block allows poor households to obtain a sufficient 
quantity of water for their basic needs at a low monthly cost, while rich households pay a 
higher average price for water because a greater percentage of their water use falls into 
blocks associated with higher rates.  
? Environmental sustainability: IBTs are good because the price associated with the highest 
block can be made punishingly high and thus discourage or stop wasteful water uses. It is 
thus felt that IBTs promote water conservation and sustainable water use. 
? Economic sustainability: IBTs are needed to implement marginal cost pricing principles, 
with the growing rates associated to each block reflecting rising marginal costs of municipal 
water supply. 
Reviewing these arguments with reference to cities in developing countries the same authors 
(Boland and Whittington 1998) identify some problems and limitations.  
? In many cities in developing countries many poor households do not have private metered 
connections to the water distribution system, and thus are not in a position to be helped by 
IBTs. Furthermore the poor often get water through shared connections, neighbours who 
have a private connection, or resellers. With more households sharing the same connection, 
under an IBT regime, water use by the group quickly exceeds the volume of the first block, 
so that the poor pay higher average prices than the rich. 
? The idea that IBT can discourage waste of water relies on the assumption that large users of 
water are the most likely to engage in "wasteful" use, which is not always true.  
? Under IBTs different users simultaneously pay different prices for the delivery of water, out 
of which at most one price can be equal to the marginal cost. Moreover the idea that 
increasing block rates reflect the trend of marginal costs is questionable. As discussed above 
marginal costs can rise with increased aggregate use or can remain constant or decline, as 
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well, depending upon the spare capacity of the system and on the existence of diseconomies 
of scale associated with the development of new sources.  
 
1.5 Forms of regulation 
The need for economic regulation is due to the existence of significant market failures 
resulting from economies of scale and scope in production, from information imperfections in 
market transactions, from the existence of incomplete markets and externalities, and from income 
and wealth distribution (Amann, 2006).  
Regulation should be an independent activity but it does not always imply the existence of a 
dedicated regulatory body. In the French water industry and in former French colonies, Regulation 
by Contract is common. This means that long-term contracts between the service provider and a 
state owned entity regulate water services.  
Regulation gained momentum with the privatization wave of the end of the twentieth 
century but it is not limited to the regulation of private sector operators, as it is considered necessary 
even in settings where water supply is public, particularly when utilities are corporatized and 
managed according to commercial principles. Regulation is also consistent with a notion of 
governance, intended as a technique of “government beyond the state” (Swyngedouw 2005), 
involving market actors and civil society (Lobina 2012).  
Water pricing is among the key issues for water supply regulation, as the pricing variable is 
crosscutting to most of the priorities addressed by regulation and critical to the access by poor 
consumers in developing countries.  
Regulation can also address issues related with service quality, environmental protection, 
infrastructure development, and access to water services by the poor. This is usually done through 
Command and Control regulation. As monopoly operator has incentives to increase profits against 
service quality, regulators can introduce quality standards, quality monitoring procedures and the 
related penalties. Environmental regulation also includes environmental and safety standards, 
compliance monitoring, and penalties or rewards. This happens for example with the control over 
wastewater pollution and network leakages, even if, often, the utility regulator does not have direct 
responsibility for environmental regulation which is covered by different institutions. This makes 
coordination critical to the achievement of environmental goals and for Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM). Infrastructure development is also a key area for regulators, particularly 
when it is intended to reach the unserved population and the poor. In some cases to reach these 
targets, the regulator may want the operator to provide services that are not commercially viable, 
through subsidies designed to assist the poor. 
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The broad coverage of fields which can be regulated reflects the aim of achieving the social 
welfare goals set down by the governments for the regulatory authority. Welfare is to be intended as 
the aggregate benefit that infrastructure services provide, including benefits to consumers 
(measured as net consumer surplus), benefits to operators, and externalities. Furthermore 
distributional issues in regulation are important and address how different stakeholder groups are 
affected differently by the solutions adopted for the provision of infrastructure services. Regulation 
explicitly targeting poor people and aiming at poverty reduction and redistribution is referred to as 
pro-poor regulation. Pro-poor objectives, quality and environmental standards are often covered by 
Command and Control Regulation which defines what is illegal and provides the quality standards 
and targets that operators must comply with, jointly with the sanctions that may result from non-
compliance. 
Other forms of regulation instead try to simulate some competitive pressure to provide 
incentives to the operators. According to Jamison and Berg (2008), policy makers or regulators can 
try to expose operators to competitive pressures, in three different ways: 
1. competition in the market: multiple operators compete in the market for customers; 
2. competition for the market: operators compete for the market by bidding for the right to be a 
service provider; 
3. competition between markets: operators in different markets compete by comparing their 
efficiency and effectiveness and the best performers are rewarded. 
Competition in the market is difficult to introduce in the water supply sector, due to 
problems related to water quality and vertical integration/separation.  
Quality problems arise as the cost of piped networks makes duplication inefficient, while the 
possibility that different competitors sharing the same infrastructure, as it is sometimes the case for 
telecommunication infrastructures is not easily feasible. As a matter of fact, introducing multiple 
water suppliers in the same distribution network would create uncertainty about the origin of water 
in the network and the related liability in case of health problems (Bisshop 2001). This would in 
turn provide powerful incentive to free-riding by operators. Moreover, there are possible losses of 
economies of scope and transactional economies (coordination costs, i.e., to cost reflecting the 
design, the negotiation and the enforcement of contracts between buyers and sellers) associated with 
the use of intermediate product markets (Garcia et al. 2007). Furthermore it was observed that 
separation might reduce the institutional control over water abstraction and jeopardize the 
application of the Integrated Water Resource Management principles developed by the Dublin 
conference in 1992 (Lobina and Hall 2008). The feasibility of vertical separation, sometimes called 
unbundling, of different stages of the water supply industry is instead more common, provided that 
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one operator only is present at each stage. It is obtained by separating water production (catchment, 
pumping, storage,…) from water distribution. 
 
1.5.1 Competition for the market and the Private Public Partnership options 
Competition for the market is usually achieved through the launch of a competitive bidding 
process, which is typically a consequence of the decision to privatize some water supply services. 
These competitive processes can result in different types of contract, which are briefly introduced 
below, jointly with the discussion of the respective responsibilities of public and private sector. 
? Service contracts: short-term agreements whereby a private contractor takes responsibility 
for a specific task, such as installing meters, repairing pipes or collecting bills. Payment 
usually consists in a fixed or per-unit fee agreed in advance, but it can also include 
performance incentives. This type of contract with respect to the other ones allocates the 
least responsibility to the private sector, as it is only responsible for specific tasks. However, 
sometimes service contracts have a wider scope (see Chapter 3). 
? Management contracts: the contractor has the responsibility for the operation and 
maintenance of the water system. The public sector retains responsibility for investment and 
expansion and, sometimes, for some management aspects (e.g. billing, revenue collection). 
Payment from the contracting authority to the contractor can be fixed or performance-
related.  
? Lease/Affermage contracts: in these contracts the contractor has the responsibility for 
operation and maintenance but also some responsibilities for commercial functions and 
revenue collection. In the case of lease, the operator pays to the contracting authority a fee, 
which tends to be fixed, bearing the risks that operating costs plus the fee might not be 
proportioned to the actual collection. In the case of affermage the contracting authority pays 
a fee to the operator and bears the risk that the revenues collected and transferred by the 
operator might not be proportioned to the fee.  
? Concession contract: in this case, the private contractor manages the whole utility at its own 
commercial risk and it is also in charge of maintenance and expansion of the system. The 
assets are transferred back to the state at the end of the contract if it is not renewed. The role 
of the public sector in concession contracts is predominantly regulatory.  
? BOT (Build, Operate, Transfer) contracts: the difference between these contracts and 
concession contracts is that they are usually used for “greenfield” projects (water and 
sewage treatment plants, rather than water supply systems which are rarely built from 
scratch). The contractor then manages the infrastructure and the government purchases the 
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supply or the service produced. At the end of the contract, the assets are usually transferred 
back to the government, sometimes at a pre-determined fee.  
? Divestiture: under this contract, the government transfers the water business to the private 
company, including the assets (infrastructure), on a permanent basis and it only maintains a 
regulatory role. It should be noticed that, once a divestiture initiative is finalized, there is no 
longer any competition and it is even difficult to revive it. 
The table below summarizes the main features of these types of contracts, focusing on the 
allocation of the different responsibilities among public and private actors. 
Table 1.2: Allocation of key responsibilities for private participation options.  
 Service 
Contract 
Management 
contract Affermage Lease Concession BOT Divestiture 
Asset ownership  Public  Public  Public  Public  Public  Private/ public  Private 
Capital investment  Public  Public  Public  Public  Private  Private  Private 
Commercial risk  Public  Public  Shared  Shared  Private  Private  Private 
Operations/ 
maintenance  
Private/ 
public  Private Private  Private  Private  Private  Private 
Contract duration 
(years) 1–3 3–5 8–15  8–15  25–30  20–30  Indefinite 
Source: Budds and McGranahan 2003 from Stottman 2000 
 
While Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) result from the recognition of some degree of 
public governance failure, it is important to notice that their regulation poses high level demands of 
skills to the public sector and potential problems of integrity. This will be further discussed in 1.6.3. 
Moreover, Private Sector Involvement in developing countries and in Sub Saharan Africa has 
proved to be more challenging than expected, because few private actors were willing to participate 
and invest and many contracts were subject to disputes (Marin 2009). More than 70% of the 
management and lease contracts implemented in SSA water sector in the last few decades were 
cancelled or not renewed (Dagdeviren and Robertson 2013). 
The third chapter will focus on PPPs and particularly on management contracts and service 
contracts which do not transfer investment and commercial risk to the private partners. 
 
1.5.2 Competition between markets: incentive regulation 
Incentive regulation is generally implemented by controlling the overall price level of the 
operator, or through benchmarking regulation. Once the desired base level of price has been 
identified, by calculating operational costs or including capital costs in the form of average cost or 
in the form of Long Run Average Incremental Cost, there are four basic schemes to adjust and 
regulate the price that the operator can charge in the regulatory period, namely: 
? rate of return regulation; 
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? price cap regulation; 
? revenue cap regulation; 
? yardstick regulation.  
According to Rate-of-return regulation, monopoly firms are required to charge the price that 
would prevail in a competitive market, calculated on the basis of the efficient production costs and a 
pre-determined rate of return on capital. The resulting formula for total revenues is: 
Total revenues= Total Costs + r * invested capital        (1.3) 
where r is a convenient rate of return, whose value is based on competitive market rates. The notion 
of competition between markets is based on the idea of taking a rate from other markets. Averch 
and Johnson (1962) however demonstrated how regulation of a firm’s rate of return could lead to 
incentives to over-invest, while later studies highlighted other potential inefficiencies that could be 
introduced by rate-of-return regulation, like higher operating costs (e.g. Bailey, 1973), as the system 
does not provide incentives to control them. 
Price-cap regulation adjusts the operator’s prices according to a price cap index that reflects 
the overall rate of inflation in the economy and the ability of the operator to gain efficiencies 
relative to the average firm in the economy. The rate of inflation is usually measured by a Retail 
Price Index (RPI), or in some cases by an index reflecting the operator’s inputs prices. The Price 
Cap is the rate to be applied to the price of the previous regulatory period and, in the water industry, 
its formula is:  
Price Cap =  RPI - X                                          (1.4) 
where X represents the expected efficiency savings. The Price Cap system is intended to provide 
incentives for efficiency savings, as any savings above the predicted rate X can be passed on to 
shareholders, at least until the price caps are next reviewed (usually every five years). A key part of 
the system is that the rate X is based not only on the firm's past performance, but on the 
performance of other firms in the industry: X is intended to introduce pressure to achieve efficiency 
gains, as it is the difference between the operator and the average firm in the economy, after 
accounting for inflation in input prices.  
A value K, based on capital investment requirements can be added, taking it from other 
methodologies (like benchmarking regulation), this resulting in a mixed regulatory form. In this 
case the formula will be: 
Price Cap =  RPI - X + K                                        (1.5) 
 In practice, the distinction between price-cap and rate-of-return regulation may be lost, as 
regulators can implicitly base their price limit determinations on the acceptable real rates of return 
on capital employed.  
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Revenue Cap regulation is a system for setting the prices charged by regulated monopolies 
limiting the variation of total revenue in a given period. As for price-cap regulation, the Revenue 
Cap system uses a rate: 
                   Revenue Cap = RPI – X                                               (1.6) 
 
The option to apply the rate to revenues, rather than to prices, means that the regulated enterprise 
does not face any quantity risk. This may be appropriate in cases where the quantity demanded is 
largely outside the control of the regulated firm, and where costs may be insensitive to short-term 
variations in quantity demanded. 
Competition between markets is also created through yardstick, or benchmarking, which 
compares operators working in separate markets, through general performance measures, like the 
cost per cubic meter of water. Benchmarking can be used to regulate overall price levels, but also to 
regulate items like service quality and network expansion. Jamison and Berg (2008) note that 
benchmarking can also be an input into rate of return, price cap, or revenue cap regulation rather 
than as method of incentive regulation that could be used by itself or it can be an element of hybrid, 
or mixed, regulation schemes.  
Benchmarking regulation is often be used to create a climate of competition among different 
utilities under the same regulatory body. This is made possible by the publication of annual reports 
with the ranking of utilities according to the benchmarking indicators of performance, or by linking 
such performances to awards and bonuses for the staff and the executive management of the 
utilities. 
 
1.6 Challenges for water supply regulation  
Before entering in the specific challenges faced by regulators and sometimes limiting the 
social benefits from the regulatory activity, it is worth to notice that regulation has its own costs. 
They can be classified as follows: 
? costs of directly administering the regulatory system by the government;  
? compliance costs of regulation, which are borne by consumers and producers to conform 
with the regulations or to evade them (Guasch and Hahn 1999); 
? transaction costs, related with the existence of a public regulatory body which is separated 
from the service provider, regardless the public or private ownership of the regulated service 
provider. 
Moreover, regulation arises to correct market imperfections but regulation itself is prone to a 
number of imperfections. The next paragraphs will focus on some relevant issues addressed by 
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economic literature about water supply regulation, particularly referring to developing countries: 
incomplete information, alternative providers, institutional capacity and balances of power.  
 
1.6.1 Incomplete information 
Information asymmetries, often analyzed in the terms of the principal-agent theory 
(Meckling 1976), may contribute to imperfect regulation. The regulator and the regulated can be 
expected to have different levels of information about costs, revenues and demand.  
Since it is unlikely that the regulator will receive all the information required to regulate 
optimally, the results of regulation, in terms of outputs and prices, are usually considered by 
economists to be a second best when compared to those of a perfectly competitive market.  
Information asymmetries have implications on the option for private or public water services 
provision (Sappington and Stiglitz 1987). On the one hand, according to Shapiro and Willig (1990) 
public ownership provides more information to regulators than private ownership, thus reducing the 
information asymmetries and the transaction costs of regulation. On the other hand, public 
ownership might provide inadequate incentives to maximize economic efficiency (Hayek 1945), for 
example due to hold up (Dagdeviren and Robertson 2013) or to moral hazard by managers.  
The emphasis on welfare improving regulation for developing countries, makes important to 
consider the problem of incomplete information of regulators, not only, as it was done above, in 
terms of information asymmetries in relation to the regulated entity, but also in terms of absolute 
lack of information.  
Often regulators do not have sufficient information about the location, the dimension and the 
actual access to water services by the poorest users. Reliable information is critical to economic 
regulation (Armstrong 1994) and pro-poor regulation should be based on a deep understanding of 
the potential customers of each utility, of the existing service providers (including alternative 
provides whose role will be discussed in 1.6.2), and of the features of the demand expressed by 
different users groups, discussed in 1.3.  
Statistical information on water services is usually collected by the governments and 
development agencies to monitor the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), 
so that there is a focus on coverage1 and access, without qualifying the type and level of the service 
provided to the population. Census and poverty data are rarely linked to these monitoring exercises 
and are prone to significant biases, often excluding informal settlements and peri-urban areas 
(Gerlach and Franceys, 2010).  
                                                 
1Coverage refers to the number of users reached by water utilities or to their proportion over the total users basin 
supposed to be served. 
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Furthermore information about the full cost of water services to the various user groups can 
fail to account for additional expenditures faced by household which affect the price that can be 
charged. These were already introduced in 1.3 and are, for example, the costs for household level 
storage of water resulting from intermittent service, the costs of other coping mechanisms or the 
costs and opportunity costs of reaching water sources.  
Finally, shared connections and above-average household sizes are very common among 
poor users and can jeopardize the functioning of “lifeline” tariffs (Gerlach and Franceys, 2009) if 
proper information about these arrangements is not available to regulators. There is also a lack of 
data on prices charged by alternative non-utility providers and their seasonal fluctuations. 
 
1.6.2 Alternative providers 
As already introduced in 1.3, piped water for most developing countries do not represent the 
only source of water for the reference population of the utilities. 
Unconnected households rely on a wide range of alternative providers, who are often 
unregulated and illegal. Even households which are connected often rely on alternative sources to 
cope with rationing and shortages or for water uses other than drinking or cooking.  
These alternative sources are provided by a wide range of small scale formal and informal 
actors. They are private, sometimes cooperative, actors purchasing utility water or producing bulk 
water and providing it, thought a variety of means (kiosks, micro networks, water carts) to 
households in the informal and poor neighbourhoods of African cities. Alternatives to utility water 
however also include direct collection from streams and shallow wells in rural and peri-urban 
contexts. 
According to most authors (Bakker 2008, Sansom 2006, Gerlach and Franceys 2010), there 
is the need to extend the scope of regulatory oversight to include this variety of service 
arrangements that operate alongside formal operators and water utilities, and some good practices 
are already being developed in the sector. The idea is that, if regulators were able to deal with 
independent, small scale and informal providers, the positive potential of these actors for extending 
the access to water services could be enjoyed, while limiting the related affordability, public health 
and environmental risks and avoiding monopoly rents. 
Regulators, however, often lack information about the parallel/secondary water markets 
which serve the same population targeted by the formal utilities and which can account for a share 
of 80% or more of the population (Collignon and Vèzina 2000), while their turnover can also be 
considerable.  
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The alternative water providers often, either knowingly or inadvertently, infringe existing 
regulations or exploit loopholes in the law (Gerlach and Franceys 2010). This might introduce some 
risks both on environment and public health, since they might cause over-abstraction of ground 
water or seawater intrusion in the water tables, or, in the absence of water quality controls, they 
could provide unsafe water to users. 
Another concern about alternative providers and economic regulation is related with the 
comparatively high water prices charged. As seen above, on the demand side, pricing differentials 
were often claimed to demonstrate that willingness to pay by poor water users in developing 
countries is higher than the actual utilities tariffs, thus calling for price increases. 
On the supply side such price differentials are related with the scale of operation of 
alternative providers, with the type of water source they rely on, and with the model of water 
distribution, which have an impact on operating costs. Furthermore, corruption and anticompetitive 
behaviour can be related with vested interests, like government income derived from abstraction 
fees and involvement of bureaucrats and utility staff in lucrative vending businesses and installation 
of illegal connections.  
On the contrary regulatory risk can also affect alternative providers, for instance where 
existing regulations give a competitive advantage to formal, utility water providers because they 
have exclusivity rights, despite their inability to cover large proportions of the target population. 
The main recommendations available about how to address these challenges through economic 
regulation are reviewed below. 
Considering that networked service provision by a city-wide water utility is the most 
economic option for serving urban areas, Gerlach and Franceys (2010) observe that regulatory 
mechanisms need to be designed on the understanding that alternative providers, while providing a 
critical service in many low-income settings, will be gradually replaced by utility water supply. 
When cities attract new residents faster than the utility can upgrade and extend service 
infrastructure, contracted resellers and licensed independent providers could be the solution to cover 
informal settlements that are difficult to be served by the utility. The same authors thus call for an 
enabling legal framework to allow and encourage cooperative arrangements between alternative 
providers and utilities, recognizing that in many cases the alternative providers have important “pro-
poor service skills” and recognizing the need of protecting their investments. In order to enjoy the 
potential of alternative providers, the regulatory framework should also consider the capacity of 
alternative providers to answer the needs of poor users through minimum service levels. As a matter 
of fact, standards usually follow internationally accepted engineering standards and might set rigid 
and unrealistic targets relegating alternative providers to the informal sector.  
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The formalization of alternative water providers obviously has a regulatory cost, which is 
likely to be high due to the lack of any centralization of these actors. For this reason, the most cost 
effective solution is that they should be regulated by the formal utilities already in charge of the 
areas where alternative providers operate. In this way the utility remains formally liable for the 
service provided subcontracts the operators. Informal operators can also be monitored by delegating 
some monitoring functions to consumer groups (Gerlach and Franceys, 2010). 
Formal Private Sector Involvement initiatives in SSA often proved to be challenging and 
unsuitable. The ideological rehabilitation of private small scale informal providers should not be 
used to revive the myth of healthy competition in the water sector (Ahlers et al. 2013) and the ideal 
of smart entrepreneurs and welfare maximizing market allocation. Therefore, while recognition and 
regulation is necessary and positive for access, for public health reasons and to avoid overpricing, 
ideological positions should be taken more carefully. 
 
1.6.3 Institutional capacity and balances of power 
According to the definitions of Jalilian et al. (2006), pp.  15-16: “accountability requires the 
regulatory agencies to be accountable for the consequences of their actions, to operate within their 
legal powers, and to observe the rules of due process when arriving at their decisions (…), 
transparency relates to regulatory decisions being reached in a way that is revealed to the 
interested parties” and consistency relates to the safeguard of public confidence in a regulatory 
system and reduction of uncertainty for investors and operators.  
The capacity of the public authority to put in place strong regulatory institutions is critical to 
market functioning. An economy with a developed institutional capacity is more likely to design 
and implement effective regulation, also contributing to poverty reduction.  
These concepts can also be described in terms of good governance, which comprises 
predictable and enlightened policy making, a bureaucracy oriented by professional ethos, an 
accountable government; a strong civil society participating in public affairs, and the primate of the 
rule of law (World Bank 1997).  
As a matter of fact, both the process and the outcomes of a regulatory regime depend upon 
the specific institutional context of an economy, as reflected in formal and informal rules of 
economic transacting (North 1990). 
Important considerations about the role of the public bodies in regulation are related to the 
concepts of regulatory and political capture respectively. According to the public choice theory, as 
individuals are self-interested (both in and out of the public arena), also the regulation in place will 
be the result of the relationships between different interest groups (Buchanan 1972, Baldwin and 
38 
 
Cave1999) and it can be biased in favour of particular interests. This is referred to as regulatory 
capture and is sometimes explained by the concentration of regulatory benefits and diffusion of 
regulatory costs, which enhances the power of lobbying groups seeking rents (Stigler 1971, 
Peltzman 1976, Reagan 1987). Political capture, instead, refers to a situation where the regulatory 
goals are distorted to pursue short term political ends, becoming a tool of self-interest within 
government elite (Stiglitz 1998). 
These considerations pose an important problem of “institution building”. The model of 
economic regulation as a purely technocratic institution concerned with the correction of market 
failure and maximization of consumer welfare is being challenged in the European context (Finger 
and Varone 2006) and it is even less applicable in developing economies (Gerlach and Franceys 
2010). 
In developing countries, economic regulation was the latest in a series of attempts by 
governments and their advisors to accelerate universal and sustainable provision of infrastructure 
services (Gerlach and Franceys 2010). However, there was a certain overreliance on conceptual 
frameworks borrowed from western experiences. This limited the theoretical understanding of the 
specific challenges of regulation in developing countries (Laffont 2005) and particularly the 
integration of regulation into wider poverty reduction strategies. As the creation of regulatory 
institutions usually occurred within broader processes of water services privatization or 
commercialization, literature tends to concentrate on the regulation of privatized utilities. 
Nonetheless, as it is increasingly recognized that privatization was unable to deliver the expected 
benefits for the urban poor (Marin 2009), there is a growing interest and awareness in appropriate 
regulatory frameworks as drivers to achieve basic water service provision for the poor (Furlong 
2010).  
It was often noticed that “institution building”, including building an accountable, 
transparent and consistent regulatory regime, is one of the most difficult problems faced by 
developing countries at present (Kirkpatrick and Parker 2004).  
Estache and Kouassi (2002) analyzed the determinants of the efficiency levels reached by 21 
African water utilities, estimating a production frontier for the sector in Africa in the period 1995-
197. The results showed that the institutional capacity of the country and its governance are 
significant drivers of performance for firms.  
Regulatory institutions are a relatively new in the institutional structures of developing 
countries, but the limited evidence from researches that are available, suggests that a number of 
regulatory failures already occurred (Amman 2006), also as a consequence of structural weaknesses 
in institutional capacity. 
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In developing countries the newly created regulatory bodies are often staffed by employees 
from the former public utility, usually deemed to be inefficient. Therefore, it is not clear why they 
should be better in regulating the system, than in running it (Budds and McGranahan 2003), unless 
the new context, duties and leadership can improve their performances.
 
 
Private sector participation also brings in new challenges, since national and local 
governments are likely to be less experienced than their private counterparts in negotiating 
contracts.  
On the one hand, as it was discussed above, it may be a problem when water and sanitation 
utilities are manipulated to serve short-term political interests (political capture). On the other hand, 
as noted by Budds and McGranahan (2003) it is also a problem when the opposite happens. This 
can also be related with the imbalance of power that can be frequently observed when indebted 
governments negotiate with international financial institutions and multinational water companies. 
This makes difficult for the local regulator to play its role effectively. Examples of imbalances of 
power can also be found in the bidding procedures and in the following implementation of 
contracts. There is usually a two steps procedure, where shortlisted private companies, qualified at 
the first step, make their own assessments of the local context (e.g. state of the infrastructures, 
current tariffs, extent of coverage, nature of government) and then submit bids. The design of the 
procedure and the criteria conveyed in its guidelines are critical to the success of the 
implementation phase. However, bids rarely focus specifically on addressing the obstacles to 
improving services in low-income areas, due to the need to be attractive to potential bidders, 
otherwise no bids would be received (Budds and McGranahan 2003).  
The relative weakness of the contracting authorities in developing countries, jointly with the 
competition which characterizes the procedure can also introduce an incentive for bidding 
companies to underestimate the costs, thus renegotiating contracts during implementation, after a 
more complete assessment, as it was the case for many contracts in developing countries.  
The particular problems raised by private monopolies, jointly with the consideration that 
regulation should not be restricted to privately operated utilities but should be developed also for 
public utilities, raises according to Budds and McGranahan (2003) important issues related to the 
time sequence of the privatization and regulation initiatives. If a good regulatory environment is 
necessary for privatization to succeed, the logic priority should be given to regulatory improvement, 
while privatization could be introduced if and when it can proceed smoothly and with local support 
and management capacity.  
Last, privatization initiatives could lead to a further weakening of the institutional capacities, 
as the transfer of functions to the private sector operator can result in the de-skilling (Bayliss 2009) 
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of the public sector. The issue of the interaction between private sector participation and 
institutional capacities of water utilities is among the ones addressed in Chapter 3.  
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2 Cost recovery and access to drinking water in Sub Saharan Africa: 
incentives to achieve the Millennium Development Goals  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In September 2000, building upon a decade of major United Nations (UN) conferences and 
summits, world leaders came together at UN Headquarters in New York to adopt the United 
Nations Millennium Declaration (Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, A/RES/55/2), 
committing their nations to a new global partnership to reduce extreme poverty and setting out a 
series of time-bound targets - with a deadline in 2015 - that have become known as the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG). 
The goal number 7 was “Ensure environmental sustainability” and it includes the Target 7.C 
that was to “halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without sustainable access to safe 
drinking water and basic sanitation”. 
The water MDG is dramatically off track in Sub Saharan Africa, with only 64% of the 
population covered in 2012 instead of the expected 77.5% (WHO and UNICEF 2014) and with 
these poor performances driven by urban areas, where the water supply coverage through household 
connections declined while the access through other improved sources, including non utility water, 
hardly compensated for that. This calls for a reconsideration of the policies implemented in the 
sector to promote commercialization and financial efficiency by water utilities. As argued by Mehta 
(2014) p. 68 “even though policy rhetoric may be about rights and equity, in practice (…) 
considerations of utility and efficiency persist which may not always have the interests of the 
marginalized upfront”. 
After a phase centered on the priority of privatization, in the last 10 years the sector policies 
developed into a new agenda, which is still focused on promoting private sector involvement, but is 
now aimed at improving the devices to be adopted by states, municipalities and State Owned water 
Enterprises (SOE) to become more efficient by mimicking the private sector, in line with the New 
Public Management approach.2 Some key priorities of this new approach are SOE corporatization, 
performance contracts with incentives and penalties, rate of return policy (Furlong 2010, Banerjee 
and Morella 2011). 
These priorities are translated at the operational level in a number of requirements that 
utilities are urged to comply with. These requirements include, among others, the increase of cost 
                                                 
2 See for example Schwartz (2008). 
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recovery and average tariff levels, the control of costs and are mainly related with financial 
performances and efficiency. 
Financial health alone, however, is not enough to ensure that utilities have the investment 
capacity that is necessary to bridge the funding gap of the African water supply sector. From the 
1980s studies on contingent valuation and willingness to pay (among others, Whittington et al. 
1994) conducted on developing countries fuelled some enthusiasm on the potential for full or 
capital cost recovery. However, once tariff rise proved to be politically more challenging than 
expected and efficiency gains more limited, the policy debate moved the attention from a call for 
full costs recovery through tariffs to the concept of sustainable cost recovery, first introduced by the 
Camdessus report (Winpenny 2003). The latter allows for a mix of Tariffs, Taxes and Transfers 
(TTT), recognizing the importance of affordability. The possible criteria for spreading the cost of 
water services can, thus, be viewed along a continuum between endogenous and exogenous 
solutions (OECD 2010), with purely endogenous solutions fully relying on users for cost recovery 
and purely exogenous solutions transferring all the costs to external actors (people located 
elsewhere, future generations).  
Overemphasizing financial performances can be misleading for utility management and 
political decision makers due to the trade-offs (OECD, 2010) which characterize the relationship 
between social, environmental and financial sustainability goals in the water sector.  
Achieving a balance between financial and social objectives is also a key challenge for the 
regulators of water services, regardless the nature of the regulated provider (public monopoly, 
conventional private sector, informal private sector), as discussed by Gerlach and Franceys (2010).3 
The incentive system associated with these performance measures can be an explicit 
performance contract (the SOE enterprise is contracted by the public authority in charge) or can be 
related with the conditional access to soft loans and other forms of financing from development 
agencies.  
Urban water supply is generally considered to be more commercially viable then other 
services, so that, in Africa it was often separated from unprofitable elements, such as sanitation and 
rural water supply and cost recovery targets are particularly demanding for urban utilities, which are 
the object of the present study4.  
                                                 
3 Out of eleven case studies covered by the study by Gerlach and Franceys four are from Sub Saharan Africa. 
4 The utilities included in the sample fall in the following classes: 1) national level utilities with competence on all or 
some of the country major urban centers (and the corresponding peri-urban areas), 2) regional/state utilities with 
competence on the head town or on the main centers of the region/federal state 3) municipal level utilities with 
competence over one municipality . The  focus on urban water supply indeed is not the result of a selection of utilities, 
but depends on the organization of African water supply sector, which is characterized by the fact that most rural areas 
are unserved or served by community managed water schemes and through decentralized solutions which fail to be 
registered and provide data to international level benchmarking and data collection initiatives. 
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The need to rely only on tariffs however can provide adverse incentives to the extension of 
networks to poorer areas, as the poor can be perceived by both private operators and corporatized 
utilities, as an unprofitable market. 
The present analysis aims at verifying if cost recovery indicators, are suitable to design a 
proper structure of incentives that could push utilities to achieve the main goal of African water 
utilities, defined by the target 7.C in MDG. The achievement of the MDG was more challenging in 
Africa than anywhere else in the world due to rapid urbanization and present low coverage rates. 
This study contributes to the understanding of the most appropriate weight of the component tariffs 
in the TTT mix, when access challenges are to be addressed. The effect of cost recovery levels on 
coverage rates will be thus assessed and discussed in order to verify if the incentive structure based 
on them has a significant effect on the results of utilities in increasing their access rates. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 contains a literature review and presents the 
hypothesis to be tested. In Section 2.3 the data set used is described. Section 2.4 provides empirical 
results, while Section 2.5 contains some concluding remarks, including those pertaining to policy 
implications. 
 
2.2 Literature review and hypothesis  
2.2.1 Literature review 
The present literature review focuses on studies investigating the relation between cost 
recovery and changes in coverage, including both qualitative and quantitative studies. Particular 
attention is given to studies about countries which are well represented in the sample (see 
Description of the dataset) and to studies about corporatized utilities, regardless the involvement of 
private contractors. 
Dagdeviren (2008) focuses on the commercialization of urban water services in Zambia 
demonstrating the tension between cost recovery and service extension when water sector reforms 
combine low level of public investment with price increases. According to the author, Zambia 
typifies other low-income economies and the aspirations for cost recovery in water supply services 
can be a means to increase the proportion of the population with access to safe water, but with an 
inappropriate policy mix, can also lead to the opposite result of declining access rates. 
Herrera and Post (2014) considers 35 countries which engaged in corporatization and 
inherent cost recovery policies. The author finds that cost recovery encountered strong resistances 
by the population and by local politicians. These resistances, thanks to the decentralization policies 
implemented jointly with corporatization, challenged the success of the reform. The author argues 
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that the relation between cost recovery and investments in infrastructure (necessary to provide 
access to water) was not properly explained to the population, and resulted in resistances. The 
assessment of the strength and features of this relation instead remains outside the scope of the 
work, while it is more directly addressed in another contribution from the same author (Herrera 
2014). In this study the authors present three case studies in Mexico municipalities which adopted 
cost recovery policies. Cost recovery policies are found to favor rich cities with strong industrial 
and middle class bases and politicians who cater to these constituent groups, as fiscal self-
sufficiency requires a customer base that can generate sufficient revenue to finance service 
improvements. In poor regions instead, improving service in urban centers with revenues from 
consumer fees is challenging. Bakker et al. (2008) focus on incentives to analyze the institutional 
dimensions of urban water supply provision to poor households in Jakarta. Based on both 
quantitative and qualitative evidence they identify some governance failures which created 
disincentives both for utilities to connect poor households and for poor households to get connected. 
Cost recovery requirements were identified among the drivers of governance failure: indebtedness 
provided adverse incentives to the operator to connect loss-making poor households, while poor 
customers preferred alternative water sources, due to the high total cost of utility water, when both 
volumetric and fixed charges are considered.  
Next, Ballance and Tremolét (2005) compare in a narrative way the performances of utilities 
of 7 SSA countries, engaged in private sector participation or SOE corporatization (public 
performance contracts and commercialization) between the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s. 
They assess technical and financial performances, with the first conceptualized, among others, in 
terms of coverage rates. The authors find some correlation between financial indicators and 
technical performance, but they also point out the need to be cautious, mentioning two country 
cases where technical and financial performance are consistent (high tariff and good performances 
in Senegal and Burkina Faso) and one where they are not (low tariffs and good performances in 
Tanzania). Anyway, the study does not focus on access as such and coverage rates is only one of the 
measures of technical performances used (other measures are OPEX5 per connection per year, 
collection rate and staff per 1000 connections). 
Coming to more quantitative studies, Whittington et al. (1991) in his seminal work about 
willingness to pay presents a case study of water vending in a big town of Nigeria. He relates the 
willingness of households to pay for improved water services with water supply planning and 
investment. Willingness to pay is taken from the rates charged by organized water vendors, also 
                                                 
5 OPEX stands for OPerational EXpenditures and it is used as a synonymous of Operation and Maintenance Costs 
(O&M). 
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accounting for the mark ups charged by households and businesses equipped with water storage 
facilities and reselling the water to the poor. He concludes that, on an annual basis, households are 
already paying water vendors over twice the operation and maintenance costs of a piped distribution 
system. As it will be seen below, this approximates full capital cost involved (GWI 2004), allowing 
some optimism about the possibility of financing infrastructural investments form users fees. 
The study by Estache and Kouassi (2002) is focused on African water utilities analyzing a 
panel of 21 utilities from 1995 to 1997. They find that there is an enormous space for efficiency 
gains which could be translated in increased access. Corruption is found to be positively linked with 
inefficiency, while governance and privatization are negatively linked with inefficiency.  
Similarly, Mbuvi et al. (2012) present a productivity analysis of efficiency and effectiveness 
of African drinking water urban utilities, based on data from 51 utilities from 2006 WOP -Africa 
self-assessment. Utilities’ technical efficiency (human resource and infrastructural dotation are 
considered as inputs and volume of water and persons served as outputs) and effectiveness 
(including water coverage but also indicators like per capita consumption, number of connections 
and continuity) are estimated. Authors argue that utilities face technical inefficiency rather than 
ineffectiveness challenges and that they do not need any additional inputs to provide water supply 
services to all the population. Correlation between utilities’ efficiency and their water coverage 
(only) is not reported at all, and if taken together with total water sales (which are not in line with 
MDG definition of access being core of the present analysis), is below 0.3. Thus, based on the 
results of the study by Mbuvi et al. (2012), one can conclude that efficiency of water utilities in 
Africa is in fact limited and highly heterogeneous, calling for independent regulation and necessity 
to improve management. However, one cannot make a solid conclusion on whether there is no 
ineffectiveness problem resulting from incentive conflict many water utilities face in Sub Saharan 
Africa. 
Banerjee et al. (2008) use data from the African Infrastructure Knowledge Program datasets 
and from the MDG Joint Monitoring Programme producing some descriptive statistics. This study 
focuses on efficiency and compliance to the reform requirements. A relevant finding which is 
presented in this study is that expanding coverage of water services is correlated with efficiently 
operated utilities and functioning governance, while the relationship between coverage and public 
spending is tenuous.  
Summarizing, the quantitative scientific literature reviewed (Wittington et al. 1991, Estache 
and Kouassi 2002, Mbuvi et al. 2012), is optimistic about the relation between financial 
performances and access, but authors tend to focus more on the potential to improve the first (high 
willingness to pay, potential efficiency gains), then on the translation of financial results into 
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access. The technical reports considered (Ballance and Trèmolet 2005, Banerjee et al. 2008) find 
some correlation between financial and technical performances, and between efficiency and access. 
However, their definitions of the terms, while including cost recovery and access is not strictly 
corresponding to them. Qualitative studies (Dagdeviren 2008, Herrera 2014, Bakker et al. 2008), 
point o the challenges which can prevent cost recovery and its translation into access, also focusing 
on incentives posed on the actors.  
Overall, based on the literature, it is necessary to recognize that the relation between 
financial performances and access is complex and there is a paucity of empirical studies which 
specify the exact features of the relation. This would be useful to identify some thresholds to be 
taken as a reference when setting targets for financial performances to avoid perverse effects on 
access. 
 
2.2.2 Hypothesis: financial and water access  
With reference to internal and external funding, in the late 2000s, the WB recognized that 
privatization policies were not going to bring in the necessary investment finance for the African 
water supply sector, for its high risk and low profitability (investments were close to zero according 
to Foster and Briceno Garmendia (2010). From this moment, the private sector involvement was 
promoted as a mean to improve the efficiency of utilities (with short management contracts, without 
investment risks on the private side) and, the other way round, efficiency gains were pursued as a 
mean to boost the interest of the private actors to the sector.  
This focus on efficiency led to an even increased emphasis on the financial performances of 
public utilities, whose relation with infrastructural investment can be seen in three ways: 
1. The operational margins will be reinvested, or will allow the utilities to obtain the necessary 
loans. 
2. The financial sustainability of utility operations will provide a sound basis for investments 
from grant and fiscal finance because of the expectation that, also with an enlarged user 
base, the utility will still ensure the recovery of operational costs. 
3. There is a donors’ favorable bias toward utilities which comply with the performance and 
efficiency requirements.  
Given the proportions between operational margins and capital costs of infrastructural 
investment, the first assumption would require an unrealistically long term commitment of investors 
or a similarly unlike availability of long term loans. As a matter of fact, similar commitments can be 
supported only by a strong political will and not by the expectation of commercial returns. This is 
due to the time horizon of infrastructural investments which usually exceeds 20 years. This is also 
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confirmed by the WB recommendation (Banerjee and Morella 2011 and Africon 2008) to estimate 
annual per capita Operation and Maintenance Cost (O&M cost) for Africa at 3% of per capita cost 
of capital for network assets. This recommendation roughly means that the capital premium 
proposed by GWI6 should lead to the recovery of capital costs, not to mention of profits, in 33 
years, which is likely to be beyond the time horizon of private investors and commercial finance.  
While levels of revenues consistent with the level of O&M costs can encourage investments 
to increase the coverage, high levels of cost recovery,7 tending toward full capital recovery, are 
unlikely to attract additional commercial finance. Moreover, as already argued above, the pursuit of 
financial returns can divert resources and attention from the priority of serving the poor. Capital 
cost recovery tariffs, or Full Cost Recovery are recognized to be not affordable for 60% of Sub 
Saharan Africa households (Banerjee et al. 2011). The thresholds of cost recovery recommended in 
the available literature are as follows:  
? the Global Water Intelligence benchmarks of USD/m3 0.40 + USD/m3 0.40 (GWI 2004) 
correspond to a working ratio value of 0.5 (hence, 2 in terms of O&M cost recovery ratio);  
? these benchmarks are also adopted by Banerjee and Morella (2011) for African utilities. 
Banerjee and Morella (2011), however, when calculating full cost recovery tariffs, 
sometimes adopt a hybrid solution by using the real operating cost and adding the 
conventional capital mark up of 0.40 USD/m3. Since O&M costs are substantially higher 
than 0.4 USD/m3 in Sub Saharan Africa, with an average of USD 1.2, the result for Sub 
Saharan Africa is that on average a working ratio of 0.75 is recommended to achieve the full 
cost recovery (1.33 in terms of O&M cost recovery ratio); 
? another benchmark, proposed by Tyman and Kingdom (2002) is a 0.68 working ratio for 
developing countries utilities which corresponds to a ratio of 1.47 O&M cost recovery, even 
though it is not specified if it corresponds to capital cost recovery. 
The present work aims at assessing whether, and under which conditions, financial results 
are actually associated with increasing coverage and to test if the proposed benchmarks for cost 
                                                 
6 The capital premium to be added to the operational cost recovery tariff proposed by Global Water Intelligence (Global 
Water Intelligence 2004) is 0.40 USD/m3 and the benchmark for operation costs is the same (0.40 USD/m3), summing 
up to USD 0.80 for full cost recovery.  
7 There are two indicators of the operational margins which are commonly used. As one can easily notice, one of them 
is an exact inverse of the other one, and . They are here defined: 
O&M cost recovery ratio is given by the ratio between operating revenues (Op Rev.) and operating and maintenance 
costs (O&M Costs) faced by the utility, so that O&M cr=(Op Rev)/(O&M Costs). The value of this indicator is 1 when 
revenues and costs equate and exceeds 1 when the utility has positive operational margins. Working ratio is given by 
the ratio between operating and maintenance costs (O&M Costs) and operating revenues (Op Rev.), so that Working 
Ratio=(O&M Costs)/(Op Rev). Again, the value of this indicator is 1 when revenues and costs equate and is below 1 
when the utility has positive operational margins. 
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recovery are consistent with coverage goals in the African context, in order to provide some 
recommendations concerning the cost recovery targets that should be set for African utilities.  
More specifically the hypothesis that will be tested can be reassumed as follows:  
Financial performances (measured by cost recovery ratios) of the utilities do not have a 
positive and significant relationship with the increase of water coverage in Sub Saharan Africa. On 
the contrary, high levels of cost recovery are associated with decreasing coverage variation. 
 
2.3 Description of the data set  
A data set was constructed to assess the effect of cost recovery on coverage expansion while 
controlling for the main variables8 which can affect changes in access, namely: 
?  Initial coverage: it provides a picture of the initial situation, which is faced by utilities; 
? Public/ODA expenditure: it indicates the level of the investments other than the ones from 
financial margins of the utilities themselves; 
? Non Revenue Water: it approximates the maintenance and technical efficiency of utilities;  
? Urbanization: it accounts for the challenge of increasing urban population to be served. 
The present section briefly introduces the content and limitations of the available databases, 
with particular attention to the indicators employed in this study:  
? IBNET database (www.ib-net.org) 
? Africa Infrastructure Knowledge Program (http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/). Within the 
Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) there is also the so called “Fiscal 
database” which is taken as reference by the official studies analyzing the AICD data. This 
source is also quoted by Banerjee et al. (2008) and by Briceno Garmendia et al. (2008). 
? United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2012). 
World Urbanization Prospects: The 2011 Revision. 
The IBNET database (International Benchmarking NETwork for water and sanitation utilities) is 
the outcome of a global initiative of the UK Department for international development (DFID), the 
World Bank and the Water and Sanitation Program (WSP). It contains normalized indicators about 
the performances of more than 200 water and sanitation utilities from 42 countries of Sub Saharan 
Africa and, at the time when data were downloaded (May 2013) covers years from 1995 to 2012. 
                                                 
8 Other variables were also considered but were not included for the following reasons: 1) collection efficiency (share of 
bills by paid divided by amount invoiced): the cost recovery indicator is already based on the actual revenues and not on 
the invoiced amounts; 2) continuity of supply: variables were not included about the service quality standard or the 
supply ladder, as I preferred to keep “access” vs “non access”, as a binary option, following the as it was also the 
approach of the MDG monitoring (improved vs unimproved); 3) share of users served through public points: as above. 
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Unfortunately, for many utilities data is incomplete. Indicators reflect the main priorities of 
international agencies and, more particularly, their emphasis on financial performance (see 
Appendix A).  
In the IBNET database financial results of water utilities are calculated as a ratio between 
revenues and operational and maintenance costs, which is also the most commonly adopted 
indicator of “cost recovery” adopted in the water sector9.  
Another indicator taken from the IBNET database is Non Revenue Water (NRW) which is 
the proportion of produced water that is not billed to users because it is lost due to leakages or to 
illegal connections. Non Revenue Water can be intended as an indicator of the maintenance status 
of water infrastructures (Tyman Kingdom 2002).10 Reflecting the importance of technical water 
losses, NRW is a better indicator for the conditions of the pipes then for the conditions of other key 
assets, like treatment plants, water taps and reservoirs. Moreover, this indicator is affected by illegal 
connections generating losses, even in the absence of maintenance problems.  
General fiscal spending is also considered, because it is here argued that public expenditure 
is uniquely positioned to achieve the envisaged coverage. The variable used to represent fiscal 
expenditure in the regression is taken from the fiscal database of the Africa Infrastructure 
Knowledge Program of the AfDB. In particular, the total “on budget” public spending for water is 
considered. The figures include both investment/rehabilitation and O&M expenditures, but they 
exclude “off budget expenditure”, which is more likely to include expenditure from SOEs revenues 
and might be correlated with financial results of the utilities.11 The values are at country level so 
that the same figure was associated to many utilities in the dataset. The variable used is the ratio 
between total spending and the GDP of the country, which could be considered as a good indicator 
for the country effort. Unfortunately, the available figures can be used only as control variables, 
because they are collected at country level. Moreover, only one figure per country is available, 
calculated as an average for the period 2001-2005, with later updates in 2009. In the dataset, this 
                                                 
9 It is important to notice that the analysis is restricted to the cases where the value of O&M cost recovery does not 
exceed 2, a threshold corresponding to revenues that double the operational costs. Since 2 is the benchmark provided by 
GWI (2004) and since it is the highest value available in the literature, this will allow the exclusion of cases whose 
values are beyond any benchmark and recommendation for cost recovery. Thus, about twenty observations of utilities 
with very large values of O&M cost recovery ratio are not taken into account. 
10 Tyman and Kingdom (2002) state that unaccounted for water, corresponding to NRW in the IBNET databases can be 
used as “a crude measure of asset maintenance” and that “this measure captures not only physical losses but also 
commercial losses, due to inefficient billing or illegal connections. Thus, high levels of Unaccounted For Water (UFW) 
indicate poor system management and poor commercial practices as well as inadequate pipeline maintenance“.  
11 Since the Fiscal Database does not include a comprehensive description of the data, this information was taken from 
Briceno Garmendia et al. (2008, p. 9). Also the information about the period covered were taken from this source. 
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figure was associated to all the cases of the same time series, thereby creating a time invariant12 
variable, so that more detailed analysis cannot be based upon them.  
Annual Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows to the water supply and sanitation 
sectors by country and year as a percentage of country GDP are taken from the same source. 
Additionally, the annual change of the proportion of urban population at country level from 
UNDESA World Urbanization Prospects 2011 is also used in the analysis. The dependent variable 
is the change in water coverage over the last three years measured as an absolute difference in water 
coverage between period t+3 and t (3-year difference in water coverage).13 Given that in the 
empirical model (2.1) all the explanatory variables are taken in period t, this lagged time structure 
minimizes the potential endogeneity problem: 
ΔY(t+3)-t= α +Xtβ +εt                                             (2.1) 
All variables used in the following are summarized in  
Table 2.1 below.14 Due to data constraints, some countries are necessarily underrepresented. 
Thus, more than half of the utilities covered in the data set come from three countries: Nigeria, 
South Africa and Zambia (for more details see Table 2.4 in Appendix B). The utilities covered in 
the study have different dimensions in terms of population served, and no weighting is adopted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 This solution can be supported by two considerations. On the one hand most of the cases are from the same years (see 
Table 2.2). On the other hand public expenditure has certain inertia across time.  
13 Three years were taken because of the following trade-off. On the one hand, there was the need to  measure the public 
policy impact on a potentially larger time span (since the decisions to invest in infrastructure, based on the situation in t 
need some time to affect the utility performance and materialize in terms of actual access), but on the other hand, there 
was the shortcoming of reducing the data set too much by estimating those differences.  
14 Due to the heterogeneity of the data sources used, some data on the utility level had to be matched. Some matching 
was also necessary within the IBNET database, because the same utility has frequently been classified with different 
identification numbers in different years (particularly in the cases of Cameroon, Zambia, Kenya and Nigeria) and 
because of changes between the figures downloaded at different times (03.2011 and 05.2013). In this last case, the most 
recently published figure were preferred.  
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Table 2.1. List of variables 
Indicator Unit Description Source Level years available (with gaps) 
Water Coverage % 
Population with access to water services (either with 
direct service connection or within reach of a public 
water point) as a percentage of the total population 
under utility’s nominal responsibility 
IBNET Utility 1995-2012  
Three-years difference in 
water coverage 
 
% 
Difference in the percentage of population having 
access to water services, calculated from the indicator 
here above  
IBNET Utility 1995-2012  
O&M cost recovery Ratio Total annual operational revenues/Total annual operating costs IBNET Utility 1995-2012 
Public expenditure for 
water 
% on 
country 
GDP 
Total fiscal expenditure for water including investment, 
rehabilitation, maintenance and operation but excluding 
off budget expenditures, which are more likely to 
include expenditure from SOEs revenues and might 
depend upon financial results 15  
AICD Fiscal 
Database 2009 Country 
2001-2005 
averages  
Urbanization  ratio Average Annual Rate of Change of the Urban Population 
World 
Urbanization 
Prospects 
Country 
1950-2015 
(projections) 5 
years averages 
Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) for 
water supply and 
sanitation 
% on 
country 
GDP 
ODA (from OECD countries) including IDA and IRDB 
loans and grants 
AICD Fiscal 
Database 2009 Country 
Annual values 
from 2002 to 
201216  
Non-Revenue Water % 
Difference between water supplied and water sold (i.e. 
volume of water “lost”) expressed as a percentage of 
net water supplied 
IBNET Utility 1995-2012  
 
As a result, we have 25 countries (out of 49 in SSA) covered with one or more local or 
national utility, so that missing countries account for less than 20% of the total SSA population. In 
these countries 75 utilities are covered with more than 200 observations (unbalanced panel). To 
check whether the missing observations in the data set form any strong bias either in terms of water 
coverage or in terms of the O&M cost recovery ratio, the average values (for the full dataset and for 
the sample used for three models – namely model b, c, d, g, h and i proposed in Section 2.4) are 
compared with the figures on SSA region found in the literature (Table 2.2). As it can be seen, for 
the years 1995-2005 both cost recovery and water coverage ratios are only slightly different from 
those reported by other studies. 
Table 2.2 Some descriptive statistics on the dataset used 
 Literature on the entire SSA 
region 
The data set of the study 
  Full Dataset Models b,c,d,g, h, i (225 observations 
from 22 countries) 
Period Water coverage 
(urban17) in %18 
Average 
O&M cost 
recovery 
ratio19 
Water coverage 
(reference areas of 
the utilities, mostly 
urban), in % 
Average 
O&M cost 
coverage 
ratio 
Water coverage 
(reference areas of the 
utilities, mostly 
urban), in % 
Average O&M 
cost recovery 
ratio 
1990-1995  79  -  _ - 
1995-2000  68 
1,00 
72.13 1.26 64.64 (22 obs) 1.11 
2001-2005  63 70.09 1.18 69. 9 (120 obs) 
 
1.12 
2006-2012   59.61 1.32 65.52 (83 obs) 1.07 
 
                                                 
15 As the Fiscal Database does not include a comprehensive description of data, this information was taken from 
Briceno Garmendia et al. (2008). 
16 Annual values from 2002 to 2007 are registered, while those from 2008 to 2012 are projected. 
17 Urban utilities were taken as a reference for comparison because the IBNET database utilities are mostly urban and 
even in the case of national utilities they are usually mandated to supply water only in some major towns. 
18 Source: Banerjee et al. (2008). 
19 Source: Banerjee et al. (2008). 
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2.4 Regression results 
Below regression results obtained by testing the hypothesis stated in Section 2.2 with the 
data set described in Section 2.3 are provided. Since the data set is unbalanced, a regression analysis 
is run with pooled OLS is run, fixed and random effects. While pooled OLS is estimated as a 
benchmark (here no heterogeneity among utilities is modeled), fixed and random effects model this 
heterogeneity in two different ways: the former introduces a unit dummy variable for each utility 
considered and the latter models the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of those effects 
(for more details see Greene 2008). For both fixed and random effects estimators, cluster robust 
standard errors were used. This solution address the problem of errors that are not independent 
(autocorrelation). The use of robust standard errors does not affect the coefficient estimates, but the 
standard errors and the significance of coefficients.  
A standard specification test for these models is the Hausman test (Hausman 1978), which 
however, according to recent analysis (Clark and Linzer 2015) does not always have sufficient 
power to reliably detect the true specification. After an extensive simulation study they find that for 
many units and few observations per unit (as in the case considered) random effects model may be 
more accurate (i.e. though potentially biased, but better constraining the variance of estimates, 
leading to values that are closer to the true parameters (Clark and Linzer 2012, p.7)) in cases where 
the test does not give a straightforward answer (e.g., significance level below 5%). Another 
advantage of the random effects specification is that it can be combined with time-invariant controls 
(such as the level of public expenditure), while fixed effects attribute the corresponding effects to 
the unit effects. Thus, for all models to be tested, different specifications and their differences are 
explored20. 
The three-year difference in water coverage was taken as a dependent variable. The water 
coverage in the initial period is found to be negative and strongly significant. On average, utilities 
with the lowest coverage in period t0 improved their performance in terms of population coverage 
the most. This finding may have several explanations: 
? First, those utilities that had “lowest start” could use it as an advantage and increase their 
coverage by reaching the most easily accessible areas first. Clearly, being closer to the full 
coverage requires more investments per capita as the most remote areas must be reached.  
                                                 
20 Some tests were carried out on models g and h. More particularly, the residuals were compared with normal 
distribution and ‘normality skewness and kurtosis  combined test’ confirmed normal distribution. A likelihood ratio  test 
did not detected heteroskedasticity. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data instead rejected the hypothesis 
of absence of first order autocorrelation, but this problem, as already explained was addressed through the use of cluster 
robust standard errors. 
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? Second, the low coverage of wide shares of the population surely generates critical public 
health situations and growing pressures from users. These pressures, in turn, are likely to 
increase the political priority among decision makers in the allocation of funds. This is quite 
a trivial argument but it still provides some support to the idea that, ceteris paribus, the 
political will matters.  
? Third, it should not be forgotten that the change in water coverage is often declining in the 
region. This means that utilities with high initial water coverage are likely to have lost 
coverage as a consequence of increasing urbanization21 and maintenance problems 
associated with aging infrastructures .22  
A control for annual urbanization rate at country level was included and a proxy for poor 
maintenance was identified in the indicator of Non Revenue Water percentage.  
 
Table 2.3 Presentation of the models tested 
 
Three-year difference 
in water coverage 
 
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
 a b c d e f g h i 
1) Initial Water 
Coverage 
-0.38*** -0.43***  -0.44*** -0.43*** -0.86*** -0.55*** -0.58*** -0.58*** -0.58*** 
2) O&M cost recovery1 34.62*** 36.04*** 33.27** 30.43** 23.63** 31.47*** 34.02*** 28.32*** 27.52*** 
3) Squared O&M cost 
recovery1 
-14.20*** -13.58*** -12.79** -11.91** -10.67*** 
-
13.81*** 
-
14.31*** -12.32*** -12.16*** 
5) On budget Public 
Expenditure for Water3 
 9.71*** 6.79* 5.74   13.32*** 8.24** 7.74*** 
6) Non revenue water 0.03 -0.13 -0.14 -0.13 -0.21* -0.11 -0.18** -0.20** -0.20** 
7) Urbanization rate2 -1.20 -1.20 0.45 -0.26 -6.80 -2.19 -2.44 1.43 0.77 
8) Oda2    3.61*     1.83 
9) Area East Africa   6.5 5.77    9.81* 9.46* 
10) Area South Africa   2.10 0.98    8.35** 7.90* 
11) Area West Africa   -4.68 -5.85    -6.92 -6.00 
Constant 8.03 8.66 11.15* 13.13** 62.78*** 26.60*** 22.32*** 21.98*** 22.96*** 
Zero slope 1.22 1.33 1.30 1.28 1.11 1.14 1.19 1.15 1.13 
N obs 235 225 225 225 235 235 225 225 225 
N groups     75 75 72 72 72 
Goodness of fit 
indicators 
R2=0.25 
F(5,74) =  
6.88*** 
R2=0.33 
F(6,71) =  
8.01*** 
R2=0.36 
F(9,71) =  
8.82*** 
R2=.0.36 
F(10,71) = 
8.09*** 
Within 
R2=0.36 
F(5,74)= 
48.35 *** 
Wald 
χ2(5)= 
82.75*** 
Wald χ2 
(6)= 
86.85*** 
 
Wald χ2 
(9)= 
108.34*** 
 
Wald χ2 
(10)= 
108.01*** 
Hausman test  
 
  
χ2 = 20.74*** 
 
 
  
Note: *,** and *** stand for 1, 5 and 10 % significance level, respectively. All results are provided with 
cluster robust standard errors. 
1 Ratios less than two in absolute value are considered. 
2 Country level. 
3 Country level and time invariant 
 
                                                 
21 Due to the way the dependent variable is calculated (simple difference in coverage percentages over time) an increase 
in the denominator of the coverage variable (urbanization) affects it more for utilities starting with high initial rates. 
22 It is also probable that utilities presenting high initial coverage are also mature utilities that reached these coverage 
rates in many years. Thus their infrastructures might be older and in poor functioning. 
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The indicator for the financial result (O&M cost recovery) is associated with positive 
significant coefficients, but the square23 of the same indicator, which emphasizes the effect of 
higher levels of cost recovery, shows a negative coefficient of comparable dimension (both are 
significant in most model specifications tested).24 Adding the squared version of a continuous 
variable to a model, is a way to add non-linearity to the linear model. Together, ‘cost recovery’ and 
‘cost recovery squared’ can describe a non monotonic relationship with one inflection point (Draper 
and Smith 1998). 
The result obtained could mean that, at first, better financial results translate into 
corresponding coverage increases, but beyond certain thresholds this trend changes to the contrary 
one: better financial results are associated with slowness of coverage increases or even with loss of 
coverage. Thus, the focus on financial performances can divert efforts from ensuring universal 
access to water, introducing incentives and priorities which are conflicting with the MDG goal. This 
can also be due to the way financial results are achieved, as it will be further discussed in the 
conclusion. 
Moreover, the results show that public expenditure is important, even if these data are at 
country level and they cannot be related with single utilities. Nevertheless they still express the 
level of public commitment. Public expenditure coefficients have always a positive and significant 
impact on the coverage change confirming the importance of public funding. This result might look 
trivial but it has some importance, since the link between public spending and improved coverage 
was questioned by some authors focusing on the inefficiency of public spending (van Ginneken et 
al. 2011, Banerjee et al. 2008). However, to give more justification in favor of benefits from public 
spending one would need much more detailed information (not only time variant but also indicating 
financial flows to single utilities). 
As introduced above, Non Revenue Water is used here as an indicator of the maintenance 
status of water infrastructures. It was used as a control variable for its possible correlation with cost 
recovery, but it has also an important autonomous effect on coverage change. Reflecting the 
importance of technical water losses, this indicator better accounts for the conditions of the pipes 
than for the conditions of other key assets, like treatment plants, water taps, reservoirs. Moreover, 
the indicator is affected by illegal connections which can generate losses even in the absence of 
maintenance problems. Given these limitations, the results still show that utilities with high Non 
Revenue Water rates increase their users’ coverage less, but the result is not always significant. This 
can mean that utilities with poor maintenance loose previously connected users and do not connect 
                                                 
23 Controlling for O&M cost recovery raised to the third and fourth power did not yield significant results instead. 
24 Controlling for trends in cost recovery (whether the ratio was increasing or decreasing) does not show any significant 
impact on water coverage. 
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new users, since extending an infrastructure in poor conditions is generally not cost effective. This 
result is also consistent with the findings by Mbuvi et al. (2012) about the importance of technical 
inefficiency. 
To check for the presence of possible spatial autocorrelation the models were repeated 
adding a dummy for the region of Africa (East Africa, West Africa, Central Africa and South 
Africa) where the utilities are located. This was done only for the methodologies that allow for time 
invariant variables, and the result improved the overall fitting of the model, without affecting the 
values of the coefficients and their significance for the main explanatory variables.25 
Finally a control for ODA was used, whose coefficient resulted to be positive but only 
marginally significant. This might be due to some collinearity with other variables, namely with On 
Budget Public Expenditure (0.28) and O&M cost recovery (0.17). These positive correlations, could 
be explained by the donor favorable bias toward utilities with high cost recovery levels. 
In the following, the result about the nonlinear relationship of O&M cost recovery with 
coverage increase will be further discussed by analyzing some features of the quadratic function 
identified. 
The point corresponding to the maximum (zero slope) in the curve describing the 
relationship between cost recovery and change in coverage can be considered as a benchmark and 
compared with the recommendations available in the literature (see 2.2), about the financial results 
that utilities should achieve. Up to that value, the cost recovery increasingly contributes to improve 
the coverage, by reassuring governments and donors about the sustainability of the utility itself and 
by providing funds from financial margins to complement public and donors’ funding. Beyond that 
value this is no longer observed and the coverage change gets slower or even negative.  
If only the cost recovery variables are considered, the relationship takes the functional form 
of a quadratic function:  
f(cr)=αcr2 +βcr+ε                                                                 (2.2) 
For this reason, given that α and β coefficients are estimated in the regression models in 
Table 2.3, the value of cr for zero slope can be calculated through the first derivative of the 
quadratic function. This value of (??) is given by the equation  
 ??=-β/2α                                                                              (2.3) 
regardless the values assumed by all the remaining variables and by the constant term, which 
only determine the position of the curve on the Y axis, by means of the ε coefficient. 
                                                 
25 Clearly, a more detailed analysis of the geographical distribution of the utilities would be of interest, but 
unfortunately this information is not easily available because utilities are very heterogeneous in terms of their 
geographic distribution of their users basins. Some cover all the main towns of a whole country, some are at the 
municipal level, some cover the towns of a district or area of a country. 
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For the models presented above (those which account for unobserved heterogeneity with 
fixed or random effects), ???is between 1.1 and 1.2. This is lower than the benchmarks provided by 
the literature and presented above. Figure 2.1 presents the quadratic functions corresponding to the 
coefficients identified in the models for O&M cost recovery and squared O&M cost recovery, with 
other variables assumed to be zero.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Quadratic functions for O&M cost recovery. 
 
While the analysis above provides some insights about the values corresponding to the 
change of slope of the curves, it does not provide a precise idea about the dimension and sign of the 
coverage change. This depends upon the other variables which determine the vertical positioning of 
the curves. Figure 2.2 refers to the coefficients of model h and shows the results obtained by 
applying such coefficients to the mean values of the variables (initial coverage, public expenditure, 
NRW, urbanization, region) with the related tolerance limits covering 90% of observations with 
95% probability following Howe (1969). 
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Figure 2.2 : Vertical positioning of curve for model h 
 
It can be noticed that, for example, for mean values the level of cost recovery can make a 
difference between increasing and decreasing coverage, since at the level of 1.47 for the cost 
recovery ratio the coverage rates start decreasing in absolute terms, while already from about 1.15 
the dimension of increase on water coverage declines. Similarly, the water coverage itself starts to 
increase only form the level of about 0.83. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The analysis demonstrates the importance of cost recovery, whose impact is particularly 
interesting. The indicator for financial result (O&M cost recovery) is associated with positive 
significant coefficients, but the square of the same indicator, which emphasizes the effect of higher 
levels of cost recovery, has a negative coefficient of comparable dimensions, that are significant in 
most cases. The cost recovery positively contributes to improve the coverage up to a certain value, 
by reassuring governments and donors about the sustainability of the utility itself and by providing 
funds from financial margins to complement public and donors’ funding. Beyond that value this 
positive contribution is no longer observed and the coverage change gets lower or even negative.  
The study confirmed that good financial results do not necessarily translate into 
corresponding increases in coverage, providing some empirical support to the warnings from 
descriptive studies about the fact that if utilities are urged to achieve financial results they might not 
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be in a position to provide water services to low income customers. For example, the high tariffs 
and high connection charges which are made necessary by high cost recovery targets, can push low 
income customers toward water sources other than utility. These are often unprotected and unsafe, 
adversely affecting the coverage (among others Dagdeviren 2008, Bakker et al. 2008, Bayliss 
2011). Similarly, overemphasizing the importance of financial results might push water operators 
toward big volume customers (like industrial customers) that ensure high consumption levels (sales) 
with small investment in distribution (few connections needed), while disregarding the low volume 
demand expressed by African poor households (Bayliss 2011, Bakker et al. 2008)..  
Poorly designed cost control or cost reduction strategies, with maintenance interventions 
postponed or reduced, might also drive decreasing social returns of cost recovery, as the access 
rates, even in previously served areas will decrease. This is consistent with the consideration, done 
by van Ginneken et al. (2011), based on analysis of data from 15 SSA countries (pp.  15-16): “low 
levels of non-salary recurrent expenditures severely limit public sector institutions ability to carry 
out their mandated roles” and “operation and maintenance (O&M) expenditures are too low”.  
It will be important to perform similar exercises on longer time series, once they are 
available. 
The policy implications of the study are about the opportunity of setting high cost recovery 
targets for utilities by regulators or as a reference for performance contracts or in the covenants for 
soft loans and grants. High targets can be misleading and introduce perverse incentives for utilities 
managers. To provide some reference values which should not be exceeded, some computations are 
proposed to identify where the quadratic function changes its slope and results are compared with 
the recommendations from the practitioners’ literature, which are generally higher: the results are 
between 1.1 and 1.2, while recommendations are between 1.33 and 2. 
It is also possible to confirm that operational costs should possibly be recovered by utilities, 
with all the models associating increasing and positive changes in coverage to full O&M cost 
recovery (O&M cr =1).  
While the study does not provide specific recommendations on the optimal mix of tariffs, 
taxes and transfer (TTT) to finance water supply infrastructure, it contributes to the understanding 
of the limitations and risks associated with overreliance on tariffs. 
The study also allows the identification of some positive recommendations for utility 
managers seeking to increase the coverage. More particularly, recalling the results on the role 
played by variables in the models, it is possible to recommend that maintenance of the infrastructure 
should never be neglected and that a certain reliance on public and donors funding should not be 
blamed, given the huge task of increasing coverage in cities with a rapidly growing population.  
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2.7 Appendix A: Variables in the Ib-net database 
http://www.ib-net.org 
Service coverage 
1.1 Water Coverage (%) 
1.2 Water Coverage – HH conn (%) 
1.3 Water Coverage - public water points (%) 
2.1 Sewerage Coverage (%) 
Water consumption and production 
3.1 Water Production (l/person/day) 
3.2 Water Production (m3/conn/month) 
4.1 Tot W Consumption (l/person/day) 
4.2 Tot W Consumption (m3/conn/month) 
4.3 Res. Consumption (% of tot cons) 
4.4 Industrial /Commercial Consumption (% of tot cons) 
4.5 Consumption by Institutes & Others (% of tot cons) 
4.6 Bulk Treated Supply (% of tot cons) 
4.7 Res Consumption (l/person/day) 
4.8 Res Consumption conn to main supply (l/person/day) 
4.9 Res Cons public W points l/person/day 
Non revenue water 
6.1 NRW (%) 
6.2 NRW (m3/km/day) 
6.3 NRW (m3/conn/day) 
Metering practices 
7.1 Metering Level % 
8.1 % Sold 
that is Metered 
Pipe network performance 
9.1 Pipe Breaks breaks/km/yr 
10.1 Sewer Blockages (blocks/km/yr) 
Costs and Staffing 
11.1 Operational Cost W&WW $/m3 W sold 
11.2 Operational Cost W&WW ($/m3 water produced) 
11.3 Operational Cost - water only ($/m3 sold) 
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11.4 Operational Cost Split - % water 
11.5 Operational Cost Split % WW 
12.1 Staff W/1000 W conn (#/1000 W conn) 
12.2 Staff W&WW/1000 W&WW conn 
12.3 Staff W/1000 W pop served 
12.4 Staff W&WW/1000 W&WW Pop Served 
12.5 Staff WW/1000 WW conn 
12.6 Staff W/1000 WW Pop Served 
12.7 Staff % Water 
12.8 Staff % WW 
13.1 Labor costs % Operating costs 
13.2 Electrical Energy Costs % Operating Costs 
Quality of Service 
15.1 Continuity of service (Hrs/day) 
15.3 Quality of W Supplied: # tests for residual chlorine (% of required) 
16.1 Complaints of W&WW services (% of W&WW conn) 
17.1 WW- at least primary treatment (%) 
17.2 WW- primary treatment only% 
17.3 WW- secondary treatment or better (%) 
Billings and collections 
18.1 Average Revenue W&WW ($/m3 water sold) 
18.10 WW Revenue /Pop served (US$/WW pop served) 
18.2 Average Revenue W&WW ($/W conn/yr) 
18.3 Average revenue - water only ($/m3 water sold) 
18.4 Revenue Split - % Water (% of total for W&WW) 
18.5 Revenue Split - % WW 
18.6 Water Revenue - Residential (% of tot W revenue) 
18.7 Water Revenue - Industrial/Commercial (% of tot W revenue) 
18.8 Water Revenue - Institutions & Others (% of tot W revenue) 
18.9 Water Revenue - Bulk Treated Supply (% of tot. revenue) 
21.1 Ratio of Industrial to Residential Tariff 
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21.2 Ratio Industrial to Residential Tariff W 
21.3 Ratio Industrial to Residential Tariff WW 
22.1 Connection Charge water ($/conn) 
22.2 Connection Charge - water (% GNI per capita) 
22.3 Connection Charge sewerage $/conn 
22.4 Connection Charge - sewerage (% GNI per capita) 
23.1 Collection Period (Days) 
23.2 Collection Ratio % 
Financial Performance 
24.1 Operating Cost Coverage ratio 
25.1 Debt Service Ratio % 
Assets 
27.1 Gross Fixed Assets W&WW ($/ pop served) 
27.2 Gross Fixed Assets Water ($/W pop served) 
27.3 Gross Fixed Assets WW ($/WW pop served) 
Affordability of services 
19.1 Total Revenues/Service Pop/GNI (% GNI per capita) 
19.2 Annual Bill for HH consuming 6m3 of W/Month ($/yr) 
20.1 Residential Fixed Component of Tariff ($/conn/yr) 
20.2 Residential Fixed Component of Tariff (% of average bill) 
20.3 Residential Fixed Component of Tariff W ($/conn/yr) 
20.4 Residential Fixed Component of Tariff WW ($/conn/yr) 
20.5 Residential Fixed Component of Tariff W (% of average bill) 
20.6 Residential Fixed Component of Tariff WW (% of average bill)  
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2.8 Appendix B: Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.4 Descriptive statistics: mean values of the variables per area26 
area (obs) 
3 years 
variation of 
coverage 
initial water 
coverage 
non revenue 
water 
urbaniza
tion 
O&M cost 
recovery 
Oda percentage 
points on GDP 
public 
expenditure 
percentage points 
on GDP 
central africa 
(11) 7.82 53.18 19.27 0.91 1.13 0.09 0.20 
east africa (20) 10.15 61.05 37.05 1.25 1.30 0.51 0.63 
south africa (117) 2.01 73.20 40.52 1.00 1.07 0.49 0.91 
west africa (77) -5.16 63.35 29.84 1.49 1.07 0.42 0.22 
Total (225) 0.56 67.77 35.52 1.19 1.10 0.45 0.62 
std 18.28 23.26 16.30 0.60 0.40 0.50 0.55 
max 72 127 82 3.76 2 3.33 1.6 
min -81 8 1 -0.56 0.01 0 0 
 
Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics - pairwise correlation matrix27  
  
3 years 
variation of 
coverage 
initial 
water 
coverage 
O&M cost 
recovery 
squared O&M 
cost recovery 
public 
expenditure oda 
non 
revenue 
water 
3 years variation of coverage 1             
initial water coverage  -0.45*  1           
O&M cost recovery 0.07 0.09 1         
squared O&M cost recovery 0.03 0.04 0.96* 1       
public expenditure 0.21*  0.10 -0.09 -0.13* 1     
Oda 0.19*  -0.01 0.16*  0.12 0.28* 1   
non revenue water 0.13*  -0.18*  0.07 0.05  0.42*  0.10 1 
Urbanization -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.25* -0.08 
*significant at 95% 
 
 
                                                 
26 The large volatility of the dependent variable must be acknowledged. For this reason, the same regressions was 
repeated excluding outliers and obtain very similar results both qualitatively and quantitatively (see Appendix C). 
27 The table refers to the sample used in models b, c, f, g. Fisher transformation allowed to identify a value of 0.13 
corresponding to the absolute value that 95% of pairwise correlations would not exceed in absence of any collinearity. 
Out of 28 pairwise correlations computed, only 9 are above this value, so that 68%, instead of 95% are below. This 
small difference reflects low correlations and supports the idea that multicollinearity does not affect the dataset studied. 
Moreover, as argued by Spanos and McGuirk (2002), the precision of the coefficient estimators and the associated t-
ratios do not necessarily decrease as the correlation among regressors increases. 
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2.9 Appendix C: Robustness check 
 
Due to the fact that the main variables of interest may be subject to outliers, some additional 
exercises were performed in order to assess the robustness of the results presented. Analyzing data 
on the presence of outliers it was realized that excluding those observations from the sample which 
are identified as outliers by some standard techniques (e.g., based on interquartile ranges and inner 
and outer fences), too many observations may be lost. Thus, particularly for the dependent variable 
used around 20% of the sample might be deleted. To avoid such a drastic data reduction a 
compromise was achieved by censoring the dependent variable while deleting outliers for the 
independent and time variant ones.28 
In particular, starting with the sample of 253 observations corresponding to observations 
available for the variables included in models b, c, d, g, h, i, without posing any restriction on the 
value of O&M CR rate, the dependent variable was censored adopting as censoring limits the limits 
identified by multiplying to the limits of first and third quartiles of the distribution by 1.5 the 
interquartile range (i.e. taking the so called “inner fences” or deleting “mild” outliers). Mild outliers 
were also deleted for all the explanatory variables with time variability, using the same 
methodology to calculate thresholds of acceptance (i.e. adopting inner fences for all explanatory 
variables used in models in Table 2.3). Tobit regression for panel data with random effects was then 
adopted to implement the censoring and estimate the model after deleting outliers. As a result, the 
sample remained of similar dimensions, 25 observations were censored and the main findings 
proved to be robust (neither the zero slope has considerably changed, nor any other main results 
discussed above), as shown in Table 2.6 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 For time invariant explanatory variables such public expenditure detection of outliers cannot be applied. 
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Table 2.6 Tobit regression with random effects after accounting for outliers 
 
Three-year difference in water 
coverage 
 
Random effects Limits used 
 f1 g1 h1 i1  
     lower upper 
1) Initial Water Coverage -0.43*** -0.45*** -0.48*** -0.46*** -2.5 137.5 
2) O&M cost recovery 1 21.64** 23.70** 17.88* 16.71* 0.5 2.37 
3) Squared O&M cost recovery* -9.45** -9.91** -7.59* -7.18* -1.26 4.36 
5) On budget Public Expenditure 
for Water3 
 9.22*** 5.43* 5.03*   
6) Non revenue water -0.07 -0.13* -0.16** -0.16** -16 88 
7) Urbanization rate2 -1.57 -1.72 1.38 0.93   
8) Oda2    1.43   
9) Area East Africa   5.90 5.49   
10) Area South Africa   7.03 6.58   
11) Area West Africa   -5.39 -5.48   
Constant 21.94*** 19.38 21.07** 21.85**   
Zero slope 1.15 1.20 1.18 1.16   
N obs 234 224 224 224   
N groups 75 72 72 72   
Goodness of fit indicators χ2 (5)= 50.09*** χ2 (6)= 54.64*** χ2 (9)= 68.38*** χ2 (10)= 69.02***   
Note: For the dependent variable the censoring was as follows: lower limit -23.5, upper limit 28.5, 
17 left-censored observations, 199 uncensored observations for models g1, h1, i1 and 209 
uncensored observations for model f1, 8 right-censored observations. 
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3 Light Private Sector Involvement initiatives in the Sub Saharan Africa 
water supply sector: efficiency, effectiveness and policy implications 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
In the last 20 years, privatization and private sector involvement were the predominant 
international strategies for the reform of urban water services (World Bank 2004, Baietti et al. 2006, 
Prasad 2006, Hall and Lobina 2006, Goldman 2007, Castro 2008). This trend was stimulated by the 
Washington Consensus and by the Dublin Principles (Van Dijk 2008). In the first period private 
sector participation was mainly and as a first option identified with hard forms of Public Private 
Partnership (PPP)29. These forms transfer substantial risk and responsibility to the private sector for 
a significant period of time, like in the case of concession contracts or to a lower extent the case of 
lease and affermage contracts. In the 2000s, the World Bank (WB) and the main donors agencies 
however recognized that privatization policies were not going to bring in the necessary investment 
finance for the African water supply sector30, as private investments were close to zero (Foster and 
Briceno Garmendia 2010, Table 16.6). 
This was due to two main factors. Firstly, the reluctance of private investors to face 
investment and commercial risks in the environment of Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) countries, 
characterized by low profitability and high uncertainty. Secondly, public bodies and civil society 
have given opposition against “privatization”. The dominant strategy of the new neoliberal reform 
model became that of corporatization and commercialization of public water services (Maghdal 
2012). Corporatization and commercialization, however, do not exclude private sector involvement 
which continued to be a preferred option, but new solutions for private sector involvement gained 
momentum (Van Dijk 2008, Anderson and Janssens 2011). These solutions are here identified as 
light, or low risk, Private Sector Involvement (PSI) initiatives and the study aims at assessing if 
these PSIs achieve the expected results and at understanding the determinants of the observed 
performances. 
                                                 
29 Following Van Dijk (2008) we only refer to Public Private Partnership when the solution involves investments by the 
private partner, using the wider notion of PSI for the remaining cases. 
30 According to Marin (2009) out of the more than 260 contracts awarded worldwide since 1990, 84 percent were still 
active at the end of 2007, and only 9 percent had been terminated early. Most cancellations were in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and in Latin America, among concession schemes.  
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With light PSIs, the main expectations from the private actors change from the provision of 
private finance to that of a model and guide for the public utilities to achieve efficiency gains31. 
Efficiency gains are usually seen as a condition for the improvement of the public utility 
management, but in some cases can be seen also as an intermediate step toward further privatization 
to make the financial performances of the utility more appealing for private investors.  
The theoretical framework of full privatization refers to the public choice theory, 
stigmatizing inefficiency and captures of the public sector as opposed to private sector dynamism 
and efficiency. The low risk PSIs can further be associated with the conceptual framework of the 
New Public Management, as the private partner is expected to bring efficiency, customer and 
market orientation into the restructured, corporatized public utilities.  
The arrangements for private sector involvement increasingly include solutions without 
private participation to investment and increasingly even without participation to the commercial 
risk. While concession contracts allocate some investment risks on the private partner and both 
concession and lease/affermage should transfer a substantial share of the commercial risk, the low 
risk PSIs exclude both investment and commercial risk. Management and service32 contracts were 
designed to attract private partners with guarantees and devices to reduce even other types of risks. 
At the same time devices to anchor their payments to actual performances were usually introduced. 
According to Samson et al. (2003), there is a trend toward service and management contracts also to 
promote the participation of national contractors.  
Table 3.1 summarizes the trends described, while the standard classification of the main 
options for private participation in the water sector can be found in 1.5.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 According to Marin (2009 p.  xi) “in the challenging environment of many developing countries, the main focus of 
water PPP should not be about attracting direct private investment, but rather about using private operators to improve 
service quality and efficiency”. 
32 It is important to notice that service contracts presented in the classical PSIs menu provided in 1.5.1, refer to specific 
tasks, resembling what we here call bare outsourcing, while the service contracts analyzed have a broader scope and 
involve strategic dimensions. This inconsistency is due to the fact that service contracts are sometimes forced beyond 
their limits.  
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Table 3.1: Features and evolution of PSIs in Sub Saharan Africa 
Years from 1990s from 2000s 
Type of PPP 
Concession contracts 
Lease 
Affermage 
Management contracts 
Service contracts 
Objectives 
Private Investments to bridge the 
financing gap 
Efficiency gains in financial, commercial and technical 
efficiency 
(sometimes with the expectation of further 
privatization) 
Key actors 
Private partners (mostly water Multi 
National Corporations) 
SOE state owned enterprises 
National (African) Private Sector 
Foreign Public Water Utilities 
Reference Theory / Paradigm Public choice theory New public management 
Risk allocation Investment and commercial risk Performance contracts 
Area Francophone Africa Other regions of Sub Saharan Africa 
Source: personal elaboration 
 
The study reviews the performance assessments of the PSI available in literature about the 
African water sector and contributes to the understanding of the determinants of the observed 
performances. More particularly the incentive structures designed by the contracts and posed on 
both the private and the public partners is analyzed to explain the observed results. As most 
partnerships are associated with some development assistance project, the analysis also provides 
some insights about low risk PSI in the context of the Aid Effectiveness debate (OECD 2005 and 
2012). 
It is here argued that management and service contracts, while resulting from the need to 
promote lighter and more easily acceptable PSIs, also make the objective and expectations posed on 
the private partner much lighter, opening opportunities for rent seeking by operators. The cost of 
such initiatives, and of the various incentives considered, instead remains substantial, particularly if 
both the fees for the private operator and the transaction costs are considered. 
The first paragraph presents the methodology and the variables selected for the analysis. The 
second paragraph analyzes the case studies against the selected variables. The variables are grouped 
into drivers of performance and determinants of the engagement in the partnership. The last 
paragraph draws some conclusions and provides some policy recommendations. Appendix A 
provides the check list used to orient the interviews about the Lilongwe Water Board (LWB) 
experience with PSI, as this case study included original field work.  
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3.2 Methodology 
The chapter presents a qualitative review of case studies on PSI experiences in the water 
supply sector in the Sub Saharan African region. Five case studies are taken from the available 
literature, while the sixth includes original contributions from field work on LWB in Malawi. In 
November 2013, semi-structured interviews were carried out with reference persons from the 
parties involved in the PSI, namely the Project Manager expressed by the Operator, the Deputy 
General Manager of the Public Utility, and the manager of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) in 
charge of supervising the implementation of projects from donors support. The checklist used to 
conduct the interview is provided in Appendix A. All cases refer to management and service 
contracts, the lightest forms in the PSI menu, as none of them involve a direct participation to 
commercial risk. Service contracts can be seen “as a hybrid between a technical assistance contract 
and a management contract” (Trémolet and Mansour 2014 p. i). As clarified by OECD (2009) 
while with management contracts, full managerial responsibility is contracted out to the external 
operator, a service contractor has no authority over budgeting, staffing and implementation 
decisions. For this reason the final responsibility for the overall performance of the utility remains 
with the utility management. Moreover, in the case studies presented, the scope of the partnership is 
broad and involves strategic dimensions. 
 
3.2.1 Presentation of the case studies 
The most significant PSIs covering management and service contracts in the water supply 
sector in the Sub Saharan Africa region have been selected, while contracts involving also other 
services such as energy and contracts below 150.000 users, like Malindi (Kenya) and Tongaat 
(Durban, South Africa) have been excluded. 
There are two service contracts (Burkina Faso and Malawi) and four management contracts 
(Uganda, Johannesburg, Zambia and Ghana) in different Sub Saharan African countries. 
It should be noticed that in three cases, namely Kampala, Johannesburg and Burkina Faso, 
the countries where the PSI was implemented is among the recognized good practices of public 
water supply in Africa (among others the WB publication by Baietti et al. 2006). The PSIs were 
later conceptualized as intermediate steps towards successful corporatization (Marin et al. 2007 and 
2010), even if in some cases, at the beginning, there were expectations for further privatization. 
Anyway these countries, but also Zambia, Malawi and Ghana, resisted more than others against 
deeper forms of privatization and the studied PSI experiences did not change their orientation.  
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As a matter of fact, the case of Kampala covers two PSI contracts, lasting three years each: 
the first from 1997 and the second from 2002. The main features of the case studies are outlined in 
Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2: Main characteristics of the case studies 
  
Kampala 
(Uganda) 
Johannesburg 
(South Africa) 
41 centres (Burkina 
Faso) 
Copperbelt 
(Zambia) 
Urban Areas 
(Ghana) Lilongwe (Malawi)  
  
Management 
Contract 
Management 
Contract Service Contract 
Management 
Contract 
Management 
Contract Service Contract 
Ye
ar
s 1997-200133  
+  2002-2004 2001-2006 
2001-2005 
+ 2006-2007 
extension 
2001-2004 34 2006-2011 2009-2013  + 2013-2014 extension  
m
ain
 d
on
or
s 
in
vo
lv
ed
 
GTZ (KWF 
German 
Development 
Bank), WB, 
UNDP, UNICEF, 
AfDB 
World Bank 
WB, EIB, Agence 
Française de 
Développement, 
KfW, African 
Development Bank  
World Bank  World Bank  EIB EU water facility  
Bu
dg
et 
fo
r i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
as
so
ci
ate
d 
to
 th
e P
SI
 
  
Ziga dam and other 
investment 
(conditional to the 
PSI)          
205 M$ IDA 
comprehensive 
rehabilitation/extensi
on projects 
Mine Township 
Services Project 
38M$ including 
investment.  
 
WB loan 
including 
management fees 
and network 
rehabilitation  
The contract (10.95 
M€) was a  
components of the 
"Urban Water 
Project" (127 M$) 
including Lilongwe and 
Blantyre the budget for 
investment  is more than 
25 M€  
 
integration with the WB 
2011-2015 2nd National 
Water Development 
Project 120M$ 
ot
he
r P
SI
 
op
tio
ns
 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 
Divestiture  
 World Bank 
pushed for a 
concession 
  Lease  
A lease launched 
but not finalized for 
internal opposition  
Management Contract  
Pa
rtn
er
s (
pu
bl
ic
 
ut
ili
ty
 / 
Op
er
ato
r) 
NWSC / Gauff in 
the 1st period and 
OSUL (ONDEO 
now SUEZ) in the 
2nd period 
CoJ /  JOWAM 
(Suez + 
Northumbrian) 
ONEA / Veolia + 
Mazars and Gierard 
AHC-MMS  /  
SAUR 
GWCL / AVRL 
(Aqua Vitens + 
Rand LTD) 
LWB  / VEI 
M
ain
 S
ou
rc
es
 Jammal and Jones  
2006 
Ballance and 
Trémolet  2005 
The Uganda Water 
& Sanitation 
Dialogues 2007 
Marin 2009 
Van Rooyen et 
al.2009 
Ballance and 
Trémolet  2005 
Fall et al. 2009 
Marin et al. 2010 
World Bank 
2000 
Ballance and 
Trémolet  2005 
Cann and Jones 
2006 
Dagdeviren 2008 
Nyambe and 
Feilberg  2009 
Adam 2011 
Dagdeviren 2013 
Shang 2013 
World Bank 2014 
Stone and Webster 2002 
Beckers and Wolters 2013 
Breeveld et al. 2013 
Pascual et al.  2013 
Van Gilst 2013 
VEI (year not available) 
Trémolet and Mansour  
2014 
Source: personal elaboration 
All the PSIs are promoted by some development agencies. In four cases, Burkina, Zambia, 
Ghana and Malawi, there is a clear relation between the PSI and investments by the donors for the 
development of the water supply infrastructure. These investments are often implicitly conditional. 
For example in Ghana, the World Bank gave the government two options: a performance 
management contract which with a grant of US$130 million, or to maintain public sector 
                                                 
33 Kampala Revenue Improvement Project KRIP 
34 Then taken over by Nkana, another public utility of the same area in Zambia. 
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management with a grant of US$30 million (Adam 2013). In the case of LWB, Van Gilst (2013 p.  
9) states that “an incentive based PS service contract was selected to address O&M (Operation and 
Maintenance) inefficiencies and investment needs”. As the contractor Vitens Evides International 
(VEI) was not tied to any investment, the reference is clearly to the conditionality of the related 
investment program by European Investment Bank (EIB). This is confirmed by Trémolet and 
Mansour (2014) referring to service contracts as a necessary condition to access investment funds.  
In all cases the duration of the contract is short, particularly because contracts are not 
renewed (average 4 or 5 years). The duration of the contract was not included among the variables 
of the analysis but, as considered by Jammal and Jones (2006) about the case study of Kampala, “it 
may have minimized operator incentives to undertake long-term change”. Also Tremolét and 
Mansour (2014), referring to the case of Malawi, states that “a timeframe of 4 years was probably 
too ambitious” and that a transformation like the one envisaged “could take up to 10 years to 
materialize”. 
As it is possible to see in the row of Table 3.2 titled “Other PSI options considered”, in 
many cases the PSI was a second option adopted after the failure of the attempt by donors and 
international agencies to promote PSIs with stronger involvement of the private partner. For 
example in Uganda, in 1993 NWSC was among the public enterprises listed for divestiture, which 
was then reconsidered for civil society opposition (Water Dialogues 2007), while concessions and 
leases were considered in the other cases. The genesis of the LWB case is here described with some 
details, as its history is similar and representative of other countries as well. 
In Malawi, Private Participation in the water sector was among the conditions for debt relief 
initiatives by International Monetary Fund (IMF) since the ‘90s (Pijuan and Fresnillo Sallan 2009). 
In 2002, PPIAF35 consultants recommended private participation in the form of a three years 
management contract for the water boards of Blantyre36 and Lilongwe, the main cities of the 
country, which could be progressively followed by a lease contract and a concession (Stone and 
Webster 2002). Contrary to privatization, from 2003 a negative response came from society, 
specifically from the Water Employees Trade Union of Malawi (WETUM) and the main public 
water companies of the country.  The service contract was eventually agreed in 2007 and started in 
2009 for both Blantyre and Lilongwe. As a matter of fact, the contract was the result of a long and 
complex mediation with the civil society and the Government, which both expressed some elements 
                                                 
35 Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility is a multi-donor trust fund (including the cooperation agencies of a 
number of OECD countries and the World Bank) that provides technical assistance to governments of developing 
countries to create an enabling environment conductive to private investment, including the policies, laws, regulations, 
institutions and governments capacity. It also supports governments to develop specific infrastructure projects with 
private sector participation. 
36 Blantyre is the second city of Malawi, included in the same project, but not covered by the present study. 
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of reluctance. According to Tremolét and Mansour (2014 p. i) “the choice of a service contract 
stemmed from the reluctance of key stakeholders in the Malawian water sector and the political 
establishment to engage in a deeper form of PSP, as was initially proposed by the World Bank and 
the Ministry of Finance” and “Stakeholders’ workshops made clear that civil society and the Water 
Boards were fiercely opposed to privatisation and that a “strong” form of PSP could not be 
imposed.” 
 
3.2.2 Presentation of variables  
All the PSIs are assessed against selected variables, most of whom are drawn from the 
relevant literature. Firstly, the PSIs are assessed against the nature of the expected results, usually 
efficiency gains expressed in terms of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and against their actual 
achievement. KPIs are the most common tool to evaluate the success of a project, and they are 
usually monitored by independent auditors. KPIs are identified by the PSI contracts themselves, and 
the analysis of the specific set of indicators adopted by each contract already provides meaningful 
insights on the priorities of the initiative. Moreover, based on the analysis of the final values of the 
KPIs, it is possible to verify the degree to which the low risk PSIs are successful.  
Secondly, to get some insights on the reasons for the performances identified, the PSIs are 
assessed against the incentive to perform posed on the utility and on the contractor.  
Thirdly, incentives to engage in the partnership are considered, to get an understanding of 
the effort by donor agencies and, as a consequence, by public finance to make the PSI initiative 
attractive for the potential contractor, acceptable in the political context and practically feasible. 
Based on these elements, the effort and the actual results, some conclusions are drawn on the 
opportunity to actively promote low risk PSIs in the context of development cooperation and with 
reference to the Aid Effectiveness principles and debate. As a matter of fact, all the PSI initiatives 
in the region are sponsored by donors and international agencies and the promotion of PSI is a 
priority on the development agenda. The Paris Declaration (OECD 2005) and the Busan Principles 
(OECD 2012) pose increasing emphasis on the actual development results of the initiatives, 
focusing on the ownership of the development process by the recipient countries, and on real and 
fair partnerships with donors. In this framework, investments by donors in the promotion and 
support of low risk PSIs can thus be evaluated against their consistency with these principles. 
On one hand, the incentives to perform are considered. The relevant variables are related 
with incentives or penalties and with the allocation of decision making power. They are the 
following ones. 
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• Responsibility and decision making power of the operator. According to Samson et al. 
(2003), service and management contracts tend to be less controversial than deeper forms of 
PSI, because they are of short duration and less authority is transferred to the private partner. 
However, this might also be considered a limitation encountered by private partners in their 
efforts to perform. The variable refers to the allocation of decision making power among 
personnel of the utility and personnel of the private partner. In their Guiding Principles for 
the partnership of service and management contract, Samson et al. (2003) recommend that 
“contract should clearly define the role and duties of all involved. The organization system 
for the implementation of the contract should be specified. There should be separation of 
roles of client and operator” (Samson et al. 2003 p. 32). The existence of residual rights is 
intrinsic to incomplete contracts, to cope with future contingencies, but it could even aim at 
reducing the pressure on the operator towards accountability (Dagdeviren and Robertson, 
2013).  
• Performance payments. Performance payments are very common tools also adopted by 
benchmarking regulation to introduce some competitive pressure, against set targets, in 
natural monopoly conditions. Benchmarking systems, providing benchmarks and target 
values for water utilities in different fields of their operations are increasingly available and 
taken as a reference for reformers, managers and practitioners (among others Tyman and 
Kingdom 2002). The balance between the fixed part of the contract and the one tied to some 
performance measure is considered to be a key element of the risk allocation in the low risk 
PSIs, where both investment and commercial risks are not transferred to the private partners. 
The theoretical reference is to the principal–agent problem which occurs when one entity 
(the "agent") is able to make decisions that impact, or on behalf of, another entity: the 
"principal". The dilemma exists because sometimes the agent is motivated to act in his own 
best interests rather than those of the principal (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
• Competition. The risks associated with contracting and renewal (competition for the 
markets) are also considered to be important elements of competitive pressure when 
operators are working in monopolistic settings. The presence of too few bidders can 
compromise the PSI gains (OECD 2008, Bayliss 2009). The expectation for a contract 
renewal can be an incentive for the operators to perform. 
• Incentives for the staff and for the utility. Even when substantial decision making power is 
allocated to the private partner, the actual implementation of the measures intended to 
improve efficiency and to achieve the set target still depends upon the utility staff behavior. 
Low commitment and efficiency of public sector workers, often stigmatized by the public 
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choice oriented literature (Niskanen 1971), should not be expected to be overcome through 
the introduction of a private partner as such. In management contracts, the private partner 
capacity to increase the efficiency of the personnel is therefore related to the possibility to 
provide consistent incentives and penalties. For service contracts the cooperation of the 
executive management of the utilities is also related with incentives and with the wider 
regulatory framework, if any. Resistance against privatization is also among the elements to 
be considered.    
On the other hand the incentives to engage are considered. They mostly refer to preliminary 
conditions which make the PSI feasible and to the allocation of risks. According to most observers, 
in Public Private Partnerships the risk should lie with the party best able to manage it (for example 
OECD 2008, Bayliss 2009). Private operators are considered better in managing construction and 
operating risks, thanks to their flexibility, while the public sector can better bear risks like delays in 
obtaining permissions or political risks (World Bank 1997).  
 
• Nature of the partner(ship). The nature of the partner is considered in terms of nationality 
and ownership. The variable considers if the foreign contractor firm is publicly or privately 
owned (Furlong 2010) and if it is from outside the African continent or local. A trend in the 
direction of public and southern contractor is identified by Bayliss (2009) “Possibly in 
response to poor private sector responses, there has been an increase in South-South 
cooperation and in investments from state utilities rather than purely private companies”. 
The cost of private finance was proposed by Balance and Trémolet (2005) as an important 
point to be considered when planning for a PSI, even when the PSI does not involve any 
investment, as a mark up on cost is necessarily charged by the private partners. Therefore 
the presence of a state utility in the role of the “private” partner could make some difference 
because it might charge lower rates of return. Another element is that the shareholders of the 
public firm are citizens, not investors. However, they are not the citizens served by the PSI 
so that they are unlikely to push the utility toward better performances, as they could do in 
their own country. Nonetheless public firms probably need to defend their image in the 
home country more than others and they are subject to higher degree of control of their 
performances with social and equity issues. South-South partnerships are more easily 
accepted, as noticed by Fall et al. (2009 p.  38): “Successful PPPs are implemented by Local 
Partners (...) to dissipate the perception of foreign involvement in a socially sensitive sector 
and has increased the acceptability of the PPP. Last, South-South partnership might prove 
to be more effective because the “private” partner already has an experience of the 
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challenges posed by water supply in urban Africa or, more generally in the developing 
countries, (for example informal settlement, low income population, absolute water 
scarcity). The nature of the relationship between the partners is also relevant, as it can be 
conceptualized as commercial or not, and the partner can have aligned perceptions or not. 
• Exchange and inflation risk. These risks are widely addressed in the Camdessus report 
(Winpenny 2003). They are more important when commercial risk is transferred to the 
private partner, but can also affect management and service contracts. Exchange risk can 
affect all contracts where foreign partners are paid in local currency, while inflation risk 
mostly affects the financial performances of utilities, particularly when, as it often happens, 
tariffs adjustments are subject to approval procedures which delay them with respect to the 
increase in the costs of inputs. Anyway poor financial performances, when commercial risk 
is not transferred to the private partner, can only affect the performance payments when 
financial performances and cost recovery is among the reference KPIs. 
• Regulatory risk. Regulatory risk concerns the possibility that the host Government 
introduces changes in the law and regulation which increase the private operator’s costs (for 
example through taxes) or reduce its revenues (through price regulation). Expropriation of 
the investor is also among regulatory risks. The concept of enabling environment for private 
sector involvement and subcontracting is often used to describe the absence of these 
obstacles and risks and refers to legislation and policies (Samson et al. 2003, World Bank 
1997). The Camdessus report (Winpenny 2003) also addresses the component of regulatory 
risk related with the availability of finance. 
• Transaction costs. A number of initiatives are necessary to facilitate and even to make 
possible the transaction, before and during the implementation of the contract (Coase 1937), 
like for example independent auditing. As noted by Ballance and Tremolét (2005) about the 
Africa water sector, Private Sector Participation “does generate substantial costs” even if 
some of them are difficult to quantify, like for example government officials time and 
attention. Supervising the contracts and resolving disputes can also result in substantial 
costs. The costs incurred by agencies like PPIAF for the promotion among policy makers, 
government officers and civil society, to overcome resistances and gain support for PSI 
initiatives should also be considered. In their Guiding Principles for the contract 
preparation process of service and management contract Samson et al. (2003) point on the 
importance of “political acceptance and goodwill for the contract (…) from key 
stakeholders” (Samson et al. 2003 p. 30). 
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3.3 Analysis and Results 
3.3.1 Expected and achieved efficiency gains and their measurement 
The efficiency gains pursued by the partnerships are expressed by the selected performance 
indicators or Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) that, as it is discussed in the next paragraph, are 
often used as a reference for performance payments. Table 3.3 shows the KPIs adopted by the 
analyzed PSIs and they are here introduced, using the same classes proposed in the table to group 
them. Information on the KPIs adopted and on the corresponding performance ratings are taken 
from literature. The results here proposed do not provide an evaluation of the single PSIs considered 
nor even of the low risk PSIs in general. The review here proposed instead provides some 
information on the expected results, on the performances, and on the measurement challenges. All 
of these elements, in fact, and not only the performances, are the basis of the following analysis.  
Commercial and Financial Efficiency indicators are: 
• Collection efficiency indicators: ratio between revenues actually collected and a target 
amount or, more often, the amount invoiced. In Kampala collection from public entities was 
treated separately, due to the common problem of insolvency by public organizations. 
Collection efficiency indicators are very common, found in the IBNET, in the Africa 
Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) database and recommended by Tyman and 
Kingdom (2002); 
•  Volume of sales: only found for the first contract in Kampala and is seldom used in the 
water sector, probably in consideration of water demand management priorities; 
•  Metering practices: Metering level is a very common indicator, expressed as percentage of 
connections metered, or percentage of water metered over total water produced. However 
less common measures were adopted by the contracts about metering. The level of ‘meters 
reading’ expressed as a percentage of meters timely read over total number of meters is not 
common but it can capture the effectiveness of the operations. The number of meters 
installed on public sector connections over the total number of public sector connections is 
also found and refers again to widespread problems with public sector payments.  
•  Operation and Maintenance (O&M) cost recovery: a ratio used to measure a company's 
ability to recover operating costs from annual revenues, calculated by dividing the 
company's annual revenues by the total annual expenses. It is found in the IBNET and AICD 
databases. 
•  Customer satisfaction is often measured by the number of complaints, usually as a 
percentage of the total number of connections (IBNET). 
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Among the KPIs adopted by the contracts there are also other indicators of commercial efficiency 
less documented in the literature, such as the volume of sales divided by a target value, or the level 
of consumption by the public sector.  
Technical efficiency indicators are: 
•  Unaccounted for Water (UFW) or Non revenue Water (NRW): the proportion of produced 
water that is not billed to users because over the total water produced. This accounts for 
technical losses and for illegal connections (or meters tampering). They usually do not 
include uncollected revenues which are captured by the collection efficiency indicator. 
These indicators are very common and they are found in the IBNET, in the AIDC database 
and recommended by Tyman and Kingdom (2002). 
•  Water and wastewater quality: these indicators are usually calculated by the percentage of 
chemical tests passed (like chlorine residuals) or by the percentage volume of water treated 
to primary and secondary level (IBNET, AICD).  
•  Continuity of supply expresses the number of hours per day of water availability. 
Among the KPIs adopted by the contracts there are also other, less common, indicators of technical 
efficiency, such as pressure in the network, Capacity Utilization, timely interventions for the 
maintenance, power and chemical consumption. In Uganda, and indicator of Connection Efficiency 
(CE) was adopted, capturing the number of active connections on total number of connections.  
Access indicators are: 
•  Coverage: percentage of people served over the total reference population. It is a very 
common indicator. The number of new water kiosks is also found as a KPI in the contract 
considered, to reflect a coverage increase. 
•  Reduction of connection costs: it is not common but addresses a key problem in water 
access, as high connection costs prevent connection by the poor.  
The main indicator for Staffing level and human resources (HR) is Labor productivity, usually 
measured by the number of staff per 1000 connections. It is found in the IBNET, in the AIDC 
database and recommended by Tyman and Kingdom (2002). In South Africa KPIs about black 
economic empowerment were also adopted. 
Table 3.3 shows the performances of the PSIs analyzed. Underlined indicators correspond to 
poor achievements, while indicators in italic refer to cases where it was not possible to measure the 
performances, so that the KPI was not used for the purposes of performance payments. Plane text 
corresponds to indicators that proved to be successful according to the available sources, even if in 
some case specific values were not available. Figures are also provided when available for the first 
5 cases, while for Lilongwe, they are provided in Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.3: Performances of the PSIs 
Kampala (Uganda) 
Johannesburg 
 (South Africa) 
41 centres 
(Burkina Faso) 
Copperbelt 
(Zambia) 
Urban Areas  
(Ghana) 
Lilongwe 
(Malawi)  
C
om
m
er
ci
al
 a
nd
 
fi
na
nc
ia
l e
ff
ic
ie
nc
y 
? GAUFF  
collection 90% 
of the target 
? GAUFF  sales 
69% of target  
? OSUL 
Collection on 
bills (non Gov) 
~100%  
? bills collection 
and reading of 
meters 
? customer service    
? bill collection 
from 85% to 
95%  
? Collection 
to billing 
+12% (< 
average) 
? O&M Cost 
Recovery 
+21% (> 
average) 
? collection ratio 
decrease(from 89.1 to 
89%) 
? customer response  
? <50% meters installed 
and read for public users  
? O&M 
Cost 
Recovery 
T
ec
hn
ic
al
 e
ff
ic
ie
nc
y 
? OSUL: CE 80% 
against a target 
of 84% 
? OSUL: UFW 
45% against a 
target of 36%.  
? water and 
wastewater quality  
?  timely 
interventions for 
maintenance on 
the network   
? increased 
NRW  
? UFW -
19%37  
? Treated water quality 
and pressure 
? NRW increase (from 48 
to 49%) 
? capacity utilization in 
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4% (in line 
with 
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of supply 
? n of new 
kiosks 
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? human resources  
? black economic 
empowerment- 
? Labor 
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Source: personal elaboration 
 
All the PSIs registered some failures in some indicators and most of them registered many. 
The only area where most PSIs registered at least some success, is the one of commercial and 
financial efficiency. Johannesburg experience looks like the most successful one. However, the 
KPIs were not defined from the beginning by the contracting authority and were decided by the 
auditor during project implementation (Van Royeen 2009), while baseline values were often 
unavailable. It should be noticed that, following Dagdeviren (2008), the performance of the private 
operator in the Zambian Copperbelt were compared to the ones of other utilities in the country, not 
to the contract targets, and they are not worse than the average. However, one could expect that the 
investment in the PSI can bring in something more, particularly when its value represents such a 
large share of the utility turnover (see 3.3.2.2). 
Some more specific comments can be derived from Table 3.3. In line with the general goals 
of the contracts, there is in all the case studies a main focus on improvements in financial and 
commercial efficiency and in technical efficiency. Access indicators are also found in some cases, 
but it should be noticed that in most cases they are designed to capture the degree of budget 
execution of complementary investment funded. As a matter of fact, investments are usually funded 
through donors’ grants, so that their degree of execution does not measure original interventions by 
                                                 
37 Improved more than average, but still 32% with a target of 30% (World Bank 2000). 
38 There was an slight increase in access, which is anyway remarkable if the 4% urbanization rate is considered. 
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the private operator. These indicators were classified in the access class, but they could as well be 
considered as efficiency indicators. The weighting system adopted to aggregate the indicators for 
the purpose of the performance payment would also shed some light on the priorities pursued by the 
PSIs, but unfortunately it was not available for enough cases. 
The scope of the analyzed contracts is usually broad as reflected by the presence of 
indicators measuring different types of efficiency. It is also important to note that in many cases the 
scope of the contract is even broader than the field that the KPIs manage to capture. This leaves a 
part of the performance not tied to indicators. For example, in the case of the LWB contract there 
were a number of contractually defined tasks39, which corresponded to deliverables, but not to 
indicators. This is also discussed in the session about performance payments (3.3.2.2). 
In many cases the selected KPIs failed to capture the actual performances by the private 
partner or they prove to be weak tools. This is sometimes due to the poor definition of the target 
values of the indicators, to the incomplete definition of the methodology for the computation of the 
indicator, or to the unavailability of baseline data, or data about the progress. For example in 
Johannesburg, the target values of the KPIs were not defined from the beginning by the contracting 
authority and were decided by the auditor during project implementation (Van Royeen 2009), while 
baseline values were often unavailable both in Johannesburg and in Ghana (Marin et al. 2007, 
Dagdeviren and Robertson 2013). This makes the evaluation of effectiveness resulting from Table 
3.3 even worse than apparent at first. In Lilongwe, the indicator “continuity of supply”, originally 
foreseen by the contract, was then removed from the KPIs.  The removal was agreed by the utility 
and the contractor because the achievement of satisfactory values was recognized as unfeasible due 
to the shortage of water. The contractor proposed to develop a rationing plan but it was not further 
developed, so that the furthest district, mainly composed by Low Income Areas (LIAs), were 
simply left without water during the daily hours, when the demand is higher. Dropping the indicator 
indeed was the only point agreed, reflecting the failure of the partnership to address the problem. 
Also in the case of Ghana, the computation of the indicators values proved to be challenging. 
Treated water quality generally resulted to be unsatisfactory, but was not properly quantified in the 
terms of the KPIs and also a governmental report (Min. of Water 2010) mentioned challenges, 
among others in “baseline setting”. Even if the contract provided penalties against the operator for 
incompliance with quality standards for 2 consecutive days, failure by the operator to provide 
                                                 
39  Contractual tasks are 1) Organizational structure plan 2) Commercial Management (including integrated accounting 
software  and customer database, tariff calculation model, metering reading and revenue collection processes) 3) 
Management Information System 4) Reduction of NRW (including GIS, loss reduction, leak detection and repair in 
distribution system, customer metering program, Illegal connections and unbilled authorized consumption 5) O&M 
Plans 6) Extension of water Supply services to LIA 7) Optimizing pumping regimes 8) Access to water facility 9) 
Public relations 10) Hiv/aids programme 11) Implementation of the Investment program (Pascual 2013 and interview 
with the PIU PM). 
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information about date and time made any sanction difficult. Similarly, data on the use of some 
chemicals in water treatment plants were not available. In Burkina Faso, despite the service 
contractors had obviously no responsibility for staffing levels, an indicator of human resources 
efficiency was present. 
The case of LWB is discussed with more detail. Table 3.4 shows that performances during 
the first four years of the contract were quite poor and efficiency gains limited. Differences between 
the figures provided by the two sources considered might reflect changes introduced during the last 
year of project implementation. 
Table 3.4: Targets and performances of the Service Contract for LWB  
Indicator % weight for 
performance payment 
Baseline target Achieved at the end of the 
4th year of the project  
source Beckers and Wolters 
2013 
Beckers and Wolters 
2013 
Trémolet and Mansour  
2014 
Trémolet and Mansour  
2014 
Non Revenue Water 50% 39%40 30% 37% 41 
O&M Cost Recovery 20% 1.15 1.35 2.25 
N of new kiosks 15% 0 372 200 
Continuity of supply 15% 
(then reallocated) 
92% 95% dropped 
Source: personal elaboration on data coming from Beckers and Wolters 2013 and Trémolet and 
Mansour  2014 
The performance was poor, as it is confirmed by the fact that, at the end of the 4th year of 
project, when targets were supposed to be fully achieved the contractor (VEI) in Lilongwe was only 
awarded 53% of the performance scores and of the corresponding payment. 
The only achieved target was the one about cost recovery. As it is discussed in the next 
paragraph, however, this indicator was recognized by both the interviewed representatives of LWB 
and VEI to be out of VEI control, while even indirect contributions supposed to be provided by 
VEI, like the tariff calculation model and the customer software were not adopted. The increase was 
drastic, from 1.25 at the end of the 3rd year to 2.25 at the end of the 4th, but both the field work and 
the secondary sources failed to identify the drivers of such a drastic increase. The increase could be 
related to the high tariff rise accorded by the Government from August 2012, overcompensating the 
dramatic inflation and devaluation of the local currency42. Moreover, such an over-performance is 
not necessarily positive, as a value of 2.25 is beyond the recommended benchmarks43 for cost 
recovery in developing countries and because a conflict between social and financial results is often 
a key trade off to be considered. 
                                                 
40 The baseline was initially 31% but was reviewed upward in July 2012 (Beckers and Wolters 2013) 
41 According to Tremolét and Mansour in January 2014 the value was improved to 30% 
42 Malawi experienced a severe FOREX crisis in 2011 and 2012, also associated with shortages of fuel, which resulted 
in the devaluation of May 2012. 
43 For example Tyman and Kingdom (2002) propose a benchmark of 0.68 for the working ratio for developing countries 
utilities which corresponds to a ratio of 1.47 O&M cost recovery. 
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As a concluding remark it is possible to observe that the performances of the PSIs 
considered were below expectations or difficult to measure. In the case of service contracts it was 
also difficult to attribute the performances observed to the intervention of the contractor, while in 
the case of management contract it was easier, at least for the functions transferred to them. This is 
discussed in the next paragraph.  
 
3.3.2 Incentives to perform 
Sometimes it is difficult to establish a link between the performances observed and the 
intervention of the contractor. This takes the form of a common attribution problem with 
management contracts, particularly when the management of human resources is transferred and 
few external factors can affect the performances. In the case of service contracts instead, we can 
sometimes notice that the theory of change supporting the PSI project is weak itself. In these cases 
the link between the contractor’s activity and the performance relies on strong assumptions, like the 
presence of a cooperative environment (addressed in the fourth part of this paragraph: 3.3.2.4). This 
problem is crosscutting to the first three categories of incentives analyzed, namely power, 
performance payments, and competition, as none of these incentives can push contractors beyond 
their reach. 
3.3.2.1 Responsibility and decision making power for the operator 
 It is here argued that the lack of a clear definition and separation of the roles of the parties 
and little responsibility posed on the contractors can be disincentives to perform. Among the 
selected case studies, the most notable difference is between management and service contracts, as 
the latter involves a lower level of responsibility transfer and usually a less clear definition of roles. 
However, within the two groups and particularly within the group of management contracts, 
different degrees of autonomy and transfer of decision making capacity can be found. In the cases 
of Johannesburg, JOWAM (the consortium created by SUEZ and Northumbrian) was given a full 
management role, only excluding production which was traditionally unbundled in Johannesburg. 
Also in Kampala, the management role given both to Gauff and OSUL (first and second contract 
respectively) included distribution and billing, but excluded production. However the responsibility 
of the performance was questioned, as “improvements would have happened even without 
privatization” (Jammal and Jones 2006). In Ghana, the management role given to AVRL, included 
total control on revenues. However, a governmental report (Min. of Water 2010) reported the 
existence of challenges, among others, in the interpretation of the contract which for example 
foresaw that some decisions were to be taken by the operator “in consultation with” GWLC and a 
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practical interdependence between the two in many fields, like technical and financial reporting, 
human resources, investment planning (Dagdeviren and Robertson 2013). In Zambia, the private 
operator has received the responsibility to determine daily staff assignments, jointly with the 
evaluation of their performance and to manage all Operation, Maintenance and Repair works of the 
systems, plant, equipment and other facilities. The utility AHC-MMS conversely kept some key 
responsibilities, through its Head Office, whose staff was not managed by the private operator and 
that was given the role of monitoring the performances of the PSI. Moreover they kept full control 
on all costs and payments (Nyambe and Feilberg 2009).  
When the service contracts are considered, the role given to the contractors is basically an 
advisory one, with no transfer of decision making powers. In Burkina Faso “The private partners 
sent two permanent staff members, initially to serve as directors of the commercial and finance 
departments. But the parties soon agreed that because of sensitivities, the expatriates should 
instead act as deputies to local managers. Many other foreign staff were sent on short-term 
missions as advisers. Thus the international operator had mostly an advisory role” (Marin et al. 
2010 p.  2) Even if there is a KPI about labor productivity, the operator had no responsibility on 
staffing levels. Some power was given to the operator by the institution of an operating investment 
fund (M$3) to allow him to purchase some equipment rapidly and autonomously (Marin et al. 
2010). 
In the case of LWB, some quotations from interviews about the role of the foreign partner 
are reported below. The PIU manager explained that the KPI Cost Recovery was out of VEI control, 
commenting that the contract was not well shaped, because the performance fee was anchored to 
indicators which did not reflect the operators performances. Even for the indicator about the number 
of water kiosks in LIA, VEI only certified the commissioning of the water posts at the end of 
process that was entirely managed by LWB and WaterAid44. According to the PIU manager, the 
most meaningful indicator was the one about NRW, while for the remaining the contractor should 
have taken the executive power. The Resident Project Manager from VEI, also recognized that VEI 
could not respond of the KPIs and explained that VEI recommendations were usually approved by 
LWB, but then they were not implemented accordingly.  
The Manager of the PIU also commented that the contract was too abstract. More 
particularly, in many parts of the contract it is stated that “VEI will assist LWB” in various fields, 
but the meaning of “to assist” is never clarified. For these reasons the PIU manager would not 
recommend to use a similar contract again. According to the PIU Manager VEI should make 
                                                 
44 WaterAid is a UK based international NGO (www.wateraid.org) 
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proposals, then LWB can agree or not, and if agreed VEI should supervises the implementation. 
However, the Resident Project Manager from VEI, discussing about the strengths and weaknesses 
of this contract design, commented that “VEI has no control over the implementation.” The Deputy 
General Manager of the LWB confirmed that, at least at the beginning, there was a problem of 
interpretation of the commitment by VEI “to assist” LWB, often mentioned in the contract: “for 
VEI the advisory role did not imply that they had to go on the ground it should mean to work 
together on the ground, even in implementation and monitoring”. The lack of assistance in the 
implementation of the recommended procedures can related also to the comparatively low 
incentives for performances and to the penalties for deliverables (see 3.3.2.2) . 
3.3.2.2 Performance payments  
All the PSIs provided for a part of the payment to be tied to the performances, usually 
measured by KPIs. The scope of the contracts however can be broader. 
In the second contract for Kampala (OSUL), although there were 20 quantitative 
performance targets, most of them were irrelevant because they were not tied to incentives or 
performance payments. Collection remained the most important target, and the operator's 
performance was appraised only against the three indicators shown in Table 3.3. Moreover, if the 
operator had met all targets, it could have received an additional maximum of US $250,000. This is 
not a strong incentive, as it only amounted to about 7% of the fixed management fee. Moreover the 
amount was supposed to be paid only if all the targets were fully met and there wasn’t any 
additional bonus in case of over-performance. Jammal and Jones (2006) suggested instead that 
“performance might well have been better if incentives were larger and continuous”. 
In Zambia an external audit is carried out annually to determine the annual bonus of 
performance payment.  
In the case of Ghana (Shang 2013, Dagdeviren and Robertson 2013), both performance 
incentives and penalties were left for the operator to determine (Dagdeviren and Robertson 2013). 
Penalties were excluded if failures were caused by preexisting “snag items”. The operator however 
during contract implementation presented “everything as snag” (Dagdeviren and Robertson 2013) 
so that no penalties were applied. Moreover "incentive design was more on attracting the private 
sector than inducing optimal performance" (Shang 2013).  
In the case of LWB, the performance based part of the payment does not foresee any 
penalty, while it provides for penalties to be deducted from the fixed part of the payment. 
According to the PIU Manager interviewed this is not recommendable. Penalties are only applied to 
the base fee in case of failure or delay to deliver reports and deliverables, or in case the deliverables 
were not approved by LWB. This, according to Trémolet and Mansour (2014), led to a great effort 
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in report production and submission particularly in the first period of project implementation which 
was misleading and diverted attention from other priorities. VEI reports, timely submitted and 
covering all the topics included in the broad scope of the contract as presented above, were 
perceived by the staff of the Water Boards as “lengthy Textbook” whose implementation was not 
straightforward (Trémolet and Mansour 2014). Reports were probably based on internationally 
recognized good practices but they were not shaped to address the specific challenges faced on the 
ground in Lilongwe and they failed to translate them in the terms of the existing procedures and 
practices. The Resident Project Manager from VEI also recognized that instead of short missions45 
(he mentioned 35 weeks of experts per year covered by many different experts lasting from 1 to 3 
week each), VEI would better have sent experts for longer assignments to provide not only training 
but also follow up on the job. 
Burkina is the only case where penalties were foreseen for low performances. Physical 
outputs, like reports, instead were associated with a price paid to the operator for each deliverable, 
not with a penalty, as it was in Lilongwe. Table 3.5 provides the breakdown of the values of the 
contracts into fixed and performance based components, jointly with information about penalties.  
Table 3.5: Composition of the payment 
 Kampala46 (Uganda) Johannesburg 
(South Africa) 
41 centres 
(Burkina Faso) 
Copperbelt 
(Zambia) 
Urban Areas 
(Ghana) 
Lilongwe (Malawi)  
Contract value for 
the whole period 
M€ 4.4 ~M$5.28 ~4.5 M€ M€ 3.9 M€1.5 in 2003 
10.95 M€ 
including 5M€ 
for spares 
M€ 2.16 Lilongwe 
only 
Fixed payment M€ 2.98 1.78 M€ M€ 2.6 ~ 1.13 M€ in 2003 
 
10.95 M€ 1.5M €  
Performance 
payment 
7% of the fixed 
management fee (€ 
209.000) 
1.43 M€ ~M€ 1.25 (max) ~ 0.45 M€ in 2003  0.66  M€ 
other 
10% of collections 
above a certain target 
0.18% 
 on operational 
margin 
a price for each 
specified output   No 
Performance on 
total contract value 
32% >30% 32% ≤25% <15% 44% 
Contract value on 
revenues in the same 
period 
6%  <1% 
<3% (annual 
revenue >M€25) 27% 4% 
6% (revenue ~M€9  
LWB report 2011-
2012) 
Penalties and 
performance bond  
€ 500,000 
performance 
bond  
The performance 
payment can 
also be a penalty 
 
Only in case of 
gross 
negligence  
? Penalties for 
deliverables47 
? no penalties for 
KPIs 
? performance 
security bond € 
200,000 
Source: Personal elaboration 
                                                 
45 Almost 50% of the man-week made available by VEI Short Term Expert in the Framework of the contract were 
devoted to the writing phase (the first phase of the project when such reports were mainly produced) and only around 
25% of this time was spent on the field (Trémolet 2014). 
46 The table refers to the second phase and to the second contract (OSUL). The first contract with GAUFF only included 
a performance payment of 25% of revenues collected (including arrears) above a certain target and no incentives for 
other performances.  
47 The total amount of penalties could reach 30% of the base fee. Penalties were only applied  for  deliverables  that  
were  under  the  service  contractor’s  full  command, such as the production of reports. There was also the possibility 
to terminate the contract by LWB if the weighted average achievement of all targets was less than 50%. However, in 
practice it was possible only if the Auditor agreed that the shortfall was the service contractor sole responsibility, which 
is technically impossible under a service contract. 
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Some general comments can be derived from Table 3.5: 
? The performance payment usually represents an important share of the overall contract 
value. Ghana is an exception and its performances were particularly poor.  
? Performance payment should be linked to variables which depend upon the effort and the 
capacity of the private partner, otherwise even high percentage of the payment tied to 
performance can be ineffective (like in Burkina and in Lilongwe).  
? The value of the contract on revenues does not usually exceed the 6% of the revenues for the 
reference period. Zambia seems to be an important exception. Also the 6% of LWB seem to 
be high if one considers that the management role is not covered and management fees are 
excluded (in Burkina, where the other service contract considered was implemented, the 
percentage is below 3%). 
? Penalties seem to be unevenly used. 
 
3.3.2.3 Competition 
During the time period covered by the contracts there was an improvement in the selection 
procedures, with increasing transparency and competition. The numbers of bidders also increased. 
In Uganda, the first PSI, with Gauff, was contracted through sole-sourcing, while OSUL, the 
second contractor, was selected through competitive bidding. In Burkina Faso there were 3 bidders 
only. 
In Johannesburg a two steps procedure was adopted with seven pre-qualifying bidders from 
around the world: Acea SpA (Italy), Thames Water (UK), Azurix Services (USA), Vivendi 
(France), Suez & Northumbrian Water Group (France/UK), Severn Trent (UK), and later 
Corporation of Western Australia. Five of them submitted final proposals and Suez & 
Northumbrian won, registering as JOWAM (Marin et al. 2007).   
In Lilongwe a two steps procedure was launched and two bidders were shortlisted out of six 
who submitted a proposal in the first round (VEI and VEOLIA). According to the PIU, VEI won 
because VEOLIA submitted a higher financial proposal and left some activities "back to the client" 
(PIU). Activities “back to the client” might mean that, after the experience in Burkina, Veolia tried 
to avoid the replication of an unclear allocation of responsibilities, which often characterizes service 
contracts and which later proved to be challenging also for by VEI (see 3.3.2.1).  
In the case of Ghana, there were few bids and AVRL’s proposal probably was better and 
lower, in terms of financial offer, than the other (Shang 2014). No information was retrieved from 
the literature about the selection procedure for the contractor of Zambia. 
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The trend towards increasing competition for the market and more transparent procedures is 
a positive one, but it should also be noticed that it was associated with the development and 
adoption of devices designed to mitigate the risk posed on the private partner in the bidding phase. 
In the case of Malawi, 50,000 € were refunded to the failing bidder participating in the second step 
of the selection procedure, which lasted 3 months for detailed proposals (Trémolet and Mansour 
2014).   
The expectation of a renewal can be an incentive to perform. Renewal never occurred in the 
cases considered and only in the case of Johannesburg and Kampala, the initial expectations for 
renewal lasted long enough be an incentive. In Ghana, despite a lease was envisaged for the period 
following the contract (Dagdeviren and Robertson 2013), the management reverted to the public 
sector and also the company created at the end of the contract in 2011 was closed, rejoining the 
asset holding company. In July 2013, “two years after this move and seven years following the 
experimentation with private sector participation, Government of Ghana has finally decided to give 
GWCL workers one more chance to operate water supply systems in the country” (GWCL 2013) 
with a backward move toward integrated public service. 
In Kampala, for example, the original contract provided for a one-year negotiated extension. 
Performance targets were agreed, but negotiations broke down on the issue of the management fees, 
and in February 2004, were halted. Also for Johannesburg, which was probably the most successful 
contract among the case studies considered, there were expectations of renewal. 
In the two cases of service contracts (Burkina and LWB), the contracts were actually 
extended. Yet this should not be considered a success because the extension aimed at giving more 
time to the private operator to reach the performance targets that remained unmet, without 
allocating extra budget. In the case of Lilongwe, the total cost of the one year extension of the 
contract was € 1,290,000, and around 25% was funded by VEI from bonus payments already 
received and the rest came from the budget for the un-awarded performance bonus (see 3.3.1). 
The analysis of the case studies makes it possible to conclude that renewal seldom occurs 
and that the lack of expectations of a renewal, therefore, is a disincentive to perform in this kind of 
contracts. 
3.3.2.4 Incentives for the staff and for the utility  
None of the analyzed PSI experiences included explicit incentives for the utility to cooperate 
with the contractor to jointly achieve the project goals and to follow its recommendations. This is 
due to the fact that the willingness to cooperate by the utility was taken as an assumption, despite 
the presence of resistances among executives and staff was known in advance by all the parties, 
being among the key reasons for the selection of light form of PSI.  
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The type of the incentives to be considered differs according to the category of contract: 
incentives to the workers are relevant in the case of management contract, while incentives to the 
utility as an institution have to be considered in the case of service contracts, as the executive 
management remains under the public utility. 
When management contracts are considered, poor cooperation by the utility workers was 
registered in the case of Ghana. Referring to this case study, Shang (2013) explains that the 
negative, not cooperative, attitude of the staff of GWLC was due to the fact that “the PPP was 
based on the assumption that they were incompetent”.  
This disempowerment feeling was likely to be absent or at least less strong in the case of 
Zambia and in Johannesburg, because the utilities were newly established. In the case of 
Johannesburg, JW (the utility then managed by JOWAM) was a newly created one resulting from 
the integration of six different operational units of the municipality, City of Johannesburg (CoJ), 
incorporated in 2000. This happened within a major restructuring and corporatization initiative 
undertaken by CoJ in many sectors following its own strategy and priorities, which is likely to 
improve the perception of ownership about the PSI. In the case of Zambia, when the mines of the 
Copperbelt area were privatized, the new owner did not want to manage water supply and other 
municipal services. AHC-MMS, the local utility, was incorporated as a company in 1999, only two 
year before the beginning of the PSI contract. About the first PSI in Kampala, Samson et al. (2003) 
poses a question mark on the issue whether the processes were properly managed to get the support 
of the senior management of the public utility and of key stakeholders, to avoid sabotage and foster 
team working. About disempowerment the same author states that most middle managers felt 
discriminated and they “have resorted to sitting and earning salary for nothing” (Vol 2 p.  122) 
while also the lower level staff reported about poor relationship with the expatriate staff.  
Another relevant dimension is the degree of control by the contractor over the utility staff 
and particularly the possibility to award benefits and salary incentives. In Johannesburg salary 
incentives and benefits were largely used by the private contractor: the average salary increases by 
23% and 693 promotions have been made. In other two cases of management contracts (Zambia and 
Ghana), the contractor has only been transferred the operational management of staff but not the 
human resources management. Particularly, in Zambia the private operator was supposed to manage 
the staff from an operational perspective only, without the possibility of providing incentives. In 
Ghana (Shang 2013) although 3000 members of staff were seconded to AVRL, AVRL did not have 
the power to fire or to promote people, nor even to increase salaries. According to the representative 
of the contractor this “means you have very small power to influence the operations of the 
company”.  
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As concerns the service contracts, expatriates from the service contractors had obviously no 
responsibility for staffing levels, even if in Burkina Faso an indicator of human resources efficiency 
was present. In Burkina Faso the expatriate staff simply hold the positions of deputy managers of 
the commercial and financial departments, coaching local management without hierarchical 
responsibilities over the staff of the local utility, ONEA, with important limitations to their capacity 
to guide the staff toward the objectives. In Lilongwe their role was the one of advisors and scarce 
cooperation was registered. The Deputy General Manager reported that “there was resistance by the 
LWB staff toward VEI and VEI was frustrated”. To address this lack of incentives, VEI proposed an 
arrangement to share the performance payments with the Water Boards, but this solution was not 
implemented (Trémolet and Mansour 2014). The caretaker model with caretakers and NRW teams 
at zone level48 included an idea of competition among zones which could also provide incentive to 
the middle and base level staff, but it was at a low level and probably it came too late. 
As a concluding remark, it is possible to state that the cooperation is critical to the success of 
light PSI and it often fails to be achieved. 
3.3.3  Incentives to engage 
3.3.3.1 Nature of the partner(ship)  
Among the contractors of the six case studies there are multinational corporations (MNCs) 
operating in the water sector, consulting firms and foreign public utilities, both from the European 
and the African continent. As a matter of fact, the oldest case studies include MNCs of the water 
sector and, in the most recent cases, public utilities from abroad. Only in one case there is a public 
utility from another African county. It is here shown that the advantages of the public nature of the 
partners fail to compensate the top-down genesis of the partnership, while it might explain some 
risk adverse attitude..  
The first contract in Kampala was awarded to a German consulting firm. The second 
contract in Kampala and the contract in Zambia were with French MNCs. Jowam, the contractor of 
the PSI in Johannesburg, was also owned 66% by a French MNC, while in Burkina another French 
MNC was awarded the contract, jointly with an international auditing firm.  
                                                 
48 The caretaker model is about technical losses and about the management of minor maintenance interventions on the 
distribution network. The caretaker approach is in line with the District Metered Area (DMA) approach that fragments 
the supply areas in smaller areas for more effective control of the network. Caretakers have vehicles and leakages 
detectors and each knows well his reference area from the social and the technical point of view. VEI has set up NRW 
task forces, trasversal to the operational units of LWB and including members of the customer services, the accounting 
and the distribution units (Trémolet and Mansour 2014). 
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These four cases indeed, are dominated by traditional actors of the sector, while the 
remaining two cases witness the new trends described in the methodological part of the chapter 
(3.2.2). 
In Ghana, AVRL is a consortium by Aqua Vitens and Rand LTD. Vitens is one of the two 
big Dutch public water utilities, owned by provinces and municipalities. Rand Water is the largest 
bulk water utility in Africa, providing bulk potable water to more than 11 million people in South 
Africa and it is also public. VEI (Vitens Evides International)49, the entity awarded the service 
contract in Malawi, for both Blantyre and Lilongwe, was created by Vitens, the company awarded 
the contract in Ghana, and by its homologue Evides, the other main public water company in the 
Netherlands, for the specific purpose of assisting developing countries utilities, on a non-profit 
basis. 
If the experience of the partners is considered, in the first contract of Kampala, GAUFF, 
being a consulting firm, had no previous experience in operating water systems. The lack of 
experience of Gauff according to Jammal and Jones (2006) helped explain the subsequent poor 
performance. Ghana was the first international experience of VEI (Trémolet and Mansour 2014), 
done through Aqua Vitens and senior management positions were filled by personnel lacking 
adequate experience (Dagdeviren and Robertson 2013). As a consequence Malawi was the second 
international experience of VEI. This means that new, less experienced actors can be attracted by 
these low risk PSIs. In Lilongwe, as VEI had no experience about LIA supply issues, WaterAid 
participation in the project was probably intended to fill this gap, with a focus on Water Users 
Associations for the management of public taps. 
The implications of public ownership can better be understood by exploring the cases of 
Ghana and Malawi. In the case of Ghana, a governmental report (Min. Of Water 2010) assessed the 
Status of the Management Contract mentions challenges including the relations between the 
partners, among others. This contradicts the expectation of peaceful cooperation among public 
partners. 
In Malawi, the partner VEI should be classified as public foreign firm. The article by 
Pascual et al. (2013) conceptualizes the partnership as a Water Operators’ Partnership (WOP). 
WOPs are peer-support arrangements between two or more water or sanitation operators, carried 
                                                 
49 Vitens Evides International is the result of a venture of the two largest public water utilities in the Netherlands: Vitens 
and Evides. The venture was born in 2005 as a response to public interest and political request for supporting 
international water projects. VEI is a small group, with 20 staff currently in total, but relies on the expertise of Vitens’ 
and Evides’ staff. 
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out on a not-for-profit basis with the objective of strengthening their capacity50. The not-for-profit 
basis of WOPs is technically consistent with the status of VEI, which is a non profit entity, but it 
does not fit well with a performance based service contract. The non-profit nature of VEI was 
probably among the success factors for the contract award, due to the lower financial proposal 
submitted, but the perceptions of the nature of the partnership were not aligned. LWB 
representatives and the PIU pointed out the commercial nature of the partnership, while VEI 
defined it as a WOP, motivating the definition with the consideration that both partners are public 
and that VEI only recovers the costs faced for the project. Moreover, the representative of VEI 
declared the intention to give back the performance payment to the board and, in case the full 
payment was not awarded, to provide the difference from their own pocket.” The inconsistency in 
the perception of the two parties and the top-down genesis of the partnership itself make the peer 
cooperation implicit in the WOPs approach hardly applicable.  
About responsiveness to performance incentives, Trémolet and Mansour (2014) underlines 
that VEI bid for a fixed fee to recover its costs and that, regardless the final design of the contract, it 
remained focused on the fixed fee. This resulted in the adoption of a risk adverse attitude, aiming at 
avoiding penalties (see 3.3.2.2) by timely fulfilling the reporting requirements instead of addressing 
the KPIs challenges, reflecting the priorities of VEI public shareholders from the Netherlands 
(Trémolet and Mansour 2014). A perfunctory attitude can also explain why VEI did not pre-finance 
items on water boards budget (like maps and bulk meters) nor even on its own budget (like 
additional human resources in the initial phase), even if they were critical to the success of the 
project (Trémolet and Mansour 2014).  
3.3.3.2  Exchange rate and inflation risk 
Exchange and inflation risks posed on the private partners by management and service 
contracts are generally low. In the cases where they materialized, however, the risk allocation was 
claimed to be unfair by the private partners and in most cases things were accommodated in their 
favor. The following information and considerations are retrieved from some of the case studies, 
while for the remaining case studies no relevant information was found. 
In Kampala, during the first year of the second contract, the contractor OSUL asked for a 
renegotiation of the contract, with a 20% increase in the management fee to compensate the higher-
than-anticipated costs of operations, foreign staff expenses, and deterioration of the Euro/Dollar 
                                                 
50 WOPs are being promoted by GWOPA, the Global Water Operators’ Partnerships Alliance , a network of partners 
promoted by UN Habitat and committed to improve their collective capacity to provide access to water and sanitation 
services for all. www.gwopa.org 
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exchange rate. An international accounting firm was engaged to investigate these claims. Though 
the claims were held to be legally invalid, a small increase in the management fee was granted.  
When Burkina Faso is considered the foreign exchange risk is limited, because the country 
belongs to the CFA Franc zone. The exchange rate of the CFAF to the Euro is fixed, in fact, and the 
private partner is from France. In Ghana Payments were in dollar currency (Shang 2013).  
In Malawi the contract was in Euro. The only currency risk was related to the cost recovery 
KPI. During contract implementation in fact, there was an increase of the costs of imported inputs, 
due to a 40% devaluation of Malawian currency in May 2012. However, this did not affect Cost 
Recovery, thanks to the prompt adjustment of the tariff (+26%) in August 2012 and in 2013.  
Among the main reasons for the poor and delayed performances on the NRW KPI there is 
the delay in the procurement of bulk meters. This is explained by the difficulties in securing foreign 
exchange from the Government. Trémolet and Mansour (2014) argues that foreign exchange was 
supposed to be available for the project, as it was financed in Euro currency, but money were 
temporarily diverted for other priorities, due to a major foreign exchange crisis at country level51. 
This consideration, in the analysis of Trémolet and Mansour (2014), calls for an additional 
reduction of the risk posed on the contractor, which should be not given for granted. If contractors 
work in unrealistic settings, simulated by donors through the local governments, this might enable 
them to perform better than other actors do, but risk reduction has a cost and the performances do 
not account for the real world challenges that the other actors face. 
3.3.3.3 Regulatory risk  
The absence of investment commitments in the low risk PSI makes the risk of expropriation 
not relevant, while the absence of commercial risk in both service and management contracts also 
protects the private partner from the risk arising from price regulation. Donors backing and 
promotion of the partnership is also an important element which reduced the regulatory risk for 
these contracts.  
In the case of Ghana the contract made explicit provisions about the responsibility of the 
grantor (the local partner) to facilitate relationship with State Agencies, including for tax 
exemptions. Even the new government policy of settling its debts in Kampala, indicated by 
Jammal and Jones (2006) as a reason for the success in bills’ collection by Gauff, can be seen as a 
removal of regulatory risk. 
Conversely in Lilongwe, the contractor faced some regulatory risk, even if only indirectly. 
As a matter of fact, the success of the cost recovery KPI depended upon revenues and on the 
                                                 
51 Malawi experienced a severe FOREX crisis in 2011 and 2012, also associated with shortages of fuel, which resulted 
in the devaluation of May 2012. 
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procedure to approve tariff adjustment. Both the annual budget and any tariff adjustment need the 
approval of the Department of Statutory Corporations and of the Ministry of Water. However, as it 
was seen above, tariff adjustments were approved during the period and the level of Cost Recovery 
was above any expectation. Moreover, the representative from VEI reported about the problems 
with custom procedures and the long time to achieve tax free entry from the revenue authority. 
These were among the reasons for delayed procurement and, consequently, for poor KPIs value for 
NRW. In this case some regulatory risk was left to the operator, who in turn perceived this 
allocation of risk as unfair.  
3.3.3.4 Transaction costs  
Some figures about the dimension of the transaction costs in the selected case studies are 
available. Transaction costs prove to be very huge, particularly if compared with the relatively small 
dimensions of the contracts themselves. A PSI relationship can be conceptualized in terms of the 
agency theory, with the contracting authority in charge of supervising the work of the agent (the 
private partner) based on the information available (Shang 2014). The contracting authority can be 
the utility itself, represented by the head office or by the executives, or the line ministry. Agency 
costs related to formal monitoring, auditing and control can be quantified. Moreover one should 
consider the costs related associated to the effort to share information, orientations and decisions 
among the personnel expressed by the private operator and by the utility respectively. These are 
likely to be proportional to the importance of the role left to the utility executives. This means that it 
will be maximum in service contracts and will be lower in management contracts where the private 
operator also manages human resources. The transaction costs here considered also include costs 
related with the preliminary activity to improve political acceptance. 
In Kampala the costs of the transaction advisor and of the technical and financial audit was 
435,000 € (Ballance and Trémolet 2005). In Johannesburg, around € 200,000 were spent for the 
independent auditor (Marin 2009), while, preliminary to the contract, Halcrow Management 
Sciences was appointed as Transaction Advisor and funded by World Bank Technical Assistance. 
In Burkina Faso the difference between cost of the project value and the cost of management 
services was 1.3M€, which probably include, jointly with the performance monitoring by 
independent technical auditors, other transaction costs. In Zambia, there was a 2.4 M€ WB of pre-
project funding (Ballance and Trémolet 2005) and in Ghana various initiatives were financed by 
PPIAF to promote private sector involvement.  
As concerns LWB, it is possible to see that there are both costs related with the 
implementation phase and costs related with the preliminary activities that were necessary to make 
the PSI accepted. The Audit of the project cost was of € 100,000 (€ 65,000 for the auditor Mott 
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MacDonald Ltd and € 35,000 for the partner). A “Private Sector Transaction Advisor” was also 
appointed to design and supervise the bidding and contracting phases, but it was not possible to 
retrieve the costs of this service. Trémolet and Mansour (2014) suggest that some shortcomings 
could have been avoided by a “marriage counselor” to clarify the mutual expectations of partners. 
This did not happen but could mean that additional, even higher, transaction costs should be 
covered to improve the PSIs performances. 
Costs related to the political acceptance are also substantial. In 2005 the World Bank (IDA 
2005) p. 2-3, commenting the delay in the privatization process in water and other utilities states 
that: “Over time, the levels of resistance to the program increased as people took the view that there 
was no consultation taking place between the Privatization Commission52 and its stakeholders” but 
that there is “high level political support”. A public awareness campaign was thus launched by 
funding media (television, radio and press) programs targeted at specific stakeholder groups such as 
members of Parliament, trade unions, employees and state owned enterprises and civil society. 
Similarly PPIAF faced transaction costs related with the promotion of the idea of private 
involvement (PPIAF 2012) for a value of more than 1M$ between 2000 and 200753. 
3.4 Conclusions and policy implications 
Low risk PSIs resulted from a compromise between the resistances of utilities, civil society 
and governments against the private sector and the reluctance of the private sector to take on risks. 
Also the expectations posed on private sector were reduced. The low risk PSIs proved to be 
acceptable for both the public and the private actors involved. Nonetheless they were then 
characterized by important shortcomings and high costs. The balance between risk reduction and 
performance incentives proved to be delicate. In fact, the reduction of some risks causes a reduction 
of the incentives to perform. At the same time, the conditions to make the partnerships feasible 
proved to be costly. In the end, the PSIs succeeded to engage the actors from both parts, but they 
failed to make them perform. 
The review of the case studies shows that low risk PSIs are characterized by a standard 
neoliberal definition of efficiency focused on commercial improvements and, in most cases, by poor 
performances. High shares of the contract value are usually tied to performance, but contracts are 
incomplete and computation of the KPIs is often questionable, while performances are sometimes 
out of the control of the operator itself. A narrow decision making space for the contractors was also 
                                                 
52 Privatization Commission: a Privatization Commission (PC) was created in 1994 within the Government of Malawi 
and supported by the World Bank. 
53 2000 Increasing Private Sector Participation in the Provision of Water Supply Services, $ 194,350; 2001 
Harmonization of the Institutional and Regulatory Framework, $ 200,000; 2005 PPP Legal and Regulatory Framework, 
$ 269,000; 2006 Developing a Public Communication Strategy for Urban Water Sector Reform, $ 149,500; 2007 PPP 
Implementation—Development of Regulations and Procedures, $ 251,500. 
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found to be a common challenge, but at the same time the restriction of the role of the contractor is 
intrinsic to light PSIs and it was necessary to overcome political resistances. Payments tied to 
deliverables and fixed payments can result in a perfunctory attitude by the operator. In the bidding 
phase, competition for the market was low, with few bidders, particularly for the earlier case 
studies, while, later, compensation for the bidding effort was recognized. There are virtually no 
realistic expectations that contracts’ renewal will take place, so that there are no incentive to 
perform for contractors. Utilities have no incentives to cooperate with the contractors and the 
resistance against the private partnerships was a common feature. Lighter PSIs failed to make the 
private sector more acceptable for utilities, but in turn, by reducing its autonomy, they made the 
cooperation of public utilities critical to the success of the PSIs. Trémolet and Mansour (2014) 
advocate a stronger alignment of formal incentives for the contractor and for the utility. This, 
however, would further increase the complexity of the contracts design and the transaction costs, if 
incentives for the utilities are not part of a wider regulatory framework. In turn, a well functioning 
regulatory framework should be considered a priority as such, and not only a precondition for PSIs, 
as the success of formal incentive systems in Uganda, Burkina and Zambia in the context of public 
water services confirms. The analysis of the partners’ nature revealed that publicly owned 
contractors did not enjoy a more cooperative environment, while some findings indicate that they 
could be less sensitive to performance incentives than private contractors. The low risk PSIs are 
characterized by devices to reduce or remove exchange, inflation and regulatory risks borne by 
contractor and more devices are invocated by observers when any element of the local institutional 
and market context challenges the smooth implementation of projects. Such devices, however, are 
costly and pose the operator in unrealistic settings, so that it is impossible to know if efficiency 
gains will be sustainable in real world settings. Moreover, the introduction of devices for risk 
reduction is not consistent with the general recommendations published by the WB itself. Banerjee 
and Morella (2011), for example, proposes a ‘State Owned Enterprises Governance Index’ with 
positive factors contributing to this index including: ‘no exemption from taxation’, ‘access to debt 
compared with private sector’ and ‘no state guarantees’. Lastly, the contracts considered have 
disproportionally high transaction costs, particularly if the limited expectations from these PSIs, are 
recognized.  
While low risk PSIs tend to deliver limited efficiency gains, if any, to the utility and that 
their costs are disproportionally high. Moreover, even looking beyond immediate results, the 
capacity building that could be expected from a peaceful cooperation between the utility staff and 
international experts (Pascual et al. 2013) is often jeopardized by widespread resistances.  
106 
 
By jointly considering the poor performances, the uncertain role of contractors to achieve 
them and the facilitating devices, the accountability for the results of light PSIs seems questionable. 
As accountability for results is among the principles of Paris and Busan (OECD 2005 and 2012), 
this challenges the Aid Effectiveness of low risk PSIs. 
Based on the study, light, low risk PSIs, cannot be recommended, but this does not mean 
that higher risk PSIs should be rehabilitated. If PSIs could be seen as a last attempt to realize Private 
Sector Involvement, the failure of the last attempt, should virtually imply the recognition of a wider 
failure of any form of PSI. However, all forms of PSIs are still promoted, as the trend toward low 
risk PSIs is not linear and a number of other parallel evolutions and further attempts can be tracked 
in the SSA water sector. 
Light PSIs are virtually positioned somewhere in the continuum between bare outsourcing 
and higher risk PSI, with the dimension and importance of functions transferred to the private 
increasing moving from the first towards the latter. On both ends of the continuum simpler devices 
are found and the roles are more clearly defined, even if only full integration (which means full 
privatization or no PSI at all) excludes problems of residual rights (Dagdeviren and Robertson 
2013). In both cases the performances of the private operator have a higher degree of independence 
from the utility and, so that at least the private contractor is more accountable and rent seeking less 
likely.  
Outsourcing seems now a preferred business model for MNCs in the sector. Suez and Veolia 
launched ‘new service businesses, which are essentially monocline offerings, such as smart 
metering, non revenue water management, energy recovery’ GWI (2012), so that potential markets 
for private water services can include ‘countries without privatization minded governments.’  
On the opposite side of the continuum, hence in the direction of increasing the risk and 
commitment by the private actor, there are higher risk PSIs which might experience a revival if the 
recent shift from affermage to concession is Senegal in considered.  
In SSA, there is also a revival of technical assistance contracts, more close to low risk light 
PSI, as shown for example by the technical assistance contracts in Zambia and Ghana, both with 
VEI.  
PSIs are thus evolving in many directions, but the study can provide a conclusion which is 
valid for any form of PSI. The analysis underlines the perverse and contradictory effects of ‘rushing 
and pushing’ (Dagdeviren and Robertson 2013) private sector involvement when none of the actors 
is willing to engage in these experiences. This paradox was particularly apparent for light PSIs, due 
to the low expectations and low results and to the high transaction costs, but this can be the case for 
any form of PSI. Forcing PSIs is not in line with the principle of ownership of the Paris declaration: 
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‘partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies, and strategies and 
co-ordinate development actions’ (OECD 2005 pp.3). 
PSIs should be implemented only when they are perceived as a need by the beneficiary 
utility, the local institutions and civil society, and they should not be related to any implicit or 
explicit conditionality. This would make the complex architectures to reduce risk and to attract the 
private sector useless. PSI is costly and diverts attention from key priorities of the SSA water sector, 
like the need for increasing coverage and alternative strategies to make financing available. In 
conclusion, PSI should not be considered a priority as such if the Aid Effectiveness in the water 
sector, in line with the objectives of the international community, has to be increased. 
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3.6 Appendix A: Checklist used for semi-structured interviews 
1. Which are the main differences between a “services contract” and a “management contract”?  
2. Are there similarities with the “monoline service model” proposed by GWI ? Is the 
conceptualization of the contract in the terms of a WOP (Water Operators Partnerships), 
proposed by Pascual et al. (2013), more suitable?  
3. The performance payment is associated to efficiency gains: how are these efficiency gains 
exactly defined?  
4. Which are the final target and results for the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)?  
5. Are there contractual KPIs other than the ones in the charts in annex?  
6. Do these KPIs well reflect the challenges and priorities that the Water Board had to address in 
2009? Are there other priorities which were not addressed by the contract? 
7. How could VEI respond of the efficiency gains in the absence of a management role by the 
private partner? Is there any contractually defined space/scope where VEI has an executive 
role? And in the informal daily practice? Is there any example of solutions/initiatives promoted 
by VEI to address the problems of efficiency and then adopted/refused by the Board? 
8. Did the expertise of private sector actor VEI prove to be suitable to bring in the expected 
efficiency gains?  
9. Referring to the contractual tasks listed in Annex 3 which are most important similarities and 
differences between the professional and organizational skills which make VITENS and 
EVIDES successful in the Netherlands and the ones which are necessary in the Lilongwe 
context? 
10. Which were the main criteria which lead to the selection of VEI in the competitive procedure to 
select the service provider? 
11. The improvement in utilities efficiency pursued by new generation PPPs and more generally by 
the reform agenda for public utilities are sometimes seen as paving the way for further 
privatization, making utilities more appealing for private investors. The Malawi Water Sector 
Investment Plan issued in 2012 considers a number of options for future PSP (annex 4). Which 
of the PSP Hypothesis you consider the most feasible, positive and why, if any? Which are the 
most risky for universal access to water supply? 
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4 Priorities and tools for Water Demand Management in urban Africa: a 
focus on household level water metering 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Increasing the level of water metering is a key point of all the initiatives for the operational 
restructuring of African water utilities promoted by donors and development agencies from the 
‘90s. Water metering penetration is among the most common benchmarking indicators54  which are 
adopted to measure the performances of water utilities throughout the world55. Household level 
water metering is usually considered a good practice and recommended. Under an economic 
perspective, it involves transmitting price signals to water users to ensure efficiency in the 
allocation of the water resource, which cannot be transmitted by a fixed fee. For this reason 
metering is a main tool for Water Demand Management (WDM) (Arlosoroff 1998, Macy 1999, 
Gumbo and Van der Zaag 2002, Mulwafu et al. 2003), which aims at keeping the demand for water 
reasonably low, in consideration of environmental scarcity. The idea is that consumption can only 
go down if people are confronted with their actual consumption and they pay accordingly. Under a 
more technical perspective, metering is also considered a main solution to reduce Non Revenue 
Water (NRW) and Unaccounted for Water (UFW)56 caused by leakages and illegal connections, as 
it allows technicians to locate the area where leakages occur and to detect and repair them. Metering 
is thus supported by a water conservation argument and by a social equity argument (Staddon 
2010). The social equity argument basically relies on the idea that, through metering, everyone is 
charged what she actually consumes. This reflects a liberal view of equity, while the actual social 
equity outcomes of a metered system largely depend on the tariff system which is used. 
While other benchmarks and targets set for the African water sector remain largely unmet, 
water metering at household and water point level, was widely adopted. “In Africa, water metering 
is surprisingly widespread, with many utilities reporting 100% metering in their service areas. (…) 
the average metering ratio is 75 %.” (Banerjee 2010 p. 6). The idea that metering level should 
approximate universal coverage is widely accepted and recommended for developing countries 
(World Bank 2008, Kingdom et al. 2006).  
The study discusses the arguments behind the widespread acceptance of the target of 100% 
metering, focusing on the suitability of household level metering for low income settlements of 
                                                 
54 See for example the AICD and IBNET database introduced in section 2.3. 
55 Two indicators are mainly utilized, these are: proportion of metered connection over the total number of connections 
and proportion of metered water over the total volume of sold water. 
56 Sometimes the same indicator is also called Unaccounted For Water (UFW). 
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urban Africa. Universal metering is opposed to selective metering, which can be based on the 
selection, by the utility of the customers to be metered, or can be based on their voluntary enrolment 
in a metering program. Voluntary enrolment is prone to a bias, as only the customers whose 
consumption is low are likely to save money by measuring the actual volumes, while customers 
with high consumption will probably prefer the flat rate. This is the situation described by Lago and 
Möller-Gulland (2012) and it could be described as adverse selection57. However, selective 
metering can also be based on the strategy of the utility to discriminate among customer categories 
so that the problem of adverse selection is no longer relevant. This opens some opportunity for 
poor, informal neighbourhoods of African cities. 
To better understand the approach of the study it could be useful to point at the governance 
and policy determinants of technological change. Metering, in this view, can be considered part of 
the piped water paradigm as defined by Lobina (2012), jointly with other technologies incorporated 
in urban water supply systems. This paradigm was transferred from the global North58 to the global 
South in the 20th century in the context of colonial and economic hegemony (Braadbaart 2009, 
Lobina and Hall 2010).  
A similar perspective does not imply any judgment about the suitability of the technologies 
associated to this paradigm to answer the needs of southern urban dwellers, but it should allow an 
open minded relativistic perspective. There is a technological path dependency associated with the 
option for household level water metering, but path breaking innovation might bring in new 
opportunities to address specific needs which were not present in the context where the technology 
was first selected (Mokyr 1992). 
In the first part of the chapter, the solution of household level metering is discussed based on 
the available evidence from literature review and secondary data analysis, both referred to the 
African context. Firstly, household level water metering is considered in its consistency with the 
specific features of the context of African low income settlements and of African utilities 
operations. This also includes a regression model to assess the impact of metering on average 
domestic consumption versus non domestic consumption, based on IBNET data. Secondly, 
household level water metering, considered a good practice itself, is analyzed to assess its 
consistency with other trends and good practices promoted and recognized in the wider water sector 
for African urban areas and for the developing world. 
                                                 
57 Adverse selection is related to information asymmetries and it occurs when a product or service is selected by only a 
certain group of people who offer the worst return for the company and, in this case, also for the society which fails to 
achieve the water conservation outcomes envisaged. 
58 Metering is part of the municipal hydraulic paradigm but some exceptions do exist even in Western Europe. As a 
matter of fact, there are some countries whose water supply strategy does not include household level metering, like  
Ireland, Norway and, until recently, the U.K. 
118 
 
In the second part of the chapter, the case of Lilongwe Water Board is discussed on the basis 
of key informants interviews, available literature and internal reports. The aim is to understand how 
metering contributed or failed to contribute to the extension of household level water supply in low 
income areas and to the development and implementation of efficient and effective billing and 
collection practices. The contribution of household level metering to WDM is also discussed and 
alternative WDM strategies are considered. 
The third part of the chapter, based on both the literature analysis and the case study, draws 
some conclusions. Appendix A provides the checklists used for semi-structured interviews carried 
out in Lilongwe, while Appendix B provides an attempt to describe the consumption decisions of 
water users in terms of the game theory, drawing possible developments for further research. 
The hypothesis is that the quest for universal household level metering can prevent SSA 
water utilities from connecting poor households in Low Income Areas. It is argued that universal 
metering should not be intended as the metering of each household, but should more loosely be 
referred to the correspondence between meters and billings. 100% household level metering should 
not be considered a target for all the SSA water utilities in all the low income contexts and informal 
settlements. Alternative solutions, also consistent with wider orientations of the African water 
supply sector, should be considered, explored and piloted, when relevant. 
4.2 Findings from the literature and from secondary data analysis 
Universal water metering has seldom been criticized by practitioners and scholars and the 
few critical contributions available refer only to developed countries and to the recent initiative of 
introducing metering in the UK (Jenkis 2006, NCC 2002, Staddon 2010, Zetland 2013). The main 
arguments against universal metering from this literature are the inability of metering to achieve the 
expected reduction in domestic consumption and the high costs of metering (Jenkis 2006). 
Referring to the first argument, the inability of metering to achieve the expected reduction in 
domestic consumption, it is due, among others, to low price elasticity, inaccessibility of meters by 
consumers and failure of water bills to communicate volumetric information in an accessible way 
(Staddon 2010). As regards the second argument, the high costs of metering and their 
disproportionate impact on low income groups was discussed by Jenkins (2006).  
The first part of the present paragraph translates these two arguments in the context of urban 
Africa. Moreover other conditions and characteristics, which are specific to the context of urban 
African utilities, are presented: the low level of domestic consumption and the positive externalities 
of domestic water consumption; the poor accuracy of metering; the growth of industrial demand. 
They are based on water sector literature which does not directly refer to metering issues, but 
nonetheless has relevant implications on them. 
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The second part of the paragraph introduces some good practices that are promoted in the 
water sector in the developing world. They are community participation, informal providers’ 
regulation and low cost solutions. These good practices do not address metering issues straight but 
they have implications on recommendable metering practices. These implications will be discussed 
to assess if 100% household level metering is consistent with the trends observed in the wider 
sector. The chart below (Figure 4.1) summarizes how these arguments are linked together and 
jointly support the opportunity of considering alternative solutions for household level water supply 
in Low Income Areas of urban Sub Saharan Africa. 
Figure 4.1: Arguments to challenge the household level metering dogma  
 
Source: personal elaboration  
4.2.1 High costs of metering 
The share of metering costs over operating and maintenance costs can be substantial and 
should be carefully considered, jointly with the opportunity cost of investing in meters. Jenkins 
(2006, p. 8) suggests that “policy makers should reflect carefully on the use of metering, 
particularly when financial resources are subject to competing demands in relation to the need to 
improve the quality, access, and availability of water resources within society.”  
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The cost of metering devices is estimated to account for 1/10 of connection costs by the 
Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) studies (Africon 2008) but the total cost is much 
higher if operation and maintenance cost of meters is considered. The estimation of the costs 
associated to metering, including purchase, maintenance, reading and volumetric billing is not 
straightforward and few data are available. Ofwat in 2000-2001 (OFWAT 2003) estimated this cost 
to be around £ 17.5 (around € 24.5 at 2003 rates) per meter per year, which was about 6% of an 
average bill. Assuming, however, that the proportions between metering costs and other costs are 
similar, it is likely to impact much more in a low consumption environment, like the one of African 
cities, than in the UK. Other authors estimate this value to be much higher, like £ 47 (UREGNI 
2007) and £ 80 (Staddon 2010 p. 5). The considerations above show that potential savings from 
metering could contribute to downscaling the costs without affecting service quality (see paragraph 
4.2.3.3). 
Also the most recent developments of the metering technology, like prepaid meters and 
SMART metering, implicitly point at the high costs and labor intensity of traditional metering. 
Prepaid metering programs are sometimes justified as a means to reduce the high costs and the 
complexity associated with reading and billing of traditional meters (Peters 2011). Smart metering, 
which is based on ICT for the automatic transmission of data59, is appreciated, particularly in 
developed countries, for its potential in the reduction of the labor needed by traditional metering. 
However, while prepaid meters are seen as a morally inacceptable solution by many 
observers (among others McDonald and Ruiters 2012), wider critical analysis about water meters in 
the context of low income areas of African cities are still missing and the present work aims at 
contributing to fill this gap. 
4.2.2 Is household level metering consistent with the context? 
4.2.2.1 Low consumption and positive externalities. 
It is recognized that in the context of Sub Saharan Africa consumption levels are still within, 
or even below, the minimum amounts that are necessary for a decent life. For example, Banerjee 
and Morella (2011, p. 135) recognize that there is no strong evidence of wasteful use of water in 
Africa, and that “the relatively modest levels of consumption would not be further reduced by a 
more aggressive use of demand management tools”. Overconsumption is also technically limited by 
the widespread absence of drainage networks. The absence of overconsumption problems holds for 
domestic consumption, unless the domestic supply is diverted for productive purposes, as it 
                                                 
59 Smart metering technology is designed to be remotely read and to be linked to variable tariffs, be easily read locally, 
and therefore meaningful to consumers, be linked to internet databases rather like bank accounts. 
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sometimes happens, for example, for agricultural production. This is however a deliberate violation 
of the rules which define the scope of domestic connections and it poses problems of the regulation 
which go beyond metering.  
The existence of positive externalities makes appropriate to compare the costs of water 
supply to the total benefits resulting from it, which should include both the public and the private 
ones. Public benefits of water (and sanitation) systems are related with the provision of public 
protection from communicable diseases (Budds and McGranahan 2003). Water provision clearly 
provides private benefits to the receiving household. However, if people are unwilling or unable to 
purchase enough water of good quality to protect their own health, and they contract diseases as a 
result, then the health of others is also put at risk. For this reason the benefits of having an 
additional user include both the user’s private benefits and the related external (collective) benefits. 
These considerations show that investing in WDM tools is not a priority when domestic 
consumption of African urban poor is considered. 
4.2.2.2 Low impact of metering on domestic consumption 
The ability of metering to reduce domestic consumption was assessed and compared with 
the ability of metering to reduce the average consumption, including all the categories of users. 
Some regressions on panel data, with 158 annual observations from 56 utilities from 20 SSA 
countries between 1997 and 2009 from the IBNET database are here presented. Fixed and random 
effects were tested, after detecting and eliminating hard outliers60. Two dependent variables were 
used with the same regressors, in order to capture the specific features of domestic water demand 
against the metering level. These variables are:  
? average per capita daily consumption (litres per capita per day - lpcpd), including domestic, 
industrial, commercial and institutional consumption;  
? average per capita daily domestic consumption (lpcpd). Domestic water consumption 
includes both domestic connections and public points and is to be intended as opposed to 
institutional and commercial/industrial consumption. 
It is important to notice that both these figures are only estimates and that they have 
important limitations in their accuracy when trying to capture the real per capita consumption 
levels. A main challenge to the reliability of these estimations is related to the fact that in the 
countries considered several households use the same tap. The percentage of users served through 
public water points was taken as control variable because, for obvious logistic reasons, their 
consumption is usually lower than the one of users enjoying household connections. The per capita 
                                                 
60 Hard outliers are defined as the ones located outside the so called “outer fences” of the distribution,  identified by 
multiplying the limits of first and third quartiles of the distribution by 3 times the value of the interquartile range. 
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GDP expressed in Purchasing Power Parity of the country was taken as control variable because 
higher living standards are likely to increase water consumption, ceteris paribus. The average 
revenue to the water utility per cubic meter sold was used to approximate the price of water, even if 
complete tariff structures would be necessary to identify the specific rates charged to different users 
categories and to domestic users at different levels of consumption (in the common case of 
Increasing Block Tariffs), in consideration of different price elasticity. For each dependent variable 
two time frames were tested: in the first frame, all the variables are taken in the same year; in the 
second frame, in order to exclude potential endogeneity risks and to account for the inertia of 
behavioural adaptation to change, the variable about the level of metering and the one 
approximating water price are taken with a lag of one year. This lag structure unfortunately reduces 
the number of available cases so that it can be only considered as robustness check. The results are 
shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Effects of metering on consumption: regressions results 
 
Dependent variable: average per capita daily consumption, 
including domestic, industrial, commercial and institutional 
Dependent variable: average per capita daily domestic 
consumption 
Without time lag With time lag Without time lag With time lag 
Random 
effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Metering level (% water 
metered on total water 
sold)  
-0.70*** -0.69** -0.73*** -.0.77* -0.39* -0.38 -0.68** -1.12 
% of users served through 
public water points on the 
total number of users  
-24.05* -20.77 -17.45 0.07 -11.17 -3.95 -13.96 -0.13 
Per capita GDP of the 
country in PPP 0.01*** 0.01* 0.01*** 0.01 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** -0.01 
Average revenue per m3 
(tariff)  -8.05 -4.28 3.98 11.37** -2.79 5.19 1.59 10.73*** 
Constant 126.07*** 128.14*** 126.40*** 128.87*** 77.30*** 84.18*** 106.00*** 155.31** 
N obs 158 158 109 109 158 158 109 109 
N groups 56 56 34 34 56 56 34 34 
Goodness of fit indicators Wald χ
2(4)= 
55.54*** 
Within R2 
=0.21 
F(4,55)= 
3.07** 
Waldχ2(4)= 
34.64*** 
Within 
R2=0.11 
F(4,33)= 
3.76** 
Wald 
χ2(4)=29.
55*** 
Within 
R2=0.05 
F(4,55)= 
0.71 
Wald 
χ2(4)=13.89**
* 
Within 
R2=0.16 
F(4,33)= 
11.06*** 
 
The results show that metering has a significant negative impact on the average level of total 
consumption per capita, while its impact is lower and less significant, or not significant at all when 
only domestic consumption is considered. Coefficients of domestic consumption are almost always 
less significant and usually lower than the ones of overall consumption61. These results are also 
robust to the lagged time frame. 
The other variables have the expected sign but they are not significant in all cases. The 
variable approximating water price unexpectedly shows some significant positive coefficients in the 
                                                 
61 However it is also important to notice that these same findings refer to average consumption and don’t exclude that, 
among very poor households, metering can prevent the access to water, particularly if associated to regressive tariff 
structures or to prepayment solutions, with the related public health problems. 
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lagged models62. The lack of significance (or lower significance) of the impact of metering level on 
the average level of per capita domestic consumption is not an argument against metering as such, 
but it at least provides some orientation for priorities when allocating scarce resources to costly 
metering programs. At the same time the results confirm the importance and the potential of 
metering for non-domestic water demand management.  
4.2.2.3 Growing industrial demand 
Domestic water demand elasticity to price is very low at the levels of consumption of 
African poor dwellers, since it is impossible for people to reduce consumption below the threshold 
of the basic need. On the contrary, price elasticity of the industrial and productive demand of water 
is much higher, since new processes and equipment can be designed to reduce the amount of water 
used.  
While increasing water scarcity is getting of major concern and domestic demand is 
increasingly controlled, water intensive businesses are spreading in Africa. This issue is extensively 
documented by the studies based on the approach of the water footprint63 and virtual water which 
quantify the amount of water necessary for different productions and consider the impact of 
international trade on the water balance of countries (among other Ercin and Hoekstra 2014). 
Countries and individual cities in the developing world are competing among them to attract 
foreign investments in fields related with the exploitation of natural resources and also in water 
intensive sectors. While in the developed world business increasingly moved toward self-reliance in 
the access to water when drinking water standards are not necessary, supply of manufactures by 
water utilities is still widely practiced in Africa and the volumes in absolute terms are increasing, as 
a consequence of economic growth and industrialization. 
The patterns of industrial water consumption and the corresponding charges by utilities are 
particularly important because of the rates of growth of SSA economies: 5.5% in 2010 according 
the Africa Economic Outlook 2012 (African Development Bank 2012) and because of the fact that 
industrial commercial tariffs are often below the thresholds conventionally adopted for full cost 
recovery levels (Banerjee et al. 2010) for both O&M and capital costs. The effort toward cost 
recovery tariffs for domestic consumption, as a matter of fact, did not yield proportional outcomes 
when commercial and industrial tariffs are considered64. In fact some utilities have industrial tariff 
                                                 
62 A similar finding was justified by Banerjee (2008) as follows: “the tariff rates are near cost-recovery levels at high 
levels of consumption. Particularly for high-volume nonresidential consumers, utility clients pay a substantially higher 
price per unit of consumption”. The lagged structure of the models however should in principle reduce this effect.  
              63 See for example the material available at www.waterfootprint.org 
64 Underpricing can be due to investment promotion priorities transferred to utilities to compete with other countries and 
cities and attract investments. Utilities can also be driven by microeconomic principles of price discrimination so that a 
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lower than the domestic ones and their average ratio was below 3, still in 2007 (source personal 
elaboration on IBNET data). This considerations point at the possibility to improve the management 
of commercial and industrial water demands.  
4.2.2.4 Poor metering practices 
Metering is considered a main tool to measure and address Non Revenue Water (NRW) 
problems. Water balances are made possible by the comparison of water flows at production, at 
bulk meters and at users meters, but also minimum night flows allows the estimation of NRW 
(Morrison 2004). Moreover, meters accuracy is itself a cause of apparent water losses, which are 
differences between the volumes metered at production and the ones metered at consumption which 
are not due to actual water loss, but to measurement errors. In fact metering errors, for new and 
properly installed meters, are estimated to be around 5% and to increase with the age of the meter 
and with low pressure (Mutikanga 2012). Mutikanga also finds that actual errors in Kampala were 
higher than 20% in 2007-2009 and also registered a rate of failure of 6.6% per year (number of 
failed meters over total number of meters installed). Moreover, it should be considered that the 
practice of estimating the consumption of metered connections in the absence of records from 
timely readings for billing purposes is widespread in Africa (Chikasema 2009). This practice also 
jeopardizes the effectiveness of metering and the transmission of price signals. Low pressure is a 
driver of under registration, while rationing practices and failures to provide 24 hours water services 
can cause the presence of air in the pipes and result in over registration. Poor maintenance and 
testing of meters are also among the main drivers of poor metering performances. The poor 
metering accuracy which characterizes most African utilities is very relevant when considering the 
costs and benefits of metering. This was properly expressed by Mutikanga (2012, p. 103), as 
follows: “when metering is inefficient, all benefits associated with metering are lost”. 
 
4.2.3 Is household level metering consistent with water sector good practices? 
4.2.3.1 Community participation 
Community participation has a long history (Kwo 1984 and 1986): self-help was the main 
British strategy for implementation of the new welfare orientated colonial development policy from 
the ‘50s (Page 2003). Community participation gained momentum after the structural adjustment in 
the ‘80s and ‘90s to fill the gap between the pressing needs of vulnerable strata of African societies 
                                                                                                                                                                  
higher price is charged to the low elasticity segment, and a lower price is charged to the high elasticity segment. Lastly, 
there could be a capture  of regulators and utilities managers by business groups. 
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and the minimum state, providing minimum service, if any. As properly described by Page (2003), 
community participation “has now become the development orthodoxy”.  
Community participation in the management of water supply in Africa was first adopted in 
rural areas but increasingly adopted also in urban low income areas, where private participation was 
first considered as a preferred option to fill the financial gaps left by the public service. It entails 
involving users in the construction and operation of water supply systems. Communities can 
provide funds before construction, voluntary or paid workers during construction and operate and 
maintain the system. Community bodies can also be the owner of the infrastructure. As part of the 
operation of any community run system managers are also expected to organise the collection of 
fees from users (Yacoob 1990, Yacoob and Walker 1991). 
Central to the organisation of such systems is some variant of a ‘‘community water 
committee’’, a representative body, often resulting from some kind of election, in charge of 
managing water supply in a particular community (Page 2003). Water Users Associations or water 
users entities are also a common device for both water supply and water resources management in 
Africa. While elite capture is often observed and the inclusiveness and representativeness of these 
institutions are sometimes questionable (Kemerink et al.65 2013), they are usually recognized as 
legitimate counterparts by donors and formal institutions, including urban water utilities66. 
Participatory approaches are sometimes biased toward market based solutions and the appeal of 
business opportunities can be among the reasons for frequent elite capture of grassroots institutions. 
However, there might be a potential still to be sized to involve urban communities in different 
organizational arrangements which do not involve reselling beyond the last meter. Community 
based management, as a matter of fact, should not imply the adoption by community entities of 
market instruments for the allocation of the resources managed and a wide range of cooperative 
solutions can be adopted (Ostrom 1990).  
For example, Mara and Alabaster (2006) propose three solutions for group connections, 
namely standpipes cooperatives, yard tap cooperatives and in house multiple taps cooperatives.  
When metering is considered, Mara and Alabaster are quite radical and only provide for in house 
multiple taps cooperatives to be metered at a collective level, while the remaining two should not be 
metered at all. As specified by the authors, cooperatives are to be intended here with the meaning of 
consumers’ cooperatives or bulk purchasers and not with the meaning of service providers, which is 
closer to the Wold Bank concept (Ruiz-Mier and Van Ginneken 2006) and to the case of regulated 
alternative providers addressed in the next paragraph. 
                                                 
65 The work by Kemerink et al. referred to WUAs operating at the water basin level in the management of the water 
resources, but similar considerations could be extended to water supply management experiences. 
66 This is a kind of paradox of Top-down legitimatiion of bottom up institutions. 
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4.2.3.2 Informal providers regulation 
Water reselling regulation, and more generally the regulation of small scale informal 
providers, are receiving increasing attention both by practitioners and scholars (Gerlach and 
Franceys 2009 and 2010). The debate focuses on how to enjoy their potential to expand water 
access, while mitigating the risks related to their informal status (unreliable water quality, 
uncontrolled prices). Unregulated reselling of utility water can only be tolerated in a fully metered 
environment. Otherwise the few connected users could resell any volume of water while paying a 
flat monthly fee. Tolerance without regulation and without purposely designed devices and tariffs 
does not yield optimal outcomes. As noticed by Boland and Whittington (1998), in fact, the 
widespread adoption of increasing block tariffs (IBT) in metered environments can have adverse 
effects on unconnected users. As a matter of fact, the connected users who resell water to 
unconnected ones tend to charge at least the high rates corresponding to high consumption levels.  
A partially metered environment instead forces utilities to introduce convenient regulatory 
solutions for reselling by household and small scale providers. In fact only purposely authorized, 
metered customers should be allowed to resell and the tariff applied to them and the final price 
should be controlled  Delegated management is among the solutions available to move upstream  
the boundaries of direct management of the last water meter by the utility (WSP 2009). It is built 
around a contractual relationship between water utilities and small-scale private operators who have 
the financial incentives to increase access and improve services (WSP 2009). Better regulation of 
reselling could therefore allow utility to relax the metering dogma. 
4.2.3.3 Low cost water supply solutions 
The consideration of the high costs associated to universal metering at household level, is 
particularly important and relevant if we consider the recent orientation of the World Bank and 
donors agencies towards the downscale of the water supply standards (ladders), also advocated by 
Banerjee and Morella (2011, p. 247): “the availability of lower-cost technologies has the potential 
to reduce the funding gap”. After recognizing that the water MDG was off-track in Sub Saharan 
Africa, the solution proposed focuses on efficiency savings and try to downscale the standards for 
water supply and sanitation. This basically means to focus on water provision through public water 
points instead of private household level connections. This solution was seen as a limitation to the 
right to water access by Water Justice67 exponents (personal notes from Marseille World Water 
Forum 2012) and actually makes a difference in terms of health and hygiene standards that it can 
                                                 
67 www.waterjustice.org 
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ensure, as it is confirmed by the WHO classification in Table 4.2. Dagdeviren and Robertson (2008, 
p. 4) share the view that low cost solutions are not optimal: “Low-cost and quick-fix solutions may 
be important in mitigating the adverse effects of lack of access to water in the slums.” because “a 
decent solution that is sustainable over the long term is beyond the commercialised world of WSS 
systems”. If water supply costs have to be reduced, relaxing metering standards offers an 
opportunity for saving without affecting the service standards. 
Table 4.2: Water supply ladder 
Service level Access measure Needs met Level of health 
concern 
No access (quantity collected 
often below 5 l/c/d) 
More than 1000m or 30 minutes 
total collection time 
 
Consumption – cannot be assured 
Hygiene – not possible (unless 
practised at source) 
Very high 
Basic access (average 
quantity unlikely to exceed 
20 l/c/d) 
 
Between 100 and 1000m or 5 to 30 
minutes total collection time 
 
Consumption – should be assured 
Hygiene – handwashing and basic food hygiene 
possible laundry/bathing difficult to assure unless 
carried out at source 
High 
Intermediate access (average 
quantity about 50 l/c/d) 
Water delivered through one tap on-
plot (or within 100m 
or 5 minutes total collection time) 
Consumption – assured 
Hygiene – all basic personal and food hygiene assured; 
laundry and bathing should also be assured 
Low 
Optimal access (average 
quantity 100 l/c/d and above) 
Water supplied through multiple 
taps continuously 
Consumption – all needs met 
Hygiene – all needs should be met 
Very low 
Source: Howard and Bartram 2003 
 
4.3 A case study: water supply in Low Income Areas by Lilongwe Water Board 
The paragraph describes the successes and challenges recently encountered by Lilongwe 
Water Board (LWB), the public utility for Lilongwe city, in the effort to provide water to Low 
Income Areas (LIA), which are informal settlements and traditional housing areas. The analysis is 
based on the review of secondary sources, like reports, published studies and on semi-structured 
interviews carried out in November 2013 with the staff of LWB: the Project Implementation Unit, 
the Deputy General Manager, and some staff from Zone Offices - and with other relevant 
organizations – WaterAid68, the Malawian Chamber of Commerce and the Malawian Revenue 
Authority. The checklist used to conduct the interview is provided in Appendix A. 
Lilongwe is the largest city in Malawi and its administrative capital since 1975.  Lilongwe 
has witnessed a high urbanization rate ever since, accelerated by the relocation of all government 
head offices from Blantyre to Lilongwe from 2005. The population of Lilongwe in 2008 was 
669,021 and it is expected to reach 1,000,000 in 2015. About 76% of this population was living in 
the informal settlements, where water is supplied mainly through public kiosks. The water coverage 
                                                 
68 WaterAid is a UK based international NGO (www.wateraid.org) 
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was 55% in 2012 (VEI 2013). The sewerage system in Lilongwe covers only 9% of the city and 
Lilongwe City Council is currently managing wastewater in the city, but LWB is supposed to take 
over this responsibility of wastewater and sanitation. The majority of Lilongwe’s residents, 
especially in the informal settlements, relies on pit latrines for human waste disposal. 
Lilongwe is divided into 59 administrative areas, identified by a progressive number. There 
is not a strict correspondence between the boundaries of the low income areas (LIAs) and the ones 
of the administrative areas. However it is possible to state that at least 16 administrative areas 
include LIAs. The metering level has been 100%, among the connected households, at least since 
the beginning of the 21th century, as household level metering was the dominant strategy. 
In 2009, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the ACP-EU Water Facility (WF) 
financed Blantyre and Lilongwe Water Board to achieve by 2013, among other goals, an extension 
of drinking water services to 723,000 additional persons in low income areas in both cities. 
The case study is relevant to the present analysis because, even if funding was available for 
household connection in LIA, LWB gave up implementing the corresponding program also due to 
the complexity, the high cost and the frequent failures associated with the management of such 
connections in informal areas. It will be argued that demanding metering standards were among the 
elements determining such complexity, high costs and failures. 
Moreover, also in Lilongwe, there is a tendency to mix participatory and market devices, 
with the result that community based entities operate as businesses. Lastly, also in Lilongwe, the 
opportunity to address non domestic water demand management was not fully sized yet. The 
present part of the chapter will cover the same topics addressed in the previous one, with reference 
to the specific case study. 
 
4.3.1 High costs of metering in Lilongwe 
According to LWB annual report 2011-2012 (LWB 2013), meters are the 4th asset of LWB 
in terms of value (notes to the financial statements p. 42) but their estimated useful life is 5 years 
only (p. 35), while for other assets the depreciation time horizon is much longer.  The results 
obtained by Mutikanga for Uganda range from 3 to 13 years for the optimal replacement time 
(Mutikanga 2012).  
505 MKW, corresponding to around 1 €, is the monthly rent of a meter charged to users and 
it is also the cost of the first 5 cubic meters (6 cm is usually considered the basic household 
consumption), so meter rents accounts for half the average bill for low income households. 
Table 4.3 indicates the costs of purchasing households and commercial meters of different 
diameters for the Board, with a minimum cost of € 34 for small household meters. 
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Table 4.3 Price of meters 
Diameter (mm) € Typical of 
15 34 
Households 20 35 
25 59 
40 101 Commercial 
Source: PIU office 
4.3.2 Low domestic consumption and the supply ladder in LWB 
Average consumption per residential connection is lower in areas with LIAs than in other 
areas. In the analysed period (2007-2013), average monthly consumption per domestic connection 
was 16 cubic meters in administrative areas with LIA, against 41cm in areas which do not include 
LIAs, as shown in the Figure 4.2.  
 
Figure 4.2: Average monthly consumption in LIA and in other areas 
  
The consumption in areas without LIAs is strongly higher than the one in areas with LIAs 
throughout the years and it also shows a much more marked pattern of seasonal fluctuations, while 
LIAs consumption does not fluctuate as much, due to the fact that it corresponds to basic needs. 
This difference is particularly important if we consider that shared connections are a reality 
in LIA, where the number of persons relying on each connection is much higher. Even, considering 
8.8 persons per connection as indicated by LWB (VEI 2013) for the whole town, this means that in 
the areas including LIAs people consume a daily amount of 60 litres of water. This optimistic 
estimate is below optimal consumption levels for the WHO (Howard and Bartram 2003), so that no 
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evidence of wasteful use of water can be found. Conversely the consumption level in other areas is 
too high, even if 100% metering is practiced.  
The same EIB/WF project that financed the kiosks also foresaw the establishment of a so 
called Access to Water Facility, a micro Finance Fund to finance household water connections. The 
facility was expected to make 35,000 individual connections affordable for low-income customers 
in both Lilongwe and Blantyre. This was a very ambitious target if one considers that LWB had in 
2013 about 45,000 connections. The idea was to provide credit for the connection cost (11,000 
MKW at that time), allowing the customer to pay back in monthly installments. 
Unfortunately the Access to Water Facility was never implemented. According to LWB 
PIU, LWB has a long backlog of clients who already paid but were never connected, also due to 
absolute water scarcity (demand exceeded supply since 2012 and they are now arranging for 
rationing). Moreover, according to the PIU it was not demonstrated if the reason why people was 
not getting connected was the affordability of the connection cost.  
The issue was further explored with a key stakeholder of LWB, WaterAid, which confirmed 
that the demand for household connections in LIAs is high, but LWB is not doing connections 
accordingly, also because these areas are too difficult and costly to manage, even when land tenure 
rights are there. This is due to the fact that houses are one close to the others and that it is difficult 
even to understand the boundaries, which also impacts on all the costs (meter readings, bill 
delivery). Trémolet and Mansour (2014) report that, in the EIB/WF project, the set up of the 
revolving fund by LWB was optional because the EC procedures did not allow for grant funding 
being used for lending activities. Its implementation therefore relied on the ability of the Water 
Boards and the service contractor to leverage these funds. According to Trémolet and Mansour 
(2014), VEI made available 0.50 M€ and according to PIU more than 1.00 M€ was made available 
by the Government of Malawi, but the facility was not implemented. 
As a matter of fact, the management of household connections is very challenging for LWB, 
with huge arrears in payments in both the wealthy and the low income areas. Massive disconnection 
campaigns were implemented instead in the recent years. Zone level staff, reported that in 2013 
three disconnection campaigns were carried out. The third one had the duration of 25 days, and it 
had a target of above 20,000 disconnections. If this figure is compared with the number of active 
residential water connections for the same period (October 2013), which was just above 40,000, a 
clear idea of the proportion of these disconnecting initiatives can easily be achieved. It was 
explained also that disconnections campaigns target the high income areas first, because these areas 
ensure revenues from reconnection fees in a shorter time. Only after completing high income areas 
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LIAs are targeted, because poor households sometimes fail to get reconnected or they do it after a 
long time.  
The reconnection fee was set at 3,500 MKW. This amount seems to be quite high and 
corresponded to more than 5 months of consumption for a basic consumption of 6 cubic meters per 
month. According to the Deputy General Manager LWB, the reconnection fee of MKW 3,500 
includes both the costs of disconnection/reconnection and a penalty.  
The average consumption at public kiosks in Low Income Areas was 16 litres per capita per 
day, considering 250 persons per kiosk (VEI 2013). This is a very low level of consumption, and it 
corresponds to “no access” in the terms of the WHO (Howard and Bartram 2003). However, the 
main strategy selected by LWB and its partners to achieve the project objectives in terms of access, 
following the idea of downscaling the ladders, is based on low cost solutions and public water 
kiosks for unplanned areas. The construction of 372 water kiosks was foreseen within the EIB/WF 
project, expected to serve more than 90,000 persons in low income areas, with 250 persons per 
point. This part of the project, as opposed to the one related to household level connection, was 
implemented. 
4.3.3 Poor metering practices in LWB case 
According to the research on LWB carried out by Chikasema (2009), there are a number of 
problems related to metering practices. Some of the most important problems are the lack of 
maintenance and replacement, the referencing system to locate the meters in the field and the slow 
and unreliable flow of information from metering to billing offices. According to the author, 
Lilongwe experienced a high increase in the number of meters with estimated consumption, which 
means that the bill is issued without a reading, based on estimations. In the study, the average 
number of meters with estimated consumption was found to be around 20%, with some areas above 
40%. He also found a direct relation between the levels of Non Revenue Water levels and the 
number of meters with estimated water consumption. 
In the most recent years, the intervention on metering was in fact associated to the objective 
of reducing NRW, a priority also within the EIB/WF project. At first, the main focus was on 
apparent losses (as opposed to technical ones), since it was expected that at least half of the total 
NRW was related to illegal connections and poor functioning of meters. Since 2011, out of a total 
of around 40,000 meters, 12,000 were replaced and the meters removed were recalibrated and 
reinstalled elsewhere. However, according to the PIU of LWB, the problem was not commercial 
losses, as the reduction of NRW achieved was far below expectations. Better results seem to be 
instead associated with the more recent adoption of the so called caretaker model and with bulk 
metering at the level of District Metered Areas – DMAs (Morrison 2004). This system allocates 
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staff of different departments, both on the field and from the local and central offices, to specific 
geographic areas, to increase their accountability and commitment to the performances of that area.  
The experience of LWB suggests that bulk metering proved to be more strategic than 
household level metering to address the challenges posed by Non Revenue Water rates. 
4.3.4 Community participation and reselling regulation in Lilongwe 
 
Table 4.4, coming from a poster in the Kiosk Management Unit (KMU) office, shows the 
number of water points managed in each Low Income Area or its sub-division, by type of 
management solution. The main solution for the management of public kiosks in Lilongwe is also 
consistent with the trends introduced above and it is 
based on Water Users Association (WUA) even if other 
organizational solutions, adopted in the past, still exist in 
some areas of the city. PPPs are managed by individual 
business people who entered in agreement with LWB 
straight. They were former staff of the LWB who were 
fired and compensated with kiosk licenses. This can be 
considered a residual category, as private sector 
management was refused by communities as a main 
strategy. LWB instead means that the kiosk is managed 
by the board straight, through its own staff. 
 
Table 4.4 Number of Water Kiosks by Area and Management Entity 
 
Source: poster in the KMU office  
 
Water Users Association (WUA) is the preferred option at present. In Lilongwe, WUAs 
started to emerge in the 2000s, with support from WaterAid and, as a result, a Kiosks Management 
Unit was established as an interface with the WUAs within the Water Board. According to 
WaterAid, there were eight WUA, including the ones under formation, in November 2013. A WUA 
is a private entity, registered as an association that enters into an agreement with LWB. WUAs are 
supposed to operate according to business principles and profits are allowed, while prices are 
regulated by LWB. WUA include elected members and members appointed by constitution from 
local elites: members of Parliament, traditional authorities, high ranking member of Christian and 
Muslim clergy, prominent business persons. The National water sector review, commenting about 
WUAs, states that they are “a combination of a community based and a private organization” and 
AREA WUA PPP LWB other TOTAL 
7  25   25 
8  15   15 
21  22   22 
22A 8    8 
22B   16  16 
23  15  2 17 
24 68    68 
25  16   16 
36   45  45 
39   12  12 
41 34    34 
44   11  11 
46 90    90 
49   22  22 
50 MGONA 16   4 20 
50 SENTI 58    58 
53   36  36 
56 104    104 
TOTAL 378 93 142 6 619 
% on total 61% 15% 23% 1% 100% 
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that their management structure has been critiqued as top heavy and costly (Malawian Min of 
Water, 2012). There is indeed a sort of elite capture which is intrinsic to the institutional design of 
these organizations. However, asked about the risk of captures, all the interviewed explained that 
when problems of legitimacy are posed by community members, they are easily solved thanks to 
the fact that the WUAs are registered and recognized by LWB. This is however a top-down 
legitimating and, as such, it is not fully consistent with participation principles. 
According to the KMU, the extent of the maintenance tasks of the WUAs is limited to small 
pipes maintenance (<10 mm) and to the kiosks premises, while they report to the KMU for other 
problems. WUAs at present don’t have any role in monitoring and controlling the household 
connection in their reference area. However, once the bulk metering installation will be completed, 
WUA are expected to become responsible even for household connections. 
According to WaterAid, the expectation of LWB is that it might be easier to manage and 
extend household connections through the WUAs, “or at least it will be no longer their problem”. 
Also WUAs are willing to do this because they think this will make them more powerful. However 
there are some constraints to be addressed. For example, according to WaterAid, users should still 
be responsible to LWB. According to the Deputy General Manager however, there is no risk 
associated to this change, at least on the part of LWB and WUAs are “a way of outsourcing” as 
“they are not linked to us in anyway” (KMU Manager). This inconsistency between the perceptions 
of the two parties reflects the tension between participatory and market oriented approaches already 
described. 
At present reselling of utility water is not allowed in Lilongwe and the Waterworks Act 
(1995) indicates that it is forbidden69. However, according to the KMU Manager, disconnection of 
resellers is not much enforced (“when someone reports to LWB about reselling then we 
disconnect”).  
The case of LWB shows that it is not easy to build sound bottom-up participatory solutions. 
It also offers an innovative case of community based management applied to household 
connections, while these experiences are usually limited to kiosks management.  
 
                                                 
69 The definitions provided in part 1 of the water act actually provide a definition of “premises” which hardly apply to 
informal settlements and anyway exclude reselling by limiting the “service” to the identified premises. "Premises" 
includes any land, with or without buildings and any building, room, hut or shed which is held or occupied as a distinct 
or separate holding or tenancy. "Service" means all pipes, valves, cisterns, casks, fittings and other appliances through 
which water flows or is intended to flow after leaving the meter on any premises, and which are intended for the supply 
of water to such premises only. 
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4.3.5 Growing industrial demand in Lilongwe 
LWB facebook published on 21th March 2013 that “the water demand has completely 
outstripped production. (…). This is mainly coming in because of developments in Kanengo 
Industrial site, remarkable development in City Centre and other areas. The current production 
capacity can no longer be increased because of the water availability in the current source 
(Lilongwe River)”. 
Total water demand exceeds production since 2012, and commercial and industrial 
consumption volumes accounted for 18% on average of the total demand, in the period between 
September 2012 and October 2013. In the peak period of November their share of consumption 
increases to 22%. The number of industrial and commercial connections is above 2,000, but area 29 
alone, where big, mostly foreign business are concentrated, accounts for more than 20% on the total 
commercial and industrial consumption. According to the Malawi Confederation of the Chambers 
of Commerce, there are about 10 tobacco companies in Kanengo (area 29), while they were only 2 
ten years ago. Other growing sectors are agribusiness, such as processing pigeon peas, soya beans, 
chilly and companies producing seeds varieties. Moreover, there are beverages companies and one 
company producing cotton. The average consumption per business in the whole city is 505 cm, per 
month while there are many users above 1,000 cubic meters per month, including agricultural 
business. These volumes are particularly impressive if one considers that the total monthly 
consumption from all the water kiosks in LIA is around 50,000 cubic meters.  
There was a 7% increase in industrial and commercial consumption total volume between 
2008 and 2012. The increase in the turnover of the manufacturing companies operating in Lilongwe 
fully accounts for the growth in the consumption levels, with around 59% growth in turnover in the 
same period (unpublished data from the Malawian Revenue Authority). However the absolute 
volume remains very high and it competes with domestic demand. This is being addressed by LWB, 
through pricing policy, as it is possible to see in Figure 4.3.  
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Figure 4.3: Unit revenues from customer categories (local currency MKW per cm) 
 
The trend of the tariff system between May 2007 and August 2013 is characterized by a 
huge increase of the rates for industrial and commercial consumption, while for the average unit 
revenues from households and kiosks consumption the increase was less dramatic. However, 
insolvency by businesses (Simbota 2013) is partially jeopardizing the positive effect of the pricing 
policy. Industrial water pricing is not associated with any goal of broader economic policy 
(promotion of FDI, SMEs development,…) as, according to the Deputy General Manager, the 
constraint to industrial investment in Lilongwe is power costs and power availability, not water. 
Even if tariffs are increasing, they do not account for environmental costs. These costs are external 
to the LWB, because, as a matter of fact, wastewater is not treated and it remains unclear which is 
the responsible body for wastewater management. The Water Works Act (1995) states that Water 
Boards are responsible for sewerage, while the Local Government Act (1998) states that the 
Municipal Councils are responsible. At present in Lilongwe there is only one wastewater treatment 
plant and it is operated by the Municipal Council, treating a small share of wastewater produced. 
The plant is supposed to be transferred to LWB as soon as the Local Government Act will be 
emended. At present the sewerage service is not charged. The staff of the LWB office in the 
industrial area confirmed that to date “it is problem of the city assembly to know where the 
136 
 
industrial customers are discharging”, also shedding some light on the advantages of this unclear 
situation. 
About the possibility to develop lower quality raw water sources for industrial uses when the 
process standards allow it, it was explained by the deputy manager of LWB that some industries 
have private borehole but this is not very common. Concessions for boreholes are given by the 
Water Resource Board among the Ministry of Water but LWB has to confirm that the Board cannot 
supply the area where the concession is to be given. Moreover, in many places water is 
contaminated and in some places the water table is very low. Another reason for the provision of 
utility water to industrial customers, regardless the quality needed, can be found again in the words 
of the staff of the LWB office in the industrial area: “We do not want to lose them: they are good 
customers”. The experience of LWB with industrial customers shows an important trend of price 
increase, but not yet any serious attempt to reduce their consumption and environmental costs. 
Industrial water demand management could be improved. This can also be associated to the 
inceptives structure that was described in Chapter 2 that pushes utilities toward big volume 
customers, that ensures more cost recovery. 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
The analysis of the literature and of the case study provided some arguments against the 
opportunity of metering all household connections in poor areas of African cities. The main 
argument is related with the high cost of metering, including installing reading and billing. This 
cost, when compared with the benefits of metering each household, does not seem to be consistent. 
Complementary to that, it is argued that a service standard based on 100% metering, can prevent 
utilities from making household connections in poor, informal dwellings. Since increasing the 
number of users is an objective of both utilities and development agencies, often involved in the 
financing of metering programmes, this problem should be carefully considered. 
It was pointed out that water demand management should prioritize non-domestic users, 
while the consumption by poor users does not need to be reduced and it is not very sensitive to 
metering. It was also shown that the operations of African utilities in the field of metering are not 
efficient and effective and this jeopardizes the potential benefits from metering. Systematic bulk 
metering instead seems to have more unexploited potential for the control of NRW. The high costs 
of metering and the complexity of the related practices were also considered and identified among 
the reasons preventing utilities from adopting a strategy of water access which is based on 
household level connection, regardless the widely recognized advantages of this solution. The 
analysis also pointed out the fact that household practising water reselling, informal providers and 
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any association selling utility water have to be carefully metered, but also to be properly regulated. 
Metering alone in fact does not ensure that prices (and quality standards) to the end user are 
consistent with the utility requirements and informal providers and resellers need special, dedicated 
tariffs and regulation to avoid excessive mark ups or the transfer of high blocks tariffs to low 
volumes consumers (Boland and Whittington 1998).  
As a matter of fact, most SSA cities are easily classified into better off areas and low income 
areas, often corresponding to the informal settlements, usually un-served or unevenly served. This 
marked spatial segregation allows for the adoption of different strategies by utilities, with universal 
household level metering only adopted for the wealthier areas.  
For the low income areas, the point is not a dual alternative weather to meter or not the 
water flowing to those areas, which is instead necessary for leakages and Non Revenue Water 
control, but is where to place the last meter. Staddon (2010, p. 15) notices that “there seems to be 
relatively little critical discussion of the optimal location for water meters or the optimal 
technology to deploy (…) it is simply assumed that these should be located at the service inlet to 
each and every house in the land.”  
If household level metering is reconsidered in favor of group metering, there is a chance to 
rehabilitate household level connections in LIA as a mean to ensure affordable and sustainable 
access to water to the poor. 
Delegated management (among others WSP 2009) is already a good example of how it is 
possible to move the threshold of the utility responsibility upward to the level of the local small 
scale provider, identified as a market agent or as a community groups. Most solutions, however, 
assume that, even beyond the threshold of the last utility meter, the allocation of water will be based 
on the market, spreading the need to meter to each and every tap (WSP 2009). As a matter of fact, 
the management practices adopted in these cases are mostly market oriented, so that Page (2003) 
points at communities as “agents of commodification” referring to the role they can play in 
transforming water into a commodity. Similarly, Ahlers et al. (2013) challenge the idea that market 
forces can push small scale providers toward affordable and high quality services. 
This is not necessarily the case if a wider variety of possible community arrangements are 
considered.  
Collective metering, as proposed by Mara and Alabaster (2006) for in house multiple taps 
cooperatives, could be extended to yard taps, without jeopardizing the rational of the solutions 
proposed. Conveniently dimensioned groups of users can easily manage all the challenges that 
typically prevent water utilities from connecting users in low income areas, from overconsumption 
to high turnover of dwellers, from illegal reselling to arrears in the payments.  
138 
 
Group connections can also overcome the problem pointed by Boland and Whittington 
(1998) of the regressive effect of increasing block tariffs in case of shared connections. This 
problem is in fact overcome by rescaling the ceiling of the basic consumption block in order to 
account for the number of users relying on the connection.  
Moreover the lower the number of meters, the higher the accuracy that the utility can assure 
for their testing, functioning and reading.  
It can be noticed that these solutions are similar to what already happens in western urban 
areas, and sometimes even in African cities’ centres, with connections of condominium buildings, 
or in poor neighbourhoods with shared connections. The main difference is that the number of users 
should be higher and their internal relations should be regulated. Group connections should not 
require any land tenure over the plots supplied, nor conversely imply any title over the plot by the 
individual joining the group, thus overcoming the challenges related with coordination among 
different bodies, mentioned as a constraint by Dagdeviren and Robertson (2008). 
The study has shown that metering at household level can be too complex and costly to 
manage and that alternatives can be explored to reduce costs, without scaling down the supply 
ladder and keeping the domestic demand volumes controlled.  
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4.6 Appendix A: checklist used for semi-structured interviews 
Individual Connections, meters and households reselling 
? Is the foreseen AWF (Access to Water Facility) for Low Income Areas (LIAs) working in 
Lilongwe? 
? The reconnection fee is currently set at 3.500 MKW. This amount seems to be quite high 
and corresponds to more than 5 month of consumption for a basic consumption of 6 cubic 
meters per month. Could you comment of this? Does the amount of MKW 3.500 correspond 
to the variable cost of reconnection or is it a disincentive late payment/no payment? Can a 
detail of such variable costs be provided? What does the experience of recent 
disconnections suggest about the affordability of reconnecting? 
? Do you want to share any comment about the recent (or still ongoing?) disconnection 
campaign? 
? According to LWB annual report 2011-2012, meters are the 4th asset of LWB in terms of 
value (notes to the financial statements p.  42) but their estimated useful life is 5 years only 
(p.  35) while for other assets the depreciation time horizon is much longer. Can you 
comment on this? Does this mean that meters costs are to be recovered in a shorter period 
and boost water bills? 
? Were prepaid meters adopted in any area in Lilongwe? And in Blantyre?  
? Were boundary meters (bulk meters) installed, as suggested by WaterAid (WaterAid 2007)?  
? Was any alternative to metering at the household connection level considered (i.e. flat rate 
combined with metering and regulation for reselling households) ? 
? Was any regulation of households reselling practices introduced?  
Water Users Associations and Kiosks Management 
? Which is at present the proportion and number of kiosks managed by WUA and other 
solutions respectively (committees, privates operators, privates under WUA contract)?How 
many WUA are currently operating? Which is the Max, Min Average number of kiosks 
managed by each WUA? 
? Both Chirwa (2007) and WaterAid (2007) report the widespread experience of “captured” 
water kiosks, referring to these situations where community committees and community 
based organizations supposed to manage kiosks, were substituted by members of local 
elites, in most cases with important mismanagement outcomes (prices increases, poor 
maintenance, arrears). Is there any device preventing WUAs to be captured as it happened 
with the former committees?  
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? Which is the Government Office which registers the WUAs? Is there any recognition by the 
Ministry of Irrigation and Water Development? Which are the criteria adopted by the LWB 
to enter into agreement with a WUA?  
? Is there any device ensuring that there is one single legitimate WUA per area?  
? How is the membership base of WUAs defined? Is there any device to ensure that any user 
can apply or that the whole users community is conveniently represented? How is a WUA 
accountable to the reference community?  
? Which is usually the precise extent of the maintenance are of WUAs (i.e. downstream a gate-
valve, a given number of kiosks,…)? Does it cover taps and kiosks only or is it also 
supposed to cover the distribution network in the area?  
? Do WUAs have any role about the monitoring and controlling the household connection in 
their reference area (reselling, meters tampering,…)?  
? Which are the main contributions, in terms of expertise and solutions, provided by VEI to 
the issue of kiosks management in LIAs? 
? How is the price charge by kiosks regulated? How is it the regulation enforced? How is the 
bulk tariff for community water kiosks calculated? Is it an O&M cost recovery tariff? How 
does the possible transfer of O&M responsibility (and related costs) over kiosks affects the 
calculation?  
? Is any regulatory function covered by the Ministry or by the Water Board? Which is the 
body in charge of price regulation?  
? Which is the nature and the role of the Kiosk Management Unit? 
Commercial and Industrial Users 
? Was any limitation to the growth of industrial demand considered? 
? Was the possibility to develop specific raw water sources considered for industrial uses (low 
quality sources, when the process standards allow it, or private boreholes)? 
? Why was a flat rate tariff for industrial/commercial users selected? Is it a capital cost 
recovery tariff?  
? Are treatment costs considered? And environmental costs? How is the problem of industrial 
wastewater treatment addressed?  
? Was the possibility of price differentiation between industrial and commercial users 
considered?  
? The previous tariffs set the ratio between the highest block of domestic consumption and 
industrial commercial consumption at 245/160 (1.53), while with the new tariff the ratio is 
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352/202 (1.74). Which is the reason for this increase in the industrial/residential tariff 
ratio?  
? How are the volumes of industrial consumption changing?  
? Which kind of industries are being attracted in Kanengo Industrial park? Are they operating 
water intensive production processes? 
? Is industrial water pricing associated with any goal of broader economic policy (promotion 
of FDI, SMEs development,…)? If yes, which is the Central or Municipal Government body 
which formulates these goals and transfer them to the Water Board level?  
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4.7 Appendix B: game theory and household consumption  
The appendix presents some possible implications of shared meters in term of the 
consumption behaviour of households and their cooperation strategies.  
Moving the meters upstream, with a number of poor households using the same meter, poses 
problems of free riding and cooperation. More particularly, in the terms of the game theory, each 
household faces up to the decision whether to over-consume or not, and with uncertainty about the 
consumption of the other households, or, to simplify, about the average consumption of the other 
households (Table 4.5). 
Table 4.5 Household consumption game 
Source: personal elaboration 
The incentives to free riding and opportunistic behaviours basically depend upon two 
variables: the penalty for overconsumption (difference between the first block tariff and the tariffs 
for consumption above this ceiling) and the dimension of the group (number of households using 
the same meters and entering a contractual relation with the water utility jointly) that is going to pay 
the penalty. The higher the penalty for over-consumption, the lower the incentive to over-consume 
and free ride. The higher the number of households, the higher the share of the overconsumption 
costs that each over-consuming household can externalize.  
With realistic values of these variables however, in a single simultaneous game free riding 
cannot be avoided and it will result instead as the dominant strategy, because each individual is 
confronted with the same game structure. If all the households opt for free riding and over-
consume, however, the result will be the lowest right cell (Table 4.5), corresponding to the lowest 
total pay off. 
The tragedy of the commons however is not necessarily the case, as the game is not 
simultaneous and it is not single. As a matter of fact, users can monitor the total consumption and 
the average consumption of their fellows during the months and adjust their behaviour accordingly. 
Moreover the game is repeated because the decision takes place every month and people can learn 
how to cooperate (Ostrom 1990). Further research could provide some reference values for the 
dimension of the groups and the penalties to be applied even by using more formal applications of 
the game theory or agent based models. 
   
  Average household 
  Normal consumption Over consumption 
household A Normal consumption Cooperation Quasi tragedy of the commons 
Over consumption Free riding Tragedy of the commons 
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5 Conclusions 
5.1 Some general considerations on the neoliberal reform in Sub Saharan 
African water industry 
The study provides some insight on three important issues: cost recovery policies, private 
sector involvement and household level metering in the framework of the neoliberal reform. While 
cost recovery policies and private sector involvement are clearly related to broader issues of 
political economy, metering belongs more closely to the space of technicalities. The study does not 
provide a comprehensive evaluation of the neoliberal agenda for the water sector, but it contributes 
to the understanding of the new public management approach to water supply sector in Sub Saharan 
Africa, which nonetheless includes recommendations not addressed in the present work like 
accountability, consumer and market orientation of the water utilities. 
The three issues studied are among the recommended recipes for African water utilities, 
while none of them belongs to the most extreme neoliberal agenda. They instead form a legitimate 
part of a softer set of tools which gained, or kept, momentum, after some failures and shortcomings 
of the reform model became apparent. These, and other New Public Management style approaches, 
are often presented and perceived as less politically biased. Their justification is nonetheless derived 
from market oriented arguments that closely resemble the ones that justified the introduction of 
their harder counterparts. Moreover, the logical links between interventions and expected results are 
sometimes more smoothed and unclear. 
Harder policies had ambitious objectives and promised important welfare gains for 
everybody. Access to water was expected to improve as a consequence of full cost recovery and 
private investments; efficient allocation of water was expected from prepaid meters. The policies 
here analyzed have more modest ambitions. While they recognize that the African water sector 
cannot ensure profits and nether the recovery of capital investments, so that access improvements 
will not come out of cost recovery policies, yet a great effort is still put into them. While it is clear 
that no free lunch will result from private sector investments in water infrastructure, it is still 
considered strategic to involve private actors, even if public finance has to pay the bill. While pre-
paid meters ensure that there is no waste of water at the cost of jeopardizing access, billed metering 
leaves some space for wastage (if bills are not properly issued, delivered and paid) and it can still 
prevent access.  
In table 5.1, the three topics analyzed in this work are indicated at the top of the columns. 
Their harder counterparts with their ambitious objectives and the reasons for their failures are 
summarized in the first rows. The revised objectives and the shortcomings presented in this study 
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are instead recalled in the second part of the table. Lastly, the alternative technical devices 
recommended in each specific chapter are presented in the final rows, jointly with their theoretical 
and ethical foundations.  
Table 5.1: Synoptic framework of the reform trends on the issues studied 
  Cost recovery Low risk PSI Household level metering 
H
ar
de
r 
ne
ol
ib
er
al
 r
ec
ip
e Problem to be addressed 
Inefficient SOE 
lack of investments 
Water demand management 
and opportunistic 
behaviours 
Harder variant Full cost recovery (plus profit) 
Concessions, lease, 
affermage 
Pre-paid meters 
Reason for failure/criticism 
Difficult to achieve full cost 
recovery mostly for affordability 
problems 
Lack of investors (see cost 
recovery) 
Public health and human 
rights concerns 
R
ec
ip
e 
st
ud
ie
d Objective 
Financial sustainability of 
operations plus substantial 
contribution to urban 
infrastructural investments 
Efficiency gains by utilities 
Efficient allocation of 
water 
Shortcomings discussed in the present 
work 
Misleading incentives for access 
increase 
Low efficiency and (aid) 
effectiveness 
High costs preventing 
access 
A
lt
er
na
ti
ve
s Alternative devices recommended by 
the study 
Financial sustainability of 
operation 
No promotion of PSI Collective metering 
Foundation of the alternatives 
 
Public finance Public ethos Civic ethos 
 
Looking at the foundations of the alternatives proposed by the study, it may be thought that 
the alternative suggestions are based on overoptimistic assumptions on how the real world actually 
functions, but this is not the case.  
Public finance could afford the costs of 17 billion dollars needed from 2009 to 2015 to reach 
the water MDG (Banerjee and Morella 2011), and even the double amount, required to bring the 
proportion of people without access to safe drinking water sources to zero, as it represents only 
around 5%70 of the military expenditure of the USA alone. Public and donor financing can afford 
this cost, even if they bring in some challenges which should be recognized and addressed. The 
possibility of financing water infrastructure from fiscal revenues is limited by the small dimension 
of the tax base in African economies, but positive trends can be detected both in the absolute value 
of revenues collected, related to the fast growth of many African economies, and in their value as a 
percentage of GDPs (AfDB 2010). Public financing can also be based on borrowing by sovereign 
and sub-sovereign public bodies, like municipalities. The cost for the latter however can be 
prohibitive in the absence of guarantees by the central government (Winpenny 2003). ODA 
financing can be associated with dependency and corruption (Moyo 2009), conditionality and low 
                                                 
70 Computation based on Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for 2008 
(http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database) 
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predictability (Bulíř et al. 2008), and it is not yet clear how the increasing presence of new donors 
from emerging countries can modify the picture. 
Public ethos, at the level of institutions, instead proved to be an issue to be addressed 
ineludibly, regardless the willingness to introduce Private Sector Involvement (Budds and 
McGranahan 2003, Estache and Kouassi 2002). In the framework of the present study this was also 
confirmed by the key role played by public utilities in light PSIs. Moreover, transparent and 
committed public regulation is recognized to be of utmost importance when the private operator has 
a higher degree of autonomy.  
Lastly, the problem of civic ethos, at the level of individuals and society, is about the 
ultimate nature of human beings. Deviations from the paradigm of economic rationality and 
individualism are well known in the management of common goods particularly (Ostrom 1990) and 
it can also be promoted by purposely designed institutions. For sure both the homo economicus and 
the cooperative one need water, and solutions to satisfy this need should avoid ideological biases.     
The three analysed recipes share an ultimate instrumental nature, and, as such, they should 
be assessed, adopted, improved or rejected, in relation to the results they deliver. The study 
provides some results that are here recalled. 
 
5.2 Cost recovery and access 
The second chapter focuses on the problems of cost recovery and access to drinking water in 
Sub Saharan Africa. An econometric model explaining the dynamics in water coverage which 
accounts for financial performances of utilities is proposed. The data set covers 25 countries in the 
Sub Saharan region from 1995 to 2012. 
The econometric analysis demonstrates the importance of cost recovery, as the cost recovery 
indicator has always positive significant coefficients, but the square of the same indicator, which is 
significant in most cases, has a negative coefficient of comparable dimensions. This emphasizes the 
negative effect of higher levels of cost recovery. Therefore, cost recovery positively contributes to 
improve the coverage up to a certain value, by reassuring governments and donors on the 
sustainability of the utility itself or even by providing some funds from financial margins to 
complement public and donors’ funding. Beyond that value this positive contribution is no longer 
observed and the coverage change gets lower or even negative.  
Good financial results do not necessarily translate into corresponding increases in coverage, 
providing some empirical support to the warnings from descriptive studies: if utilities are urged to 
achieve financial results they might fail to provide water services to low income customers. For 
example, the high tariffs and high connection charges which are made necessary by high cost 
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recovery targets, can push low income customers toward water sources other than utility, often 
unprotected and unsafe, adversely affecting the coverage (among others Dagdeviren 2008, Bakker 
et al. 2008, Bayliss 2011, Hall and Lobina 2012). Similarly, overemphasizing the importance of 
financial results can push water operators toward big volume customers who ensure high 
consumption levels with small investment in distribution, while disregarding the demand expressed 
by African poor households (Bayliss 2011, Bakker et al. 2008). Poorly designed cost control or cost 
reduction strategies can result in the delay and reduction of maintenance interventions, driving 
decreasing social returns of cost recovery, as the access rates, even in previously served areas, 
decrease, because operation and maintenance expenditures are too low (van Ginneken et al. 2011).  
The results have important policy implications about the opportunity of setting high cost 
recovery targets for utilities. This is often done by regulators or by donors and international 
agencies setting targets for performance contracts or in the covenants for soft loans and grants. High 
targets can be misleading and they can introduce perverse incentives for utility managers. In order 
to provide some reference values which should not be exceeded, the point where the quadratic 
function changes its slope can be taken as a reference. The results are between 1.1 and 1.2, higher 
than the recommendations from the literature (GWI 2004, Tyman and Kingdom 2002, Banerjee and 
Morella 2011), which are between 1.33 and 2. 
As the value of 1 corresponds to the complete recovery of operational and maintenance costs 
only, it is also possible to confirm that these costs should be possibly recovered by utilities through 
tariffs. In all the models proposed, the descending part of the curve started above the value of 1 
O&M cost recovery can thus be associated with positive changes in access. 
Other positive recommendations arising from the study for utility managers seeking to 
increase the coverage are that the infrastructure maintenance should never be neglected and that a 
certain reliance on public and donors funding should not be blamed, given the huge task of 
increasing coverage in cities with a rapidly growing population. 
Sustainable cost recovery can be part of pro poor strategy aiming at expanding the access, 
based on cross subsidy among users categories and on tax and transfer finance. A reasonable level 
of cost recovery in fact makes utilities more bankable and reliable for donors and allows them to 
maintain their infrastructures properly. On the contrary, if cost recovery is not intended as a part of 
a pro poor strategy, it can become a part of the water access problem. If financial performances are 
not intended a means to increase water access and they become an end as such, this will adversely 
affect the results that they were supposed to pursue.  
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Cost recovery can keep its place in the tool box of reformers, but it should not have a 
legitimate autonomous role in the reformers agenda. This agenda in fact should focus much more 
strictly on access priorities and should adopt a broader set of tools to address them.  
 
5.3 PSIs and aid effectiveness 
The third chapter refers to the Light Private Sector Involvement initiatives, considering 
efficiency improvements, aid effectiveness and related policy implications and analyzing the 
determinants which can incentive or discourage the partners of light forms of PSI initiatives to 
achieve the expected results or to engage in the contracts. This is done through a review of case 
studies from literature and from original fieldwork, involving management and service contracts, 
which are the lightest and lower risk forms of public-private partnership. The incentives to perform 
for both the private and the public partner, as determined by the contracts and by the wider context 
are considered. The incentives necessary for both parties to engage in the partnership are also 
analysed, jointly with the costs of creating these preconditions. The review of the case studies 
contributes to explain why low risk PSIs tend to deliver limited efficiency gains to the utility and 
shows that the costs associated to the contracts are disproportionally high.  
Low risk PSIs are the result of a compromise between the resistances of utilities, civil 
society and governments against the private sector and the reluctance of the private sector to take on 
risks. Also the expectations posed on private sector were reduced. The low risk PSIs have proved to 
be acceptable for both the public and the private actors involved, but they were then characterized 
by important shortcomings and high costs. The balance between risk reduction and performance 
incentives has proved to be delicate, as the reduction of some risks causes a reduction of the 
incentives to perform and generates substantial costs. At the end, the PSIs succeed to engage the 
actors from both parts, but they fail to ensure that performances are in line with expectations. 
High shares of the contract value are usually tied to performance, but contracts are 
incomplete and computation of the KPIs is often questionable, while performances are sometimes 
out of the control of the operator itself. A narrow decision making space for the contractors was also 
found to be a common challenge, but at the same time the restriction of the contractor’s role is 
intrinsic to light PSIs and necessary to overcome political resistances. In the bidding phase, 
competition for the market was low, with few bidders, in the earlier case studies; while 
compensation for the bidding effort was recognized in later cases. Utilities have no incentives to 
cooperate with the contractors and the resistances are widespread. Light PSIs fail to make the 
private sector more acceptable for utilities, but in turn, by reducing the autonomy of the private 
operator, they make the cooperation of public utilities critical to the success of the partnership. A 
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stronger alignment of formal incentives for the contractor and for the utility was thus advocated. 
This, however, would further increase the complexity of the contracts design and the transaction 
costs, if incentives for the utilities are not part of a wider regulatory framework. In turn, a well 
functioning regulatory framework should be considered a priority as such, and not only a 
precondition for PSIs.  
The contracts considered in fact have disproportionally high transaction costs, particularly if 
the limited results from these PSIs are recognized.  
The PSIs analyzed are characterized by devices to reduce or remove exchange, inflation and 
regulatory risks faced by the contractor. Furthermore, more devices are invocated by observers 
when any element of the local institutional and market context challenges the smooth 
implementation of projects. This, however, poses the operator in unrealistic settings, so that it is 
impossible to know if efficiency gains would be sustainable in real world settings. By jointly 
considering the poor performances, the uncertain role of contractors to achieve them and the 
facilitating devices, the accountability for the results of light PSIs seems questionable. As 
accountability for results is among the principles of Paris and Busan (OECD 2005 and 2012), this 
challenges the Aid Effectiveness of low risk PSIs. 
Light, low risk PSIs cannot be recommended, but this does not automatically mean that 
higher risk PSIs should be rehabilitated. If PSIs could be seen as a last attempt to realize Private 
Sector Involvement, the failure of the last attempt should virtually imply the recognition of a wider 
failure of any form of PSI. However, all forms of PSIs are still promoted and evolving in many 
directions, but the study can provide a conclusion which is valid for any form of PSI.  
“Rushing and pushing” (Dagdeviren and Robertson 2013) private sector involvement when 
none of the actors is willing to engage in these experiences has perverse and contradictory effects. 
This paradox was particularly apparent for light PSIs, due to the low expectations and low results 
and to the high transaction costs, but this can be the case for any form of PSI. Forcing PSIs is not in 
line with the principle of ownership of the Paris declaration: “partner countries exercise effective 
leadership over their development policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development actions” 
(OECD 2005 p.3). 
PSIs should be implemented only when they are perceived as a need by the beneficiary 
utility, the local institutions and civil society, and they should not be related to any implicit or 
explicit conditionality. This would make the complex architectures to persuade the public sector, 
reduce risk and attract the private sector useless. PSI is costly and diverts attention from key 
priorities of the SSA water sector, like the need for increasing coverage and alternative strategies to 
make financing available. In conclusion, PSI should not be considered a priority as such if the Aid 
155 
 
Effectiveness in the water sector, in line with the objectives of the international community, has to 
be increased.  
According to Van Dijk (2014) the debate on PSI has moved from “against privatization” to 
“ok but under which conditions”. The study contributed to clarify the meaning of “under which 
conditions”- This should not mean that conditions must be created at any costs but that in many 
cases conditions are simply not there and PSI should not be introduced.  
 
5.4 Household level metering and the drinking water ladder 
The chapter analyses the priorities and tools for Water Demand Management in urban 
Africa, focusing on household level water metering. The study presents an analysis of the issues 
associated with water metering at household level by utilities in low income areas or informal 
settlements of Sub Saharan African cities. Metering is considered a key tool for water demand 
management and recommended as a good practice in the water supply sector but, while its benefits 
are clearly spelled out by donors and development agencies, its costs and shortcomings are seldom 
considered. The paper analyses such challenges, based on the available literature and on an original 
case study on Lilongwe Water Board (Malawi) and provides some arguments against the 
opportunity of metering all household connections in poor areas of African cities. 
It is pointed out that water demand management should prioritize non-domestic users, while 
the consumption by poor users does not need to be reduced and it is not very sensitive to metering. 
It is also shown that the operations of African utilities in the field of metering are less than efficient 
and effective and this jeopardizes the potential benefits from metering. The high costs of metering 
and the complexity of the related practices are also identified among the reasons preventing utilities 
from adopting a strategy of water access which is based on household level connection, regardless 
the widely recognized advantages of this solution. The analysis also points on the fact that 
household practising water reselling, informal providers and any association selling utility water 
need to be carefully metered, but also to be properly regulated. Metering alone in fact does not 
ensure that prices (and quality standards) to the end user are consistent with the utility requirements 
and informal providers. Moreover, resellers need special, dedicated, tariffs and regulation to avoid 
excessive mark ups or the transfer of high blocks tariffs to low volumes consumers (Boland and 
Whittington 1998, Gerlach and Franceys 2010).  
It is pointed out that participatory approaches are sometimes biased toward market based 
solutions (Page 2003) and the appeal of business opportunities can be among the reasons for 
frequent elite capture of grassroots institutions. If household level metering is reconsidered in favor 
of group metering, there is a chance to rehabilitate household level connections in LIA as a mean to 
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ensure to the poor affordable and sustainable access to water. For the low income areas, the point is 
not a dual alternative weather to meter or not the water flowing to those areas, which is necessary 
for leakages and Non Revenue Water control, but is where to place the last meter, challenging the 
assumption that this should be located at the service inlet to each and every house. Group 
connections can also overcome the problem pointed out by Boland and Whittington (1998) of the 
regressive effect of increasing block tariffs in case of shared connections. Moreover the lower the 
number of meters, the higher the accuracy that the utility can assure for their testing, functioning 
and reading.  
The study has shown that metering at household level can be too complex and costly to 
manage and that alternatives can be explored to reduce costs, without scaling down the supply 
ladder and keeping the domestic demand volumes controlled. 
Metering is only a minor part of the water supply technical paradigm and the role of other 
parts, probably even more strategic, could also be discussed, as the dominance of centralized water 
supply systems (Lobina 2012). Metering however is strictly associated with commercialization 
oriented reforms of water utilities and was given a high priority in the framework of cost recovery 
and of water demand management goals. Metering, in this view, can be seen as a tool for cost 
recovery, which should also be a tool itself. In this case the shift of priorities is thus double: 
metering became a priority as such, regardless its consistency with the social objectives that the cost 
recovery is supposed to purse. Again, the study advocates for a resetting in priorities, where every 
tool can give its legitimate contribution but can be even rejected. Technologies should be 
appropriate (Schumacher 1973) to purse the goals associated with existing social pressing needs, in 
the specific context, not vice-versa.  
 
5.5 Closing remarks 
All the devices analyzed in the study have probably some potential for the improvement of 
water services, provided that they are conceived as instruments to achieve explicit social and 
welfare objectives and not as final goals, such as it is often interpreted by IFIs and donors. The 
importance of focusing on water access objectives, by distinguishing more clearly between means 
and ends, has already been pointed out by different authors. For example, Dagdeviren (2008 p. 
117), referring to cost recovery policies implemented among Zambian commercialized utilities, 
stated that “while reforms for improving service provision are welcome, it is important to focus on 
the compatibility of the means and ends in the process of implementation”. 
Bayliss (2009) highlights that sometimes the reform is interpreted as a given, standard 
recipe, and the region is evaluated in relation to its ability to conform to the reform. Reform 
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proposals should in turn be evaluated against their suitability for the existing environment. This 
paradox is apparent when the words of Marin (2009 p. xi), commenting that Sub-Saharan Africa is 
“a challenging region for reform”, are considered. In fact, the recognition of the access to water as 
a human right by the United Nations in 2010 calls for a stricter focus on the social and welfare 
objectives of water supply, which is also advocated by the present work. Recent outbreaks of 
communicable diseases, like Ebola, in the Sub Saharan region should also make clear that water 
access is not a negotiable priority and that the implications of public goods externalities cannot be 
ignored.  
The enthusiasm for the Washington Consensus largely accounts for the genesis of the 
inversion of priorities observed in the ‘80s, as policies were oriented towards privatization and the 
reduction of public expenditure and there was the expectation that the resulting economic growth 
would have benefited also the poor. In developing countries this also corresponded to the structural 
adjustment which followed the debt crisis of the ‘80s. The Augmented Washington Consensus 
(AWC) accounts instead for the increased focus on the role of institutions, that more recently has 
resulted in corporatization and commercialization, and in NPM style policies (Rodrik 2006, 
Schouten 2009). These agendas however survived the recognition of some failures and after the end 
of the era of unconditional trust in neoliberalism. For example, to mention a criticism that, mutatis 
mutandis, can also apply to the water sector, a narrow focus on efficiency gains was recognized to 
be a poor substitute for a sound growth strategy (Rodrik 2006, World Bank 2005).  
It is worth spending some final words on the role played by the development community in 
this context in the African water sector. 
African countries often lack the human resources and the autonomy to invest in the 
development of their own original solutions, and therefore tend to accept technocratic solutions, 
brought in by donors and practitioners. These last actors in turn have a certain inertia and, as 
noticed by Rodrik (2006, p. 1) in the context of broader development recipes derived from the 
Washington Consensus, “life used to be relatively simple for the peddlers of policy advice in the 
tropics”. The development community adopted, recommended and translated into practice the 
tenets of the neoliberal ideology even beyond the implications of the Washington Consensus. In 
fact, the recipes of the Washington Consensus, regardless of their actual effectiveness, were 
intended to achieve economic growth, which clearly is not the main goal of water sector policy. A 
similar inconsistency is pointed out by Bayliss et al. (2011) who question the legitimacy of the 
priority attributed to Private Sector Development within water sector programs. Private Sector 
Development was officially endorsed by the World Bank (2002) as a cross cutting strategy, to be 
declined also in water sector programs. However, there is no theoretical support to the idea that 
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water services development should promote private businesses, regardless their nationality and 
dimension, nor empirical evidence that this can have an impact on the local economies. Moreover, it 
should not be forgotten that the Washington Consensus relaxes its austerity dogma in the case of 
public spending in strategic sectors, like water services. Williamson himself (1989) advocated the 
reorientation of public spending from subsidies toward broad-based provision of key pro-growth, 
pro-poor services like primary education, primary health care and infrastructure investment. 
Nevertheless, these exceptions to the basic rule remained largely unattended and neglected (Rodrik 
2006).  
The present work emphasizes the importance of social objectives of water supply 
interventions and the importance of the ownership of the reforms by local, possibly re-empowered, 
institutions. The work calls indeed for a serious reconsideration of the water sector policies and of 
the utilities reform agenda. While the focus on the water access objective should be more stringent, 
the tools box adopted should be more flexible and it should be broadened.  
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